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abstract
the PRIVATIZATION OF CITIZENSHIP:
RACE AND DEMOCRACY IN
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND BRAZIL
MAY 2000
AN 1 HONY PETER SPANAKOS, BA., PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
PhD., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Howard .1. Wiarda
I he spread ol democracy is one of the most important and impressive occurrences
in Latin American politics in the last two decades. I lowever, scholars may, and do.
question the degree to which democratization has truly occurred and been
institutionalized. I his dissertation examines the quality of citizenship for Afro-
Domimcans and Afro-Brazil ians, groups that have been traditionally considered
marginalized, with the belief that an analysis of the quality of citizenship for these
peoples will make visible the depth of democratization in these two countries.
I he dissertation examines the citizenship of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-
Brazilians by using two distinct models of citizenship: the first is a Liberal model which
focuses on individual rights and negative freedoms that are protected by a state; the
second is a Republican model which emphasizes positive rights, political activity and
community. Combining empirical research and observations, secondary sources and
statistics (when available), the dissertation finds that neither Liberal nor Republican
viii
versions of citizenship are adequately institutiona.ized for Af,
Brazilians.
ro-Dominicans and Af ro-
In an attempt to examine what sort of citizenship does exist for Afro-Don, inieans
and Afro-Brazthans. the dissertation finds that citizenship is
'privatized' and that this
privatization is deepened by pofitiea, culture and the adoption of neo-libera, economic
Plants. ^
- P-* on three fronts: first, power is ,arge,y extra-
institutional and, despite democratization, political agendas and decisions are often
orchestrated in private space; second, citizenship is considered an exclusive status,
•dated to one's socio-economic identity, rather than an inclusive and universal political
identity: third, services traditionally associated with the state have become cut as the state
es, and KGOs and organs of civil society are now taking the place of the state
on a micro-political level, in some areas.
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PART I
theoretical perspectives
Democratic government has shifted from the “exception” to the “rule” in Latin
America. In the last two decades every country in Latin America, with the single
exception of Cuba, has shifted to, and maintained, a system in which all government
officials are chosen through elections. Suffrage is universal, the media are much more
independent than they have ever been, and, in many countries, although not all, the
military has returned to the barracks and has not been an active participant in the political
arena. I he dominance of electoral government and competition for political positions
between elites and political party organizations represents a very important move towards
democracy. It also allows scholarly attention to move its focus the transition from
authoritarian government to the institutionalization of democratic citizenship.
Democracies are most clearly defined by their citizenship, not just
demographically and culturally, but in terms of how democratic is citizenship, what rights
and responsibilities are considered fundamental to citizenship, and how are these ensured.
An examination into citizenship allows one to see the everyday politics which are
juxtaposed to the “democratization” of political parties seen through electoral politics and
competition between political parties.
1 he first chapter of this book, “Citizenship, Race and Denw—dzation in the
Dominican Republic and Brazil, focuses on outlining theoretical terms and issues within
the context of the Dominican Republic and Brazil. I he chapter begins by outlining the
salient issues of what I consider a crisis of citizenship in Latin America, and then
examines two dominant concepts of citizenship, which I label “Liberal” and
'Republican ”' The fonner is fundamentally based in negative freedoms, individual
rights, and a limited and neutral state. The latter is a font, of citizenship based in positive
freedoms, active participation in political and communal activity, and a political
community which receives loyalty and other ’emotive' responses from its citizens. I will
then briefly place citizenship in the context of Latin America, and assert that neither
Libera! nor Republican citizenship pervade in the Dominican Republic and Brazil, and
that democratization has been concomitant with a “privatization” of citizenship, which
undermines both Liberal and Republican notions.
In order to examine the true depth and breadth of democracy in the two countries.
1 will look at two groups that are often considered marginal. Afro-Dominicans and Afro-
Brazilians. I will first distinguish Latin American patterns of race relations from US and
European concepts of race, and then I will examine the role and meaning of race and
racial identities in the Dominican Republic and Brazil.
It should be noted that these terms do not correspond to a particular political party, but to traditions
within political theory.
CHAPTER 1
mZENSHIP, RACE AND DEMOCRACY
IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
ANI) BRAZIL
This chapter sets ou, the theoretical framework and models which wi„ he used in
,hlS b00k
' 11 bC8inS With 3 brief 1examination of the importance of citizenship in Latin
America in this most recent period of democratization. This will be followed by two
sechons which wall outline the most relevant aspects of both Liberal and Republican
visions of citizenship, respectively. The notion of citizenship will then be examined
Within 'he“ 0f '=°n.empora^ Latin American democracies. The hierarchical
„a,u,
° f CitiZenShiP in lhC tW° C0untries comP^ ^ analysis of citizenship among a
traditionally marginalized group, such as Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. to
examine the depth of democratization. The last two sections will examine the meaning of
"race •' in Latin America. The first of these will distinguish a “Latin American” pattern
ot race relations, from the more “rigid” system of Anglo and Dutch-American countries.
1 he second section will focus specifically on how race is conceive'* =- *he two countries
under study by combining empirical observations, statistical data, and discursive analysis.
re
The Crisis of Citizenship in Latin America
Any recent observer of contemporary Latin American politics will notice constant
appeals to citizenship
"(ciudadanici, cidadania) and the rights of citizens (derechos de los
w yrk • H
eSSe
.
ntially contested concept." The meaning attached to race is hardly fixed, and as recentor m race theory has suggested, race is socially constructed, ,'hus, since race does 'not refer to a clear set
o categories or characteristics which hold true over different historical periods and in different cultural
contexts, it is important to ground studies of race in the society which has constructed the significance of the
1
CiudadanOS
’
direitos dos cidadaos). These terms are used in reference not only to the
traditional domain of explicit legal rights, but also to health care, penal codes, and even
environmental policy proposals. The often excessive use of citizenship as a political
referent and/or rallying point seems to suggest a recognition of the correlation between
the deepening (profundizacion/profundizacao) of the process of democratization and a
similar growth (amplificacion/amplificacdo) of citizenship.
I he fact that citizenship has become one of the key terms in political discourse
shows not only the awareness of the importance of citizenship, but the recognition that
Latin American democracies are enduring, in varying degrees, a crisis of citizenship
(Bacal, 1997: 283). Citizenship seems to be in crisis primarily because the development
of citizenship is lagging far behind, and often contradicts, successful democratic refonns
in other areas, namely electoral politics. Informal politics are incapable of matching up
with formal democratic guarantees and this constitutes a serious problem for nascent
democracies. Citizenship is also in crisis because popular disappointment with
democracy, if properly channeled, opens the possibility of transforming dominant patterns
ol relations and deepening democratization. However, as will be shown in chapters 4. 5
and 6, the possibility for using this moment to generate any long-lasting transformative
effects to benefit the majority of the population seems unlikely. Additionally, although
politicians invoke citizenship often, there is only limited evidence that they find
citizenship critical enough to push it to the top of the political agenda. Thus, the lack of
institutionalization of democratic citizenship constitutes a crisis whose severity has not
received enough attention due to other priorities during democratization, such as
concept
.
2
achieving economic growth, slowing (hyperinflation, a
to civilian rule.
nd insuring military subservience
2
While there are many Crises af00t cau*, can be analyzed from many
angles
,
this essay considers three related phenomena as being fundamental in the
creation of a crisis of citizenship.
‘
",
hiCh " lmiVerSall >' aPP'-Me to all
structures and network c
1*mited b
-
v the extra-institutional power
gove^much^ofTte'deciV
ln tbe b
?
rm °f cHentelism, caudillismo/coroneUsma
—which
Atnerica
’ makmg ami the aPP™Pria«ion of resources in Latin
S^ipnt^!^blT|iC re u ti0nShip betWeen democratic politics andizerisnip, which, when applied to the Latin American context is not defined in
status
S
Th
tCmiS bUt rather in exclusive domains of privilege and's, I e perception of all members of a political community as having eoual
s%amttlh!!sewh T*
"
'“‘f
^ ?“ multiple levds marginalization thatep rates those o have power from those who do not. This separation is rarelvrandom, and is often based on individual and group identifica.ion-soda culturaleconomic, religious or otherwise. ’ lI!turaU
appamfs
1
which
5
,V °",f^L" ofPolitical agents (citizens) with a central politicalp. ratu , n modernity has meant the State. Between the Great
Depression/World War 11 and the Debt Crisis of the early 1980s, Latin American
economies were heavily statist, promoting Import Substitution Industrialization
pi ograms winch increased the role of the State in incorporating popular sectors.mg the last two decades, neo-liberal economics have been hegemonic, and this
Ofthe many arguments to explain this crisis of citizenship in Latin America, I will mention only a few Itizenship tended lo be only imposed and effectively maintained during dictator™ and populist Limesand as a result citizenship was conceived within and authoritarian and limited context (Reis 1007)" Br.an
teXTLi e i$~ed " fr°m bd°W" ‘"™gh "public s a^
'
'cZ^
irpassive (Turner 00 0 Tt'P “ « limited, citizenship
elite nrp« f
'
’ The the history of citizenship in the West is associated with popular and. t pressures for expansion of political space. 1
9
th
and 20* century pressures to open political space wereLn uni e to specific elite groups, while power remained in private spaces (Brea, 1983). 3) Although the
,ncre?
°f C 'U™15
*.'pin th ;' West 15 seetl as a continuous and linear evolution of rights corresponding withasmjy p.uralistic and democratic governments (Marshall: 1963), the history of Latin America"
republics demonstrates recurrent problems with establishing a "democratic tradition" or culture, as
emocratic regimes were often short-lived, and coups, military rule and dictatorships impeded the
opportunity ot a slow and deep cultivation of a politics of citizenship (Wiarda: 1997). 4) The history' of
s avery and social exclusion was so intense in many areas of Latin America, that discussions of citizenship
served often as window-dressing for European visitors, intended to cover up profound historical differences
wmch the simple promulgation of laws could not address. 5) Many argue that there is a fundamental conflict
between democratic politics and capitalist economics, and that the cleavage between the horizontal claims
BAX'
0 t0rmer
’
and thC VertlCal ones the olher make democratization a problematic enterprise (Robinson:
ar
and in the area of-cial distribution,
THeSe Pr°blemS °nnS,itUtional^ing a democratic form of citizenship are practical
and explicitly political. However, i, shouid be noted that there is a, leas, one other crisis
in which citizenship is involved: an identity crisis. While a sympathetic portrait of
citizenship may be universal among political elites and mobilize,, i, is by no means clea
dial all Political actors, or theorists, are referring to the same thing when they invoke the
•erm "citizenship.” Although Shelter notes that "by its very nature as an essentially
contested concept, citizenship entails a discussion of, and a struggle over what its
meaning is..." (Shelter, 1993: 130’), there tend to be two principle visions of citizenship.
One identifies citizenship with the legal guarantees of individual rights, while the other
refers to political activity and participation within a bounded political community
(Stewart, 1995: 63).
While Benjamin Constant differentiated between the liberty of the moderns and
the ancients (Constant, 1 988), political theory has categorized these two visions of
citizenship as being heirs to the Liberal and Republican traditions respectively (Beiner.
1995; Mulhall and Swift, 1998; Taylor, 1989; Horton, 1994; Walzc., 1999; Avineri and
de-Sahlit, 1996). Liberal Citizenship emphasizes the importance of individual rights and
negative liberty, while Republicans understand citizenship in terms of community
membership, active participation in politics, and positive notions of freedom. Although
the literature on democratization has spent little time linking its theoretical models to
political theory, debates between procedural ists and substantivists invoke many of themes
Similarly, Van Gunsteren "citizenship is not an eternal essence but a cultural artifact. It is what people
make of it"’ (Van Gunsteren
,
1 998: 1
1
).
4
Which emerge from the Liberal
-Republican debate. Distinctions between procedural^,
who favor a minimal and parsimonious notion of democracy, and substantivists. who
prefer a maximalist understanding of democracy, are based in the Liberal a
traditions, which will be outlined in the next section.
nd Republican
T his chapter will be neither a literature review of the two traditions, nor an
attempt to delimit the factions within each tradition, nor even an analysis of the debate
produced by scholarly encounters between advocates and critics of one or both of the
above traditions. Instead. 1 will outline the most important elements of procedural*. and
substantivist claims which can he traced to Liberal and Republican conceptions of
citizenship. I will produce “ideal types” that will obviously obscure dissent within
schools and runs the risk of oversimplifying the positions presented. However, the
presentation of the traditions here is not intended as a means of critical analysis of the
theoretical value of Liberalism or Republicanism; rather, ideal types serve to evaluate the
quality of democracy and the relevance of democratic citizenship in the Dominican
Republic and Brazil.
Liberalism, Polyarchy and Rights
...the role of the people fin a democracy] is to produce a government4
.
The Liberal tradition is based on individual rights and tolerance. This has
typically been understood as the recognition of the autonomy of the individual and his or
her freedom to make choices and express preferences. The “self’ is seen to be prior to
the community, and therefore is autonomous in its decision-making. The rights of the
ind,vidua,, part,cu,arly his or her freedom
,o choose, is a fundamental concern of
govemmen,. Libera, government shou.d ensure the protection of tndividua, rights, bu, i,
ntust not tramp,e on the rights of a minority in order to protect those of a majority.
The most obvious distinction of the Liberal state, beyond its recognition of the
sanctity of the sovereignty of the individual, is that it is limited. The Liberal state is self-
constraining (Sched,er. Diamond and Planner.
, 999). Seif-cons,rain, on the par, of
government, a critical issue in Liberal democracies, depends on a fairly minimal state
which makes no major ethical claims nor purports to a singular not- of public good. A
neutral State suggests a minimalist vision of what politics is. As Robert Nozick writes
-the minimal state is the most extensive state that can be justified. Any state more
extensive violates people's rights” ( 1 996: 1 36). A similarly minimalist view is
expounded by Ronald Dworkin who considers political acts to be “legislation,
adjudication, enforcement and the other executive functions of government... nothing
more should be added” (Dworkin. 1996: 217). Politics is conceived of, like the State, as
a necessary evil that exists only to guarantee maximal individual freedom (Jaffe. 1997:
64), and government, like any form of politics, is conceived to be a form of coercion.
Paraphrasing John Rawls, Mulhall and Swift write “[political power... is coercive; so its
exercise must, if it is to be legitimate, respect the freedom and equality of citizens” (1998:
108).
Liberalism is perhaps the dominant paradigm in comparative politics, and even in
political science more generally, and, not surprisingly, comparative politics has heavily
emphasized the importance of “Liberal” criteria in its definition of democracy. Joseph
4
(Schumpeter, 1950: 269).
6
Schumpeter s notion of an elite centered and essentially formal democracy is perhaps the
ntos, common point of reference (, 950). He considers democracy to be simply the
-free
competition [among leaders] for a free vote ” nml th* i c • •J , and the role of citizens within such a system
IS essentially limited to voting for “leaders” (Schumpeter, 1950 : 271 ), He recognizes that
.his form ofdemocracy is far less participatory and utopian than others, but he believes
•ha. his is the most realistic and possible form ofdemocracy given the “plausibility of
assumptions” and the “tenability of propositions” (Schumpeter, 1950 : 269 ).
Schumpeter's minimalist form of democracy was revisited by Robert Dahl in his
1971 / olyarchy. in it, Dahl expands Schumpeter’s notion ofdemocracy to include the
(roc expression of citizen preferences Pnlvarrhv naMci es. i o y c y, Dahl argues, represents the minimal
requirements for a democratic government, 1. is n political and procedural model which.
hkc Schumpeter’s model, emphasizes parsimony. Dahl’s minimal requirements for
polyarchy are: 1) the freedom to form and join organizations; 2) the freedom of
expression; 3) the right to vote; 4) eligibility for public office; 5) the right of political
leaders to compete for support; 6) the availability of alternative sources of information; 7)
free and fair elections; and 8) institutions which compel the government to depend on
votes and other expression of preference (Dahl. 1971: 3).
Polyarchy has been and remains the dominant model employ^ in democratization
studies since the “Third Wave" of democratization began in 1974 in Southern Europe, as
institutional and minimal visions of democracy have been hegemonic. Scott Mainwaring
writes “Dahl’s polyarchy (1971) exemplifies a clear formulation, with reasonably
parsimonious yet not simplistic explanations. This is what we should strive for"
(Mamwaring, 1992: 329). Similarly, in his presidential address to the American Political
7
Science Association, Lucian Pye said “in searching for the ntos, prontising variables for
expiaining dynamic change we probably could do no better than to star, with Robert
Dahl s theory of polyarchy” (Pye 1990-141 ri, „ i ,y tr , iyzu. 5). The appeal of polyarchy is that it offers
scholars a parsimonious model which lends itself to mass comparative analyses, allowing
•or discussions of democratization across region and time which might no, have been
possible otherwise (see Coppedge and Reinicke, 1991; Przeworski etal, 1996),
Those w ho tend to use polyarchy as their standard definition of democracy accept
that polyarchy is a minimal model, but one that is nevertheless possible and
operationalizable, unlike more substantive definitions. Additional, these scholars
emphasize the importance of procedures (proceduralists) and institutions
(institutionalists) in democratization. Polyarchy represents a “procedural minimum” in
tbat i, “presumes fully contested elections with full suffrage and the absence of massive
fraud, combined with effective guarantees of civil liberties, including freedom of speech,
assembly, and association” (Collier and Levitsky, 1 997: 434). Polyarchy also emphasizes
the tole that institutions play in terms of ordering citizen preferences and providing
government accountability. John Peeler, for example, has argued that institutions,
particularly political parties, are “essential” to the successful consolidation of democracy
(Peeler, 1998: 165). In his analysis of democracy in India, Ashutosh Varshney notes that
despite its lack o! an industrial revolution, the wide income disparities, and the low
general levels of literacy, democracy has endured in India. He attributes this to the
leaders of India during its independence, because they reinforced democratic institutions,
and to two specific institutions, the catch-all Congress Party, and the structure of the
federal system India (Varshney, 1998).
The most important democratic procedure for Libera, scholars. Ure one in which
Polhica, panics are most re.evan,, is ,ha, of dec,ions. This has remained ihe paramoun,
iocus of sehoiars who employ a minima, is, notion of democracy, a testamen, ,o
polyarchy's Schumpeterian heritage. Elections are the easiest means of monitoring
cmzens preferences, and fair and free elections can easily be distinguished from the
elections that occurred during dictatorships and other authoritarian regimes.
These scholars recognize that polyarchy is minimal, bu, they believe i, provides
broad enough guarantee of rights and freedoms so as to provide an environment in which
democracy can grow. Trying to do more than this could jeopardize the stability of the
transition to democratic government, as Huntington makes clear in his discussion of how
to handle pas, human rights violations ("do not prosecute do no, punish, do no, forgive,
and, above all, do not forget"- 1 99 1 : 223). Nevertheless, when polyarchy seems to be
securely in place, scholars feel comfortable making the judgement that democracy has
been consolidated in a given country
. Although some scholars, such as Diamond, Hartlyn
and Linz (1999) argue that democracy is consolidated when all relevant political actors
har e accepted democracy as "the only game in town,” most proceduralists would agree
with the more parsimonious definition of consolidation proposed recently by Andreas
Schedler which argues that “[t]he term ‘democratic consolidation' should refer to
expectations of regime continuity—and to nothing else’ (Schedler. 1998: 103).
Citizenship within a fairly minimalist democracy that is essentially procedural and
institutional is conceived in terms of individual rights, particularly political rights.
Although all political and civil rights are important within the Liberal tradition, it is their
violation, not their exercise, which concerns scholars. For example, a citizen need not
9
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expression of preferences privileges voting above many other rights, particularly in ternts
ol defining citizenship. In , 989, Robert Dahl’s writes "the rights of citizenship include
^ °PP°rtUnity ^ ^ the highest officials in the government”
(Dahl, 1989: 220) which seem* tn c is to echo Schumpeter s minimalist definition nearly four
decades earlier in which he wrote
“democracy means only tha, the people have the
opportunity ol refusing the men who are to rule them” (Schumpeter, 1950: 284-5).
Republicanism, Substantivists, and Participation
4he nation of citizens does not derive its identity front some common
ethn.c and cultural propeities, but rather from the praxis of citizens
who actively exercise their civil rights 5
.
The Republican tradition is one that is characterized by the importance of self-
government and civic virtue (Sandel, 1999: 11). The republic is constituted of agents
who. through their active participation, construct government and society. The freedom
of citizens in Republican theory is an especially positive notion of freedom, and it rests
on the individual's independence. This independence differs from Liberal autonomy
quite significantly. As opposed to the Liberal agent whose decision-making process is
autonomous and isolated from other people, groups and commitments, based on his or her
existence and value prior to society, the Republican agent cannot be understood outside
of society. He oi she is born into a world where relations, expectations and cultural
norms already lay claim to him or her long before any conscious expressions of
preferences can be made (MacIntyre, 1981; Avineri and de-Shalit, 1996:3; Horton and
10
Mendus, ,994: 7-10; Sande,, ,996:
, 2 ). Nicholas Onufwri.es
“[h; an association
comes firs..
.he absence of association (republic, society), there is no agency and there
can be no agents” (Onuf, 1 998: 5). Republican agents also recognize a certain civic
responsibility and virtue that denies the citizen the possibility of the voluntaty withdrawal
from civic life possible within the Liberal paradigm 6
.
1 he republican agent is independent in that a citizen
they are not “dependent.” This idea stems out of Aristotle's
can only be truly free when
denial of citizenship for
slaves, women and laborers, because they lived in the world of necessity, they could be
swayed by dependent relations (particularly economic ones), and therefore were no, truly
free ( Aristotle, 1972,Arendt, 1994: 12 ). Republican thought has long posed the
importance of land ownership because i, ensures the long-term interests of the citizen in a
community, and because it gives the citizen a certain amount of economic independence
believed to be necessary for participation in public life. J.G.A. Pocock writes that
"political and economic autonomy" is "a prerequisite against corruption" in Machiavelli's
notion of virtu (Pocock. 1971: 212). Recently, Phillip Petit has conceptualized freedom
within the Republican tradition to be “freedom from domination” (Petit, 1997: 4). He
writes:
[to be un-free involves] having to live at the mercy of another, having to
live in a manner that leaves you vulnerable to some ill that the other is in a
position arbitrarily to impose; and this, in particular, when eacn of you is
in a position to see that you are dominated by the other... It is the
grievance expressed by the wife who finds herself in a position where her
husband can beat her at will, and without any possibility of redress; by the
employee who dare not raise a complaint against an employer, and who is
(Habermas, 1995:258)
These arguments are suggested by many thinkers such as Machiavelli, Tocqueville Rousseau and Arendt.
vulnerable to any of a range of abuses, some petty, some serious that theemployer may choose to perpetuate..
.(Petit. 1907; 5)
™
Obviously, this is a much more robust understanding of freedom than that posed by
l iberals in that it tries to remove social and economic power differences that limit liberty.
Republican government is far less concerned about the protection of individual
and minority rights than it is about citizens asserting their civic duty and participating in
the construction of the republic itself. Citizens are responsible for not only the creation
and maintenance of their own government, but for its daily and most banal duties.
C itizens are charged with the responsibility of publicly engaging one and other
common notion of a public good. While Liberals fear a unitary vision of -the good”
would lead to the repression of those who subscribed to alternate v^', Republicans
argue that a State which recognizes no public good cannot command the loyalty of its
citizens, nor can it sustain their participation in its affairs (Sandel, 1996: 6). Social
institutions can and must elicit "emotive'’ responses by citizens because that is the only
wa> to maintain civic action and consistent participation in public affairs (Pinsky. 1996;
Taylor, 1996: 49; Miller, 1996; ignatieff, 1995: 5).
The Republican citizen must construct the public sphere, and in doing so, he or
she defines the public good (Taylor, 1 989: 169; Arendt, 1994). This follows Aristotle’s
definition ol a democratic citizen as "a man who shares in the administration ofjustice
and in the holding ot office (Aristotle. 1972: 93), which has been translated into modem
political language as to rule and be ruled (Ignatieff. 1995: 56). Aristotle considered
He lists other examples, which for the sake of space, 1 have omitted.
Barber writes that Liberalism has challenged religious and traditional authority with the consequence of
weakening the bonds that “sustain and integrate" (Barber, 1989: 55).
800d POli,iCa
' aC"0n 10 * *he^ fo™ 0fM0ra, action. WHUe certain acts were
P-, of the highest ntora, caiibe, Aristotie believed that, regard,ess o, goa.s or resuhs
participation in politics in itself was something
“good.” This notion of poiitics is in s,,k
contras, to the modern Libera, distrust of poiitics, and hence, the limitation of the
boundaries of the political. Politics is no, a 'necessa,y evil’ but a ‘moral obligation.- as
well as an ontological imperative-since the human being is a “political animal" {soon
romon). Participation is fundamental, as evidenced by Benjamin Barber's concept of
"Strong Democracy" which “requires unmediated self-government by an engaged
citizenry. I, requires institutions that will involve citizens a, both the neighborhood and
the national level in common talk, common decision-making and political judgment, and
common action (Barber, 1984: 261
)
Although the Republican tradition has been far less influential in comparative
polmcs than has been the Liberal one, there are those who subscribe to Republican
notions of democracy and citizenship. Such scholars oppose minimal versions of
democracy, arguing that democracy must entail more than simple procedural and
institutional frameworks. They argue that such procedures and institutions may be
undermined, if not completely invalidated, by the presence of clientelism, sharp gaps in
socio economic disparities, cultural norms which devalue particular groups, etc. They
argue that democracy must make more broad and more deep claims. In a 1 993 essay
Guillermo O Donnell argues that a democratic regime—a system of procedures—must
be distinguished from a democratic state—a bureaucratic, legal and ideological
institution
. A regime may be democratic in that an elected government is in power, but
O Donnell writes “[i]t is a mistake to conflate the state with the state apparatus, the public sector, or the
the lormaI political democracy of that rceime will i ji g. c will be undermined if the State is not also
democratic.
Many scholars who study democratization find polyarchy to he highly
disappointing because many Third Wave democracies meet the minima, requirements se,
0Ut hy POlyarChy
’
ye ‘ SCh0brS
- “bou. labeling then, as democratic. Richard
JOSCPh HaS CharaC ‘eriZed SeVera
' regimeS in Al'™a «* “Virtual Democracies” because they
maintain a democratic fagade to legitimize governments which are often quite
authoritarian and violent (Joseph, 1 998). Terry Lynn Karl has repeatedly warned scholars
about the
-fallacy of elec.oralism” which is “the faith that the mere holding of elections
will channel political action into peaceful contests among elites, the winners of which are
accorded public legitimacy” (Karl, 1995: 73). As opposed to procedural ists and
institutionalists, these scholars (substantives) insist that democracy must make
substantive claims which go beyond simply holding elections. Robert Fatton summarizes
this position in a recent article on democratization in Haiti. He writes:
A substantive conception ofdemocracy entails a participatory structure ofgovernance where rulers are fully accountable to citizens and where the
economic sphere comes under popular control. It must include more than
C electoral mechanisms guaranteeing the possibility of regime alteration
anc the institutional check safe-guarding individual rights from the
overpowering reach of the state. It must emphasize civil society and the
market to the same norms of democratic accountability (Fatton 1 999-
213 ).
public bureaucracies. These are unquestionably part of the state, but are not all of it. The
V "? 7 P/imari iy ’ 3 Set 0f Social relations that establishes a cem»u order, and ultimatelyc k S t With a centialized coercive guarantee, over a given territory. Many of those relations are
formalized in a legal system issued and backed by the state. The legal system is a constitutive dimension of
the state and of the order that it establishes and guarantees over a given territory. That order is not an equal
socially impartial order; both under capitalism and bureaucratic socialism it backs, and helps to reproduce,
systematically asymmetric power relationships” (O’Donnell, 1999: 135).
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arrangements. It is fundamentally an idea about soei n m °r °lher insl 'tutionaldenotes a society where power is in the hands of* ?S,nbution «fpower and
Substantivists point beyond elections and
|
^0).
elections take place and procedures are institutional, to
Podbcal practices such as Cientelism. and cultural norms which attach status to members
of certain groups over others, as leading to hierarchical societies which undermine
democracy. Schoiars as diverse as Howard Wiarda (.997) and Sonia Alvarez, Hvehna
Dagn.no and A.turo Escobar (1 998) have argued that cultural politics in Latin America
P'a> a veo' critical role in limiting and/or impeding democratization. Robert Fatten
(,"9) 3nd Wi " iam R0bin*>n (1996) have argued that the current wave of
democratization has been vety limited because of i* juxtaposition to neo-hbera,
economic programs that have worsened income disparities between citizens and will
ultimately erode democracy
J *
Substantivists recognize that liberalization and. perhaps even, limited
democratization has occurred in many countries of the world in the last two decades. Bu,
democratization should be understood as an interminable process which no government
has completed, and to which all should strive. This understanding of the chronological
aspect of democratization differs quite markedly from Schedler’s idea of consolidation as
regime continuity. Substantivists argue instead for
-deepening’' democracy by expanding
institutional accountability, increasing participation, emphasizing the role of civil society,
lev eling inequalities in economic distribution, shifting cultural nonns which denigrate
members ol certain groups (von Mettenheim and Malloy, 1998; Cha.mers et al, 1997).
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Repub, ican citizenship reflects the maxima, claims that substantiate make of
democracy. As O'Donnell writes Citizenship floes no, stay within the (namowly fleflnefl
- m most contemporary literature) confines of the political” (O’Donnell, ,990:
,36).
instead citizenship extends into political activity, community bui,fli„g and equality of
relations within and across societies. Republican citizenship can often be seen in the
politica, and civic activity of individuals and communities in civi, society, where
individuals and groups attempt to articulate political programs, to build community, and
,o increase government efficacy. Such citizenship is especially import for the more
'marginal' populations who are barred politica, access and full exercise of citizenship
due to low economic status and cultural prejudice.
I he Nether-Lands: Citizenship in Latin America
' '
^ofltfie^rut.r^'Ir
865 democracies in the area
,i
Political cultu e. This encompasses not only beliefs and preferencesgathered in public opinion surveys, but also symbolic representations and collectiveimaginations
-in other words, those bits of ’evidence’ people do not tm&e^xplicit
DC C3.ll.SO tnov ^ n e *?10 ^because they consider them ‘normal' and 'natural
Just as Aristotle's citizen of onepolis may not be a citizen of another, the
Republican argument recognizes that what is construed within one political community as
the set of rights and responsibilities understood as citizenship may not apply in another.
Similarly, in "Justice as Fairness,” John Rawls notes his political Liberalism is “securely
founded in public political and social attitudes... [that sustain] the good of all persons and
associations within a just democratic regime” (Rawls, 1996: 194)". Can democracies
lu
(Lechner, 1997: 170)
1 ]
'
Similarly, Joseph Carens writes “Liberalism, it might be said, emerged with the modern state and
16
and democratic citizens be crafted outside the communities in which they have^
Man> who study Latin America would no, answer vety positively '3 Thjs
n°‘ mea" ,ha
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, oniy tha, attempts to
impose a democratic po.iticai institutionai structure over cuitures with stro„s
autlioritarian tendencies is iiheiy to produce hybrids and mutations' 4 (O'Donnei,
, 99,
Wiarda
;
l997)
' ,n 0thCT^**
-^- institutional born, of democracy may
m practice be quite different from the expectations set out by the polyarchic model
The n0 'i0n °f Ci ‘iZenShip iS
^ considered to be essentially modern
Ang|o-American and European (Turner. 1 993: vii, This citizenship, based on the
experiences ob England. Trance and the United States of America, is considered to be
developed as pad of a modem project and as a point of interstice between the nation and
the State. Nation, stale and citizenship are all concepts whose official histories are
associated with
-Western” discourse. Bryan Turner, and others, h-» Piqued the
egalisn, of traditional concepts of citizenship, associated with T.H. Marshall (1 963 ) as
ethnocentric, and they argue that while i, may be applicable to the histoiy of English
citizenship, i, may no. remain as relevant in other countries. Barry Hindes asserts that
Marshall's notion of citizenship is not even accurate within the context of Great Britain
(Hindes, 1 993 ). Whether it is essentially, or exclusively, a European and Anglo-
presupposes it” (1995: 244).
' See Giuseppe di Palma (1991).
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is
' ' S ’ S "0t t0 say that “democracy”—in a pure and essential sense-exists anywhere
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° s a" d ,ntora,al Practlces . O'Donnell has written of "oe,waive democracy"(1994). Caldeira and Hols,on (l99S)have wrinen of"Disjunctive Democracy". Other rems include
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American concept, however, is an important distinction. Citizenship is considered an hei,
0f "K Ma8na Cana
' 'he Age °f Re™luti0
-’ -gicide, the Declaration of the Rights of
Man, and the US Declaration of Independence, Constitution and BN, of Rights. Each are
nts "'thin a narrative in which authority faced increasing limitations on its
arbitrariness, and in which the political Cass continuously expanded unti, i, reached, in
theory, all aduhs horn and naturalized in a specific state. While the citizen (ci,oyen) was
a bearer of privilege based on status in pre-Revo, utionaiy France, the modem Western
citizen is conceived to be a form of political and legal equality based on contract (Turner.
1993: 5; Parsons: 1 97 1 )
16
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The construction of citizenship in Latin America, in general, and in the
Dominican Republic and Brazil, in particular, hardly followed the patterns of England or
the United States, although there were numerous attempts to construe, citizenship based
on the US model in the 1 9'" and 20'" centuries. It should be noted tha, the majority of the
attempts to open political space were led by elites who hardly expanded universal legal
rights, and that government-led efforts to expand the citizen base were often populist
measures used to increase the control exercised by the federal government over those veiy
popular sectors. Additionally, the recurrent presence of coups and dictatorships, military
or otherwise, often wore away many earlier attempts at constructing citizenship 17
.
Citizenship, even when it expanded, however, remained fairly restrictive.
However, in the past two centuries "who" is included within the citizenry has been
quite significantly transformed, and so have the rights that have been extended. In the
“Democraduras",
“Dictablandas” (see Collier and Levitsky 1997 )
and
0
RousIei
llable readi "8S ^ ° f^ ‘“"Actualization’ of political society can be found in Locke
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qmrements for voting. Recent constitutions outline the rights of citizenship in universal
language and many barriers that previously excluded different individuals and groups
I- public spaces have been formally removed. However, a gap exists between the
theoretical and discursive articulation of these rights and their actual protection for
members of traditionally excluded groups, such as Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians,
who are disproportionately represented among the victims of police violence.
I’aulo Sergio Pinhe.ro writes that ‘'Brazil, like other Latin American countries,
society based on exciusion-a democracy without citizenship” (Pinheiro, 1996: 18).
After historical and empirical research on (the possibility of) democratic citizenship for
Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, I am convinced that neither the Liberal nor the
Republican citizenship is effectively institutionalized'* There is neither the profound
sense of community that compels citizens to participate in the life „f ,he polls nor is there
an effective commitment on the part of government to protect the rights of all of its
citizens. In fact, as will be argued in chapter 6. it seems that Afro-Dominicans and Afro-
Brazilians suffer from profound political anomie. While this may resemble libertarian
views of citizenship there are two critical differences. First, libertarian disengagement
from politics is voluntary. Libertarians choose not to involve themselves in politics, as
opposed to the situation for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians who are alienated from
politics. Phis alienation is due to: discourses which negate their political agency and self-
See chapters 2 and 3 for a more deep analysis.
See chapters 4 and 5 for examinations of Liberal and Republican notions of citizenship in the
countries.
two
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chen.eles. Second, libertarian citizenshtp in the United States, for example, is
protected by guarantees of individual rights. Libertaria:
political activity without fear that their
ians can thus disengage from
personal rights or property will be encroached
upon. Such a luxuty does no, exist for Afro-Don, inicans and Afro-Brazilians where
either the State cannot, or will not, make
individual riuhts.
any guarantees to ensure their most basic
tizen. neither a community member nor an
1 he result leads to a sort of “nether” ci
individual, neither one bom into a virtuous community nor someone who assocta.es
based on free choice, self-ref,ecuon and free affectivities. I refer to this situation as the
Pitvatizatiou of C.ttzenship,”"' a phenomenon which would probably be accepted by
neither Liberals nor Republicans. There is even the question as to whether this should
even be considered a form of citizenship. I, is worth briefly explaining what is mean, by
this tern,, and. for tha, matter, why I use the w ord “privatization.” The “privatization of
citizenship” refers to three particular privatizations20
.
-zen.,h.p becomes private because the public and political—regardless of
whether one uses the Liberal or Republicans definition of these terms-are perceived to
20
See chapter 6 for more on this theme.
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' C Pnvatizatl0n generates a privatization of behavior. New wavs of life based ond i vidua list strategies emerge. They are rational and creative in adapting to competitive relationships Butey do not assume collective commitments. On the contrary
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d C0MimK ^iia sola,iorSf thanllectiv a tion. This has been exacerbated during the current era of neo-liberal hegemony.
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.he distant realms of a foreign and isolated group Power • .p - 1 0H 1S Pnvate and so the
obsenanon and vigilance, to speak nothing of participation. Citizenship is a,so
-private'
ln SenSe tha
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- governments have a„ been, to some
extent, privatized in the last decade or two ^ • ,
, „ ,
' SerV ‘CeS tha have traditionally been provided
to the lower classes by the federa. government have been decentrau n^cu to either local
governments and/or Non-Governmental n • •ernment Organ,zat.ons. While this has allowed for some
“m’"“
"«*«
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their activities with larger entities (Walzer, 1999: 63-4).
btnally, citizenship is ‘privatized* in tha, the distinction of being a citizen, of
membership in a community of rights hearing individuals is one based on private
resources, no, on birth or naturalization. Roberto da Mat,a has written that Latin
America there are no citizens, only sub-citizens and super-citizens (1991). There is little
notion of rights bearing being applicable to a universal category
,
si„ce ,he idea of rights,
and citizenship in general, is linked to the idea of status. Unlike the contractarian notion
Of
-bearers of equal status' suggested by Parsons, the status implied by Latin American
citizenship has tended to be a means of exclusion, rather than inclusion. Thus, those who
bear marks of social status might be considered super-citizens, while the majority of poor,
semi-literate people could vety well be classified sub-citizens. Rights are reasonably
guaranteed, if no, overstated, for the wealthy and are often ignored or violated for the
poor. As a result, the poor, marginalized, Afro-Dominican and Afro-Brazilian
populations seek “status,” to the extern that i, may he available, through individual
21
negotiations of their identity, such as through
‘whitening.”
conspicuous consumption and through
Visions »f Race 21 : Latin America and Miscegenation
a* refmin
This examination of
-race" in Latin America begins with the caveat that i, is
entirely misleading to assume that “race” has one particular meaning cutting across all
societies and historical epochs. Recognizing this, the analysis of race contained in this
essay will focus on how i, is conceived in Latin America, and particularly in the
Dominican Republic and Brazil. The amount of literature on race based on how race has
been conceptualized within the social imaginary of Anglo-American or northern
Turopean contexts is rich and abundant. Bu, race is imagined in these contexts within a
framework where racial identities are clearly defined, and prejudice against demographic
minorities is based on exclusion on ihe basis of color. The racial situations in the
Dominican Republic and Brazil are undoubtedly different, even if Afro-Dominicans and
Afro Brazilians suffer similar conditions of relative impoverishment, and limited
educational and occupational opportunities. However, it seems impossible to discuss race
m Latin America without the constant implicit, if not explicit, reference to the system of
race relations which pervades in Anglo-American and northern European countries, and
most obviously the US.
The concepts of race considered will be of Whites, Mulattos, and Blacks. The racial conditions of
"TastorMs' i 988-3417”"“
"* lwo coumri“ wil1 be examined i" this book.
Anthony Marx, in a comparison of race in the United States of America, South
Afrtca and Brazil, makes an interesting note of differences between German and French
notions of citizenship and the racial classification systems of the US and South Africa
and Brazil, respectively (Mar, >998: I6)
. Following the traditiona, distinction between
German citizenship as being biological, racial, and exclusive {Mcifl) with the
French ethnic, cultural and inclusive citizenship
^nteinschaft) (Brubaker.
,992) Marx
argues that while in Anglo and Dutch colonies, integration of blacks within the nation
was no, possible due to ‘-white nationalism” (,998: 2). Latin American race relations are
closer ,0 the French model. These distinctions are heuristic and should no, be extended
•o the extreme, which is that Anglo and Dutch colonies were rigidly racist, and that Latin
American colonies were utopian anti accepting. The distinction, however, should neither
be ignored.
The differences between cultural and racial notions of identity recall those
betw een Iberian and Western European patterns of race relations identified by Hany
Hoetink m his 1967 work Race Relations in the Caribbean: Two Variants. In it, Hoetink
argues that Iberian colonies developed milder forms of race relation,
-ban their European
counterparts (Hoetink. 1970: 115-6). Race relations are rendered more mild because
Iberian colonies demonstrated high levels of miscegenation, defined “w hite” as somewhat
browner than the Anglo and Dutch colonies, and because light-skinned mulattos could
identify as white, with little resistance from society. Hoetink writes:
the ‘somatic distance' between white and colored is smaller in [Iberian
colonies than in Western ones]... since a pail of those who ‘biologically’
are colored fall within the margin of the prevailing white somatic norm
image. Thus, a continuous absorption by marriage of coloreds into the
or
economically, a^tebnofetttlr^ri^™tiCally’ and also
Thus does not mean that mulattos were accepted by white elites without reservations
•ha, Africans in Iberian colonies were treated better than the Africans living in En,ish
and Dutch settlements in the Americas. However, their situation was different.
Discourses of race in the Dominican Republic and Brazil are hardly Manichean
stnce racial difference is no, an issue ofdemographic minority status.W
and pardos, when taken together, in the Dominican Republic constitute an overwhelming
majority of the population, and„ and pret0s, when considered together. i„ Brazil
constitute a near maturity. This allows for significant flexibility in terms of individual
negotiation of racial identity, although, race is no, completely flexible, since “blackness”
is regarded as something less privileged than “whtteness,” even though i, is a relative
category. Thus, although mobility is possible, in critical areas, such as the economy and
juridical rights, it is very limited for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.
Recognizing the uniqueness of racial significations in the two countries, this essay
will try to examine what is recognized as racial identity within each country, and how
members of a marginalized
-racial’ community act. interact and react conditions tha,
are otlen adverse to their exercise of citizenship. While there are significant differences
within the discourses of “blackness” and Afro identity in the Dominican Republic and
Brazil, there are considerable similarities in terms of ascription as well as ontology.
Blackness, ” m both countries, is part of a discourse which privileges: whiteness, ethnic
24
As Anglo-American perceptions of race tend to be.
The term "Indio" is a Dominican term which refers
refer to people of native ancestry.
to light-skinned Dominicans. It is not used, here, to
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y negative meaning because of its association with Haiti. The actual
association ofWwith . culturally and physical different group
. even it,„ese
differences are not always anmrpni d i
• PP nt, allows racist meanings for negrUud to become more
uniform and concrete.
As ear,y as the 1930s, anthropological studies of race in Latin America, often in
BraZil
’
ind 'Cated there ** ' diff— between race relations in Latin America
and Anglo-America (Freyre, I9T4; Tanenbaum:
,946,. Prior to this there was iittie
systematic study of race, outside of slave., in Latin America. There were some late 1 9«'
centu. musings on race in literature and philosophy, which were certain,y influential
bower er there were few attempts to address the political, social and economic issues
surrounding race. Prior to this, the idea of race was often subsumed into studies of
slave., despite the fact that many blacks and mulattos and slaves were born free and/or
25
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particularly Catholicism, is considered a European religion, probably due its colonial
con'sSbiCatfiha,K'&SjT (™« S° B™*«> are no, official languages they are
Brazilian, fluency in’KS he » 1“f 5^ m ",e CaSe ° f an Afro-Don, inican or Afro-
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Ljvio Sansone characterizes the structure of ‘Latin American’ racial relations
quite accurately, writing:
degree of be characterized by a high
religion and popular culture^m^T
tradltl0n ln the c°untryside of
somatic norm that has historicallv^lcat^
° f C°l0r and a he8emonic
phenotypes on a scale mnr • r
" 0Cated negro and indian
appearance’.
.
. this type
™der tlle no,ion of 'good
manipulate ethnic idemi, ?
S haS °f,ered spa“ «o
mobilization. (Sansone in Hasrabalg" 1 996b
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What ,s clear front this is that miscegenation has allowed individuals
.0 be able
.0
negotiate their racial identity while group identic,ion has been qui,e inflexible Ihus
Wh"e ‘he indiVidUal Afr°-D0—1 « could becoine educated, hold a
prestigious job, speak French or English, and therefore shed the tag in most
mired in social prejudices.
The incidence of miscegenation has been noted by many scholars as being critical
to the construction ot a much more fluid form of racial identity than that which took root
111 ‘he Bm ‘Sh and DU ‘Ch P0ssessi0ns m the New World (Freyre, 1934: Hoetink. 1970)
Marvin Harris, for example writes "the most important aspect of interracial re,ations...in
Tatin America from the abolition ofslave* is the absence of neatly defined racial
groups" (Harris, 1967: 86). Gilberto Freyre. as well as many other authors and
commentators on Latin America, noted the mixture of races which seemed to indicate an
absence of racial consciousness and prejudice (1934; also see Tannenbaum, 1946). While
26
racial mixture certainly did not mean an eauali.v f
—
a
Race in the Dominican Republic and Brazil
and who felt too proud of the sociaTsuperiOTh!^v-f
1,
f
vo!utionar
>' Propaganda...
•
_lo follow the examples of the Haitians- finally'yt OfiO
C°™terparts in the French Zone
-selves white and, in the absence of any injurious ^themselves such.27 nded by cons,denng
Perhaps nowhere else >’«
diverse or, even, antagonistic traVifi“c^inn
^irTl’h T*
harmonious «*» of
Meanwhile the vacuum between the two evt-n *
° lberal a waY as it is in Brazil,
t e Brazilian regime cannot be accused of rigidhV" U j
enorm°us
- bu > - any event,
flexible, and plastic regimes to be’Lnd
dem°Cra,ic
-
Nationaiity is generaiiy considered to be something that is iargeiy
-imagined' and
18 Pr°Pa§a,ed ,hr°Ugh* hi— «*"»*» an immutable essence (Anderson
199,; Hobsbawm,
.992, Some schoiars argue that no, oniy was nationahty imagined
hut there was a deiiberate program through which the idea of a nation, and beionging to
" were constructed and imposed onto a people (Hobsbawm,
,982; Marx ,998-
Wos, , 999b). The idea that racism does not exist in Latin America, and particuiariv
the Dominican Republic and Brazii, is often considered to be a result ofhegemonic Cite
strategies which attempted to define the nation as essentiaiiy mestizo/mu,atto (Hanehard
27
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C
e“o- H^
S Ae HaMa" Re™ ,Uti0" 0fG
- d’Alaux, the French Conncu, in Haiti in
(Freyre, 1946: 77-8)
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1994; Safa, 1998). Such ideas of nationality, like that suggested by the work ofFreyre
,hc re,ative marginai
—— a„d A,,Bra2ilians to be ;
reSU" °f,he he"ila8e " Sla
-'“—
•
poverty, lower levels of literacy and
more l.mtted opportunities, rather than clear and racial discrimination.
ThC
,hat raCe iS SUbSllmed 10 «* W- America (Marx,
, 998:
, 5) „ clear
“,e COmm°n deC 'ara,i0nS °f DOminic»S Brazilians tha, there is an absence of
raCla
' tenSi°nS and idemities “ "*
-—" In the Dominican Republic the
definition ofOominicanidad (Dominicans) has been constructed in terms of ethnic
and religious elements, and has been contrasted to Haitianiclad (I „,,nness) 0„^
and ethnic grounds. In Brazil, a more complicated doctrine was articulated which stated
‘lim raCial tenSi<>nS
"0t eXiS' ” Brazi1
’
and as •
-suit Brazil represented something of
a •'racial democracy. In both cases, defenders of the position tha, racism does no, exist
n the two countries argue tha. extensive miscegenation makes it impossible for anyone to
be a racist since every Dominican and Brazilian has a Afro relative, in-law, spouse, or
friend.
Criticism of the marginalization of Haitians in the Dominican has recently
allowed the subject of a Dominican form of ra
focus only on Haitians and Haitian Dorn
tacism to surface. Yet studies of race tend
inicans, due to the lack of previous studies of
to
race and the belief that racism refers to Haitians, and not Dominicans. Criticism of the
idea of "racial democracy” in Brazil has a much longer history. Among the more
valuable contributions, Carlos Hasenbalg argues that “the social perception of race
thanherefS, 1 Cspecia "- edrated and ‘’l^o/bramo, and particularly in Brazil, acknowledge
r, a T,
the,r S0Clety
- However
'
racial tensions are not perceived nor are racial idendtiesclcai and immutable. I his will be examined in greater depth in chapter 4 and 5.
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aCCOrdi"8 '° 3 C°minUUm ° f Sl^— HasW ,o a fragmentation
'dent,tleS (HaSenba
'g: ‘"6a: ‘ 65)
- ^He fragmentation of identities has limited
opportunities for political activity and solidarity an,ong Afio-Brazilians, thereby
weakening their political agency and abihty to ntobiiize (Hanchard,
, 994) While
research on race in the Dontinican Repub.ic remains nascent, and is prinrari,
impressionistic and discursive, there exists in Brazil ample research, including verv
complete behavioral research, which attempts to prove that racial democracy is a myth
(Hasenbalg. 1979, l lasenbalg and Silva. 1992; Fernandes, 1969). It should be noted that
«he idea that racial tensions do no, exist in either of the two countries is something that
has been accepted by a great majority of the population of the Dominican Republic and
Brazil, especially Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. and the effect of academic
challenges to such discourse has been very limited in temts of “conscientizing” the
masses (Spanakos, ] 999a).
Who are the Afro-Brazilians and Afro-Dominicans in such a mestizo population?
In attempting to address this question it is important to remember that identification
reflects both individual and societal perception. One may identify oneself as bein, “X ”
and yet one may be identified by society as “Y.” Thus, a person may identify as nudaia.
but may be seen by society as being negro, or vice-versa. However, the complexity of
racal relations in the two countries cannot be collapsed into so sir.;; ' - a scheme, because
m a room of negros/pretos one may consider oneself morena (brown), while the
negros/pre,os may consider the same person indie or bronco, and the same person in a
room of blancos/brancos may be considered morena or negro/pre,a. Because the
discourse ol negritude is so linked to a specific discourse of political, social and
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~ ^iori, wi,hi „ a society which dlstingu|shes^ ^
S,aU ‘S
'“• e,C
’
lhe
**. racial identity ofan
Dominicans and Euro-Brazilians.
A dark-skinned educated ma„ may vcry weI1 be recogni2ed by^^
Brazilian society as hlanco/brmco
, ^^ ^ ^
canahie of showing the signs-educatio, wealth, job. etc-,ha, prove his,,a,a. The
Sa,,1C "ld,V,dUal When drCSSed Si"lply
*" a poor neighborhood tnay vet, we
He harassed, and even beaten. by p„,iCe officers. When i, is clear that the poiice are
dealing with an educated person, the, will apologize and adtni, ,ha, the, ,nis,„„k" the
Afro-Domtntcan or Afro-Brazilian lor someone else. Very often, the educated Afro-
Dominican or Afro-Brazilian feels both anger and a son of hutniiiation for the
"confusion.- I, is important to point on, that in this ease, the police confused the
educated man with a "common"^ This suggests tha, prejudicial policing is often
considered
-acceptable,- or a, least justifiable, as long as the police read the signs of
social
“inferiority” properly (Spanakos, forthcoming a).
Stnce negritude is understood in terms of a color continuum, and not as a polar
opposite of European identity, people identify themselves and are identified by society in
a fluid way. Due to the negative connotations associated with negritude in the two
countries, few Dominicans or Brazilians, until fairly recently, have identified themselves
as negro. Additionally, the idea of a continuum of color rather than fixed racial
categories triggered various strategies of negotiation of identity, such as dying and
uro-
”
""
,di0" in the Dominican sense
'
s ‘nce in Brazil il refers to people of Indigenous Heritage.
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straightening hair, use of facial powder, marry
recently, plastic surgery, all ofwhich allow;
mg someone lighter skinned, and more
s 0ne t0 move away from the extreme
position of
“blackness.”
Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians? The categories chosen here7 Pe°P 'eS^ ei,hCr ^ certain, or perhaps a„, contexts
Pne,0/Pm0
' """" ™ S
---
-ndi,tons are unifonn for a„ of the su,
PS, however. Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians are all affected, to vaiying
degrees, by similar discourses which denigrate
“blackness," give preference to
^
miscegenation, and praise
“whiteness." Afro identity is conceived here as both racial and
ethmC3 '- USm8 3 PUrdy ^ definition could theoretically gualify many, if
no. all. light skinned Dominicans and Brazilians as Afro. However, unless they identify
ociety could identify them as Airo, they will not be considered as such32
.
Similarly, the category Euro could include many dark-skinned people due to its ethnic
component. Once again, this will depend on both individual and societal identification.
It is important to note that in identifying themselves, many Dominicans and
Brazilians of v arying racial and ethnic backgrounds will define themselves exclusively as
Dominican and Brazilian, respectively. Clearly this speaks of a certain preeminence of
national identity and solidarity, over a racial one. or any other identify for that matter.
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“istror°:rzr.rt “T,h Afr°“
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C0mblnatl0n of these two aspects ’ (Sansone. 1997- 458)
;^,her ide"f “« identified by sociely a S
Brazilians.
’ f h ma,gmal socio-economic position is similar to Afro-
“ *• d""
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-•-« Afro,
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- TCi"c
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, utoto,
*» » """> to-.-.™ politician* to«—. to
ice k.itcsn mulatto Dominican, and the neighboring "Wg,0J~ ia Haiil’. The
...... °f the
— heto— to to—,.
„
overestimated.
There iS an CXpreSSion that “in the Dominican Republic, only the Haitian is
Blacb.'- Such a statement is hard to accept for students of racial politics, particularly front
lhe USJ4
’
y6t ‘he Sta'ement makeS sense wh™ one considers exactly what i, means to be
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M
During several lee, ,re ™ "R eeZ D
"" wl " be dis“sed •" chapters 2 and 3.
black students from the usIS ' “'un P-jb ' IC '" ,he aUthor fo "" d US students, particularly
Vision of racial identificationlaTcorTmZ? p • "5""* conceP,io"s of race. Assuming that their’
are,
C°ntCI 'l,Cy cn,,c,2ed Dominicans for no, recognizing who they reallv
in.
gro and Haitian in the Dominican Republic. One of the principal ideologues ofa 1011a identity during the TrujiHo dictatorship), Manuel Arturo Pena Batlle, writes inne historical essay
-we [Dominicans] should not forge
,^^ fe a ,
and Catholic nation, that we are D • •
' SlU
Th .
:t Dominicans, emerged pure and homogen0us'’ (1943 P)
diffe^^H
SPan '0la^ D°min *can People are genetically and culturally
essential because H,spanidad (H iSpanicness) idewified Dominjcans
as Europeans living within the New World, where
in the New World.
as the Haitians were
“Africans” livi ns
The prejudicial distinctions can be seen more clearly in Joaquin Balaguer’s The
]n u
^ iha( Oom;n;cans
haW '° "^ °f ‘he——--- Haitians wil, leave their side of the
ISla,ld and degenera,C
,he PUrity
°f Dominican culture and blood
(Balaguer,
,947). In the revised version of this text, published as The Island Upside
D°Wn iLa "* Ba 'agUer
—
- ^ “barbaric customs,” including
•ha. they have a prominent place for
“promiscuity” and “incest” in their culture, tha, they
reproduce life vegetables and that they, “the Ethiopian race,” are “naturally indolent”
(Balaguer, 1 987: 40, 37. 52). These characterizations are no, the mere jingoistic rantings
o. one of the count*’, most ardent nationalists. Balaguer occupied many posts during
•he three decade Trujillo dictatorship, including secre.aty of education, and he spent more
than twenty years as president of the republic after the fall of Trujillo.
j
.
^ 'here iS 3 Clear raCial «* between Dominicans and
attians,
.be former ofmixed heritage
, but^^ ^ ^ rf
r
CUlar'y SinCe mUCh °f,he di~ «- “> a„d denigrate, tbe Haitian in the“n RCPUbiiC i$ re,ated l° infe °f
—^ °f development,
„on-Chr,s,ian
problem o, the Afro-Dominican is that s/he often demonstrates the type of racial and
Hai ‘,an ,S " 50^ Wh°
-« to be Haitian, or who bear the si,ms
•hat are assoctatcd with Haitian identity and no, Dominican identity, such as darh-sKin.
"literacy, or the religious practices of Santeria, Gaga and Vodu.
A, the same time, interracial relations and marriage are no,
--ommon in the
Dominican Republic. It is even difficult to call such relationships intemacial, since such
differences are often seen to be differences in shading, rather than racial categoty. There
" alS°' " h’ Bra?iK " abS°,Ute Afro aesthetics and a vety high amount of
consumption of Afro cultural production. Whether i, be merengue, rap. hip-hoP .
additionally in Brazil, samba, axe, pagode-rhe Afro woman, particularly the
nude,a. and Afro culture are almost universally appreciated, even if high brow culture
stereotypes and demeans them.
There is a simultaneous pride of Afro beauty and culture, particularly the
objectification of women, while maintaining an understanding of vety unequal relations
Of power among different racial, or even gender, groups. For example, in both countries
an adage explains that you many a white woman, choose a mulata for a lover, and have a
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black woman as a domestic servant35 t
WOrld
“Plataforma” show in ^
^
*
fc
.
,r are y Clotlled da"«rs is A.-n„ca
, Also hshow consists ofsamba, pagode, barely clothed women men and wo
cost,,™ f
A men wearing
~ mes Por carn >val, and of several men performing capoeira16 Th f „
designed for tourists does no, have any p . f
‘
'
' *“* Sh°W
> er ormers who are Fn™ n -i-
there is •
-uro-Brazihan suggests that
quite a stgntficant amount of pride in Afro R
.
. .
P l ^bro-Brazihan
contributions to Brazilian
identity and popular culture And tiv
' (b,s certainly is the case, particularly since such
contributions are more readily recognized nowadays than in the past 33
.
*
-ever, the pride that Brazilians may demonstrate for Afro-Brazilian
contributions is also tied to a certain amount of shame.
V3lUed Bra2 "' " reCem SUney 0fprim^'— ^dems in Brazil makes this
painfully clear. When shown
“white” and ‘-bl^w- r-igures, students overwhelmingly
hlentified theW figure as
(S3%),W (85) and only 6% recognized the
^
b ' aCk fi8Ure " “Wea,thy’" C°mpared With 1 7%
- 14% and 94% respectively for the
white figure (Hanchard IQQd-An r t
)• n another survey, when asked whether they agreed
or disagreed with the statement “A nnnd av, •goo A egro is a negro one with a branca (white)
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ofwomen by cultures in which national identity was co,raric edT
d '’"mS ' be " S "h” ,h' ° bjec,ifl<:a < i°"
important to note that there is no breakdown of the “use vli ^ e* ?
d°ptmg machi^ narratives. It is
countries exists, or a, leas,, there is no adage that refers io this.
’ °™ “d me" in «* two
that slaves were able tfp77h™fom
^mantl an b°°d
$
A
"8° la ' D ',ri"8 colo,,ial ,in3es
-
« is said
.
capoeira has moved from being something cracked 1 d Th,!5 "18 " as a da"«' <" the las, decade,
Btazil, to being a martial art consumed by Brazilians of all'
'' ' P00r Afro-Brazinans in Ihe Northeast of
•ha,
,, once held has slowly disappeared.LL “7" «*
See (Guillermo-Prieto, 1990).
^mpiereiy.
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of citizenship lor Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilialans.
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PART II
historical perspectives
by
‘Vule^’^f^e^stem^tV^e
F
lcatofy terminology of color and
T he fundamental ideas eonsidered in this book-^itizenship. race and
democracy-are all concepts which can be eonsidered
‘‘essentially contested.” These
concepts are eonsidered to be socially constructed, that is, shaped and patterned by social,
pohltcal and economic conditions, rather than immutable and obje-‘- realities.
Following Anthony Marx (1998), this book argues that the construction of socio-political
identities and behavior is molded over time with the State assuming a particularly
significant role in the interpretation of citizenship, race and democracy.
This next section (chapters 2 and 3) will examine dynamics and continuities in the
construction of the State and its relation to citizenship, as well as the definition of racial
identity and exclusion/inclusion. While a, no point in the histoty of either country did
Afro-Dominicans or Afro-Brazilians occupy the highest position in a hierarchical society,
Dominican and Brazilian social hierarchies were rarely rigidly defined along racial lines.
Lighter skin color, education and more European physical features tended to correspond
to social ascendance for people of mixed blood, although ascendance did not
unequivocally necessitate acceptance and equality. During certain periods and in certain
regions, social mobility, political agency and the ambiguity of racial identity were more
considerable, while at others they were quite minimal.
A brief note on method is necessary. In order to make more clear each country’s
umque s>'stem in which race and citizenship has been conceived, few comparisons will be
:r
and An8,°-American w°r,d
-
—~ aw« of how Dominican
r
" idemit> W0UW ^ * f°rei*ners
’«rly* ones. This
white and intensely exclusive, especially in Brazil.
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Brazilians. The poss.bil.ty was real considering that the Dominican dictator Rafael
1 rujillo, who ruled for 3 1 vearsMOtn ai\y ars ( 1 930-61 ), was a mulatto of very humble origins and
Gctuho Vargas
,1930-45, and ,950-54). the most significant politician of the era in
Brazil, was especially sympathetic to Afro-Brazilian causes. Within both eountries a
notion of integration and assimilation was presented as being necessary for national self-
realization and, later, for national security. The nations were presented as ethnically and
culturally homogenous, although with an ethnically diverse past. No Dominican nor
Brazilian could be the victim of racism because there were no “races” in the two
countr.es due to centuries of miscegenation. This unity was reinforced in the Dominican
Republic by highlighting the ‘exteriority’ and difference of the Haitian.
Other authoritarian governments clung to the notion of a national identity based
on unity which systematically denied the claims of Afro-Dominicatr md. especially.
Afro-Brazihans who challenged national rhetoric. In the late 1970s and throughout the
democratization during the 1980s, Afro-Brazilian activity was important in not only
challenging ideas about national (such as the idea of racial democracy), but also in terms
of expanding the notion oi citizenship. Afro-Dominican activity also was able to contest
CHAPTER 2
RACE AND CITIZENSHIP IN THEDOMINICAN REPUBLIC (1492-1930)
AND BRAZIL (1500-1930)
This chapter will provide a brief historical survey of political and racial identity i„
•he Dontinican Republic and Brazil between the arrival of European ships upon the
shores of the Caribbean and South America and the modem, authoritarian, state-building
efforts that began in 1 930. Alternating between cou n, ties, each section will review
relevant events and relationships during different eras in the two countries, with the
intention of highlighting the uniqueness of the construction of race and citizenship in both
countries.
Although the case!, dtfier significantly, three common elements appear fairly
consistently throughout this chapter. The firs, is that in both countries authority was
located within private and paternalistic relationships and power wa. ,„.tsidered to be
personal rather than institutional. This personal authority was legitimized by a
hierarchical socio-political system that treated certain people as superior and others as
inferior. The seeond is the role of political culture in setting a system of values and
norms which conditions what individuals believe, accept and are willing to challenge.
I he political culture of these two countries, has not always been unequivocally
authoritarian, and at various points, political institutions, the Crown, the government, and
the legal system, have been able to force restraint on the powerful at various points. Yet.
the historical tendency in the Dominican Republic and Brazil has been for institutions to
limit the excesses ot the powerful, rather than to serve as the proper channels through
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which politics are articulated, deliberated and legislated. Finally, it will be emphasized
«ha, racial identification and the n,caning attached race are equivocal. While slavety
produced highly unequal relations and was certainly cruel, masters often assumed a vety
paternal and, at times, protective role over slaves. Additionally, although the histoty of
Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazi.ians is affected by the histoty of slavey, i, is no, solely
termined by slavery. In both countries, again varying overtime, large numbers of Afro,
nomimeans and Afro-Brazihans were born free and/or were manumitted, and many of
'he C°UntrieS ' m°St imp011ant hist0rical were of African descent. The large-scale
miscegenation that took place in both countries also led to definitions of “white” and
-black” which differed quite a bi, from those in the Anglo-American colonies.
Iberia and Africa
By the end of the fifteenth century, when Spanish and Portugese explorers
charted the coasts of the Western hemisphere, the Iberian governments had already had
considerable contact with various African tribes and peoples. No, all of this contact
resulted in the enslavement of the latter peoples; in fact, during the seven centuries of
Moorish domination of Iberia, people from northern Africa governed the peninsula.
Independence Iron, the Moots led to the creation ol the nation-states of Portugal in 1 147
and Spain in 1492. Removing Moorish dominance was critical to the rudimentary
formation ol national identity, which, since it was a response to the Muslim Moors, made
religious identity fundamental. Racial criteria, since the Moors were darker and from
Northern Africa, was also involved.
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The union of religious and national identification no, only ntade problematic the
"'es °f Vari°US MUSUmS livin
* in ^so of Jewish people, who similarly had
centuries. Both Iberian countries defined their populations on the basis
including racial ones, between peoples were already assimilated into Iberian culture.
Scholars differ as to the racial content of
-pure” blood, since i, connoted both religious
and racial identity. Dominican historian Hugo Tolentino Dipp argues that ”i, should be
made very clear that the question of the purity of blood in Spain was no, based on ideas of
racial difference and inferiority.” He notes that those who were of unpure blood were
-Jews, Moors, Africans, [and] mestizos," and therefore “purity” was no, a “racial-
distinction (Dipp, 1992: 105, 101-2). From a slightly different perspective, Stuart
•Schw artz notes that idea of pure blood was used in sixteenth century Portugal to
-distinguish those persons who were untainted by racial or religious deviance.” Purity, he
writes, was used for “the ideal white, Old Christian Portuguese, untainted by the infected
races, as the expression went, of ‘moor, mulatto, negro or Jew'” (Schwartz, 1 989: 248).
The fifteenth century was something of a golden age for Portugal. It became clear
that to expand would mean either conquering Spain, which was highly unlikely, or
braving the Atlantic ocean. The value of maritime activity was increased by the vast
wealth that was believed to exist in Asia and Africa. Between 1415 and 1498, Portuguese
explorers conquered lands and set up trade posts along the eastern African coast, in the
The term “purity- of blood" would later be used in the colonies for distinguishing between people ofdifferent races and cultures.
w K K
‘ The ‘
u
P0rtUgU
?
e ’’ and "Spanish" explorers were not necessarily Portuguese nor Spanish. At times,pamsh men sailed for the Portuguese, and vice versa. Other explorers were Italian. As for Columbus,
many different groups have claimed him as one of their own.
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southwestern coast of Africa, and in Asia Sn • ,- Spain also entered into the fray, challenging
Portugal for the possession of Ceuta a small
’ S aH blU lmP°rtant in northern Africa, and
although Portuguese explorers were able mW 10 Unc0ver more ,errito0 . in ,he fifteenth
century', the Spanish explorers were the firs, to reach the Americas.
Before examining the
“encounter" between the Europeans and the natives i, is
wonh examining the Old Wortd. Cotumbus set sat, the same year tha, Ferdinand and
sabe, unified the Spanish crown, which was a,so the year tha, the Moors were expelled
front Spatn. The Moors had been removed from Lisbon some three centuries earlier The
independence of the tberian countr.es coincided with the unification of the distinct
provinces within the Iberian territory. This is especially true of Spain where the marriage
of Isabel of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragom united two of the most powerful Spanish
principalities. T he construct™ of national identity and unity during this period,
following the anti-Moorish sentiment of the Reconquest, revolved around the
Christianization of Spain and Portugal, and inquisitions into the lives of those who did
not accept the Faith. The institution of the Inquisition was much fierce in Spain
than in Portugal, where territorial boundaries were newer, and where religion was more
“inextricably" linked lo nationality (Burns. 1980: 36; Freyre, 1933. preface).
Black Africans were no novelty in Iberia in this period. They had been there since
the Moorish occupation, and they did not all serve as slaves. Additionally, slavery was
not a condition that was exclusive to the black Africans. As late as 1514, the Portuguese
Ordenacoes Manuelinas refer to the treatment of w hite. Moorish and black slaves
(Schwartz, 1 989: 25 1 ). Similarly, the slaves in Spain were "blacks, Moors. Jews, and
even Spaniards” (Dipp, 1992: 163). However, as the Atlantic slave trade-which the
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Portuguese initiated in the 1440s3
-grew s |averv hp
m , _
* ’ Sl ' ,> btCame more
"tore associated with
color of skin and place of birth (Eakin, 1998: 18 ).
^ves were predominantly domestic laborers in Iberia, and were generally
-wed a certain amount of freedom to maintain their customs and religious praxes 3
im0^^ C0 '0nial^ Dominican Repub, ic (Dipp,
,992:
, 66) . In the new
f0Und C0 '°nieS
’
SUCh aS the PreVi0US^ “"Inhabited Madeira island, however the
Portuguese began to use slaves as a primaty source of labor in the production of sugar
Sugar production became increasingly important and pro,),able after 1453 with the fal, of
tHe B>Zantine EmPire Wh°Se SU8a '' Pr°dUCti0n and Crete had been dominant in
Europe (Cambeira, ,997: 95). By 1 493, the eighty sugar (plantations)
Madeira were owned predominantly by Genovese and Jewish merchants who relied on
the labor of slaves who were African, mulatto and natives of the Canary Islands
(Schwartz. 1989. 8-9). This w as only the beginning of the plantation system that would
profoundly affect the lives of manv of the Q s miir a c •> 9.5 million African captives brought to the
Western Hemisphere as slaves, with the largest number going to Hr a
The slave trade would grow to previously unknown levels during the next three
centuries. That is no. deny to the ancient roots of the practice, since neither the virtuous
republic ofRome nor the democracy of which Pericles boasted were ignorant of slave
imr
,°
d
r
d “ EUr°Pe ,hr0Ugh 'he M-'l" caravans, and
exchange for gold (mIj 986 14) ' 8 AWca " S 'aVeS ,0 0," er Mrk™' ™
Repubiicand Brazii
- cari°s
“treated like members of e femi ies' an
8 of century in the Dominican Republic were
1989 : 20 ). faierSZTaL ^ T* 10 customs” (Deive.
plantations (ingenios/engenhos).
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or
.aws .ha, systematic^ denied free status ,o ,arge pans of ,he popuiatiom'.
Similarly, slave, was an institution which was quite well estabhshed in various parts of
Afnca before the bmh of the Atlantic slave trade. Katia Queroz Mattoso estimates that
anyw here between 30 and 50 percent of the population of the region of Sahel, a region in
Africa, was enslaved (Mattoso, 1 094: 1 5). Slave* was no, limited to this region, as i,
»as practiced also in Benin and Sudan, if not in other areas. According to Mattoso,
slaves in Africa were ‘integrated’ into a family and could no, be soM which seem$ tQ
suggest a paternal, rather than exclusively commercial, type of slavery
.
1 he presence of the Portuguese, and later the Dutch, increased the slave trade in
Africa, and among Africans. Previously, slaves were often victims of war from other
tribes. However, the commercialization of the slave trade allowed tribal chiefs to remove
Milage upstarts as well. Additionally, during periods of crop failure or drought, children
might be sold into slave., since many families could ill afford extra mouths to fill. and.
at times, even whole families sold themselves into slavery. By the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, with such a high demand in Brazil, among other areas, “military
campaigns undertaken [in Africa aimed] to conquer not land but men” (Mattoso, 1994:
20). Previous interest in the trade and precious metals in Africa had been replaced by the
newest and most dreadful commodity.
For example, Herbert Klein notes that “... it has been estimated that at the height of the Roman empire
the population of Italy contained seme two to three million slaves, who represented between 3 s and 40
percent of the population" (Klein, 1986: 4).
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Dominican Republic (1492-1791)
Christopher Columbus arrived on the island which he called Hispaniola (Little
Spain) in December of 1492. Columbus remarked that the inhabitants were especially
beautiful in comparison to the Indigenous peopies encountered on other islands, since the
former were more white, and looked more like Spaniards (Dip* ,992:
, 55). Columbus
was not alone in seeing beauty in the inhabitants of Hispaniola. The 39 men he left
behtnd at the Fort La Navidad (the Nativity) took many of the native women as wives or
concubines. When Columbus returned one year later, he learned
.ha, the natives had
k.lled the Spaniards because of the latter's abuse of the native women (Moya Pons, 1 995:
29-30).
Approximately 400,000 natives lived in Hispaniola in 1492 6
. By 1519, due to
forced labor, vicious massacres and various epidemics, there were close to 3.000
Indigenes left (Moya Pons, 199o: 27, 37). The Indigenous populations were hit hardest
after the Spanish presence on the island became permanent. After two inept governors,
including Columbus himself, the Spanish crown sent a more competent administrator,
Nicolas de Ovando, in 1 501 along with 2,500 immigrants, mostly nobles and gentlemen,
a few free Africans, and, most importantly, very few women (Dipp, 1o02: 128; Moya
Pons, 1995: 32; Deive, 1989; 19). Despite incentives for married couples and the
governor’s persecution of those who married natives, miscegenation became common
place and a mestizo (mixed of Indian and European blood) population was bom (Dipp.
IS estimate ls f,om Frank Mo>'a Pons
’
one of the most prominent Dominican historians (Moya Pons,
27) - 0ther estimates range from between 60.000 and the 3,000,000 figure produce by Bartolome de
las Casas. For the sake of consistency, the numbers presented by Moya Pons will be used. I am especially
grateful to Jane Rausch for this comment.
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' 992 1 30-5). The new governor enforced the enconuW and rePar,imien,0* practices
of .he Spanish crow, subjecting the natives to harsh s.ave* primarily to working i„ the
gold mines. Access to indigenous labor, however, was fairly limited to a small elite
among the Spanish population9
.
The enslavement of the Indigenous population was always considered problematic
S.nce one ol the goals ol the Spanish colonizers, in theory, was to Christianize the
Indigenous. Asearlyas 150, “the Crown had declared that the Indians were free and
should be treated as such...” (Moya Pons,
.995: 33). But this declaration bore little
wetght, and the Crown softened its position when the governor explained that the mines
could no, function without the coerced Indigenous labor. The Crown and the governor
came to a compromise which allowed for the continuation of forced Indigenous labor on
the condition that the natives become educated in the Christian faith. Ironically, as the
defense of the Indigenes in Spain grew more vocal due to the advocacy of priests such as
Antonio Montesinos and Bartolome de las Casas, the natives were quickly disappearing 1 ".
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s VVTItes "During this new reparti,niento
, a small colonial elite of 82 personspresenting only 1 1 percent of the encomenderos
,
managed to appropriate 44 r - - ofthe Indiansdistributee Apart from the elite, only 646 colonists received Indians. The rest of the pollal whichconsisted of several thousand persons, was left without Indians and with very limited possibilities to earn am& except y working with their own hands, an idea repugnant to those accustomed to Indian serfsperforming most physical labor" (Moya Pons, 1 995- 36)
sin'LTeTell 3m 3 VOI
'
Ce in the wilderness; you are in mortalcr th cruelty and tyranny you use in dealing with these innocent people. Tell me by what ri-ht orjustice do you keep these Indians in cruel and horrible servitude- Are these not men- Have they "not
onal souls. And you not bound to love them as you love yourselves?” ( in Cambeira, 1997: 58) That
hk |T ^rf'n
05 W3S qU1Ck 'y reCa"ed t0 Sp3in shows that his Proclamations were not entirely popular. In
‘ YeHnt l
°f
'??^ A B^fAc^unt, Fray Bartolome de las Casas writes of Hispaniola,t° thls sheepfold, into this land ot meek outcasts there cam some Spaniards who immediately
e laved like ravening wild beasts, wolves, tigers, or lions that had been starved for many davs killing
terrorizing afflicting, torturing, and destroying the native peoples, doing all of this with the strangest and
most varied new methods of cruelty, never seen or heard of before, and to such a degree that this Island of
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Between 1 520 and 1 530 it was clear that not only was the scarce of forced labor
tone, but so was the source of wealth, gold. This prompted large numbers of Spaniards
New World empire, Moya Pons writes,
“Emigration was so intense that by 1528, seven
wns had C°mpletely dlsaPPeared and those remaining held a combined
Population of only 1 ,000 Spaniards. A royal decree in
.520 prohibited the colonists from
leas ing the island under penalty of death, bu, emigration continue despite this law”
0995: 38). Once again, it is worth noting the inability of the central governing
institution, the Crown, to enforce a policy upon its citizens.
Before leaving the Indigenes in history i, is worth noting a few things about them.
There were two main groups of Indigenes in Hispaniola, the Tainos and the Caribs. The
former were far more passive, more society oriented, and punished incest severely".
whde the latter were a warring tribe that practiced cannibalism (Moya Pons, 1995: 27).
Questions about incest and polygamy were constantly circulated, and were intended to
prove the natives’ lack of civilization and humanity
. One Spanish jurist, Pedro de
Sepulveda, “argued that the Indians were not truly human, but rather 'little men' who
were neither worthy nor capable of being baptized" (Wucker, 1999: 65). Throughout the
brief period of co-existence on Hispaniola, the Spaniards, with few exceptions,
consistently looked at the Indigenes as being physically and culturally inferior beings.
S
°
,
P°PUlT (Ia™S 3 pop 'llation ,hat 1 estimated to be more than three millions) has now
should not b
C> “"dre
,
d perSOnS" (las Casas
'
l992: 29). The importance of these two men
I
e exaggerated. Most likely, clergy supported the repressive forced labor of the Indians as Ihev
Revolution Zrh” *1 '“^i
°
f ‘" e Africans a ""Arable land-o^t!^ Hata
^
ion, the Church was often also owned a considerable number of slaves
• T StS that .the Tainos vvere ve^' clear about incest, although Alan Cambeira suogests that itis possible that there was incest among the Tainos (1997: 37).
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and barbarian, whose mentalitv ; .ntall,y~ It Was t^louSht rendered them incapable of
conceptualizing civilization” (Cambeira 1907.^ r-r . 1997.53). Considerable debate also was given
to the issue of whether or not the natives had souls.
THe SPani3, dS n°ted dif‘™
- Stoups of Indigenes, and clearly
Preferred the Tainos, who prior to the Spanish arrival were subsistence fanners.
However, they had a very hard time getting natives, of either tribe, to farm for anything
more than subsistence, especially since fanning was considered
“women's work”
(Chapman. 1 997: 3). The indigenes' reluctance to farm in excess of subsistence seemed
•o validate for the Spaniards their claims about the lack of civilization and the primitive
nature of Indigenous society. More troubling for the Spaniards was that the natives could
no. survive the labor in the mines, and many would run away into the mountains to avoid
repressive labor.
W ar agamst a Spanish-raised Indigene named Enriquillo, between 1519 and 1533.
weakened the colony. I hough the population of Indigenes was small, Enriquillo was
aided by runaway African slaves, whose presence on the island was growing, and by
Indigenes captured from the other islands of the Caribbean who were forced to work in
the mines of Santo Domingo. A treaty with Enriquillo in 1533 ended the hostilities
bringing a degree of peace to the island. That the war lasted so long is not only a
testament to the guerrilla techniques of Enriquillo's soldiers and the geographic
conditions of the Dominican Republic, but also the weakness of Santo Domingo’s militia
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and government, especially considering that Enrinuill
mr
qUI"° s arm
> “listed of only 500 men
(Wucker, 1999: 66).
Indigenous labor and gold mines ,were soon replaced by large plantations, initially
P -mg sugar, and later ginger. These plantations were dependent upon slave labor
which by the 1530s was increasingly African. Free Africans and African domestic slaves
had been in Hispaniola since at leqst i uqa j ts-a 1 496, and Dipp notes that in 1 5 1 5 one ‘'black’'
*«. Mejia h,d
,ndi„ns „„„ Dipp
™™ »-
encomienda ,„di,„„,„
, „f
_
E
'“ » “» '* "Oh. a„
““ Mi . It™*
.
..quid acquire
later” (Dipp, 1992: 160). By the 1520s some son •i -o , 500 African slaves entered annually the
colon\ of Santo Domingo (Cambeira, 1997 : 100)
G°Vem0r °Vand0 Wamed the Cro™— Minos (Africans who were living in
Iberia) were bad influences and were more likely to run away and rebel than bodies
(Africans taken directly from Africa). The Spanish crown decided that the best way to
maintain control would be to send more female African slaves (Deive. 1989: 20, 24). and.
rn 1526, the Spanish crown declared that one-third of all slaves imported must be women
(Moya Pons, 1995: 20). It is highly unlikely that the increase in number of women
produced any reduction in the numbers of runaway slaves, although it had the unintended
consequence of greatly increasing the numbers of mulattos bon, in Santo Domingo.
Estimates for the population of Africans in Santo Domingo are very imprecise as
figures exist only tor slaves and even those are not entirely clear. In 1545. Moya Pons
estimates the population of the colony of Santo Domingo at 5,000. with an additional
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that as many as 2.000 African slaves were arriving annually, but sugar production had
n by the 1 570s, and slaves were being diverted to ginger plantations.
Some of the Africans,
.ike some of the Indigenes before them, ran away from the
Plantations where they worked. Estimates of the number of runaway African slaves in
have been as many as 7,000 runaway African slaves in 1 545, Dipp argues that the number
was Probably less than 1,000 (Cambeira. 1997: 76; Dipp, ,992: 221). Among them, there
were small groups, as well as larger groups which formed a son ofcommunity, calied
ci,narrows, often with internal political and soeia, structures. Some writers have argued
that c inn,, rones created communities reminiscent of African societies (Cambeira, 1 997;
74). However, i, seems that ladmos often assumed leadership roles in many cimarrones
and that cimanoms were vary rarely composed of only one ethnic group (Deive. 1 989:
272)1 Wh ‘Ch Pr0blema,izes sim P'e representations of the communities as replications of
pre-enslavement African communal life.
Justifications lor African slavery followed much of the prejudices against the
-primitive- natives. However, a new ideological argument was formulated especially for
the Africans. Like the natives, they were considered primitive, close to the earth,
innocent and savage. But the Africans were much believed to be better workers and
naturally more suited for slave labor than the Indigenes, since they did not die off so
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' JU3n ISidr° Ji— Julian asserts
-the
COnd'“0ns better tllan Indians” (in Dipp. 1992: 167 13).
The seventeenth centuty has been ealled the Century of Misery by Dominican
historians. While in 1606 the population of the Santo Domingo was 5.960 free people
and 9,648 slaves, the total population was 7.500 in 1681 (Moya Pons, 1986: 46 u ).
hollowing the bus, of the sugar industty. the principal industries in Santo Domingo were
ginger plantations and the selling of mahogany in the south and cattle herding in the
north. Tins led to two different societies, particularly with regards to race relations,
although paternalism predominated in both (Hoe,ink, 1 994: 92). The cattle herders, or
Ha,eras, of the northern region of the Cibao often worked alongsioe meir slaves doing the
same work, and slaves often earned enough money to buy their own freedom 15
. While
lines between master and slave, and black and white, were becoming more and more
blurred in the north of the country, the south continued to maintain traditional seigneurial
distinctions and privileges which separated the pure blooded Spaniards from those of
mixed heritage.
Western hemisptoe^ t0 be a "truth " accePted ac™s the entire
obllabala T may°r faCi ' idad qUe e ' “ espantosas conidciones a q„e
167y
esclavitud, es fundamentaimente su caltura inferior lo que mas explica el hecho" (in Dipp. 1992:
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f°rma,i0n °" 'he "umber 0fslaves un,il 1 769 "hen the population of thecol y w 70,625 people including 8,900 slaves (Moya Pons, 1 986- 46)
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Sancher VatJ H patriarchal. A relationship of trust between master and slave pointed lo solidarity
'
, 1, 0 f
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did (m.
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laSkS; aS°C,al divisi0n oflabor was aN bul nonexistent. In this type of setting slaves
orlr to buvS ft HPPe"m °" P lanta,ions dependent on slave labor, bul they rather saved money inae y their reedom (Betances, 1 995: 1 0).
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re were time, when poverty was so extreme and widespread that even these
dlfferenCeS beCame
'eSS Stark
' Cambefra
-^ «-in point: -,sters vvere^
10 Wa ' k baref00t
' Hke Sl
--«* same food (Cambeim,
, 997:
, 07) . Thi$
Per,0d W3S CHtiCal in eqUaliZing
-*«. ""hough neve,, completely, whieh
had developed during the early period of slavery thr
3 ‘ tlnancial situation of slaves, freed
peoples and masters became increasingly similar-in terms of poverty and
and miSCegCnatl0n COntinued at a significant rate. Distinctions, such as negro,
% CUQrteron
' and Snf°, all indicating the amount of African and/or
European blood possessed by individuals, began ,o be replaced by the more colloquial
l“nC" d‘ "C"“ (Wh ' te of tho earth) (Torres-Saillant, 1 998; Wucker, 1999: 33
,.
I Ins was a tr.bute to the laxing of previous schemes which counted the number of
African and Spanish grandparents a person had, and gave a much more inclusive tenu
whitened the non-Spanish population. Additionally, during this period, the
colony was so poor that i, was incapable of importing new slaves, only receiving a boos,
'n Population w hen a group of immigrants from the Canaty Islands arrived in 1684.
Moya Pons writes that ,00 families arrived in 1684 and were soon followed by another
201 families by 1687 (Moya Pons, 1995: 66 ). As immigration and miscegenation
continued, "the number of Caucasians easily surpassed and remained consistently greater
than the numbers of Africans” (Cambeira, 1997: 1 15). The number of free blacks and
mulattos was also very high, particularly in the Cibao.
During the eighteenth century the Dominican Republic recovered from the
depopulation of the previous century. In 1718, the population w as recorded as 18.410.
and by 1783 it was 1 1 9,600 (Moya Pons, 1986:46). Cattle herding and the sale of
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W3S Pr°dUCed ^
-«* raised in Santo Domingo was
northwestern par, of Hispaniola in ,he ear, seventeen,,, eentnr, a territory which would
b ranee m 1665, with a new border defined in 1697. The growth of this
territory, called Sain,
-Domingue. was astounding. Within a short period the Freneh
Air,can slaves, and vast amounts of Dominican beef and leather.
While the 168
, census of Sain,
-Domingue registered 4,000 French planters I 565
^ves (Moya Pons,
, 995: 68
. 76). By the iate eighteenth centuty, sugar relied upon a
slave labor force of 500,000 in Sain,
-Domingue, while the same i.,.:
.:y in Santo
Domingo had only 600 slaves at us disposal (Wucker, 1999: 99 ). The population of
San.0 Domingo by the late eighteenth centiny, in contras, to Sain,
-Domingue, was Cose
,0°'000
’
Witl’ 85’°°0 t>ee Whi,es
’ mula«<* and blacks, and 15,000 slaves (Klein, 1986:
222 ; Wucker. 1999: 36; Maingot, 1992. 230). Sain,
-Domingue was the world's riches,
colony and larges, producer of sugar, w hile Santo Domingo was one of Spain’s most
insignificant colonies with only a fledgling sugar industry.
51
Brazil (1500-1808)
'• '500, fc Portuguese uubl, *,„» Clta| ^^
Ch possessed valuable wood but did not seem to have gold, as did the Spanish
es, noi did it offer ihe riches of the spice trade which the Portuguese had just
acquit ed following Vasco de Gnnm’c «;t a uama s circumnavigation of Afrirn it11 U1 r iica. it was not until 1530
ortu^uese crown decided to colonize the territory, essentially to prevent the
Spanish from capturing the territory for themselves. Even when colonization began, the
Portuguese remained vety Cose to the Atlantic shores, with few settlements in the
interior. In fact, i, was no, until the rubber boom in 1890s .ha, the Amazon was
colonized on any significant level.
Like Columbus, Cabral left several men behind in this new land before returning
,0 Iberia to relate his discovety. These men, referred to in histoiy books as
"ilegredados"" took quickly to the Indigenous women like their Spanish counterparts.
> 'nhke the men left by Columbus in Santo Domingo, the degredados became quickly
integrated into Tupi society. Some of them possessed several Indigenous women as
and by the time the Portuguese returned, there was a new race of mesticos (mixed
of Indigene and European). Despite the dislike of the Portuguese for the degredados and
then mestico children, they were forced to rely upon them in order to enslave the Indigene
Ve
f Cnf ,The lsland ofthe True Cross)- “Provinca *
,u_
t Rli .. .
th® Holy Cross) and then Terra do Brasil" (The Land of Brazil). While some believe
suggests that the"
3™6 * ^ ^ B
fr
Zl1 W°°d that Was found in abunda"ce, a new oook by Eduardo Bueno
;;to bS' (Bueno ,99* 13).°™
'™d "h™” W" iCh Ulnl COmK fr0"' E"Slish verb
” The de^ dad»s were criminals who were exiled from Portugal as part of their sentence.
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populations which would be used in
<- sugar plantations (engenhos), as well as in the
cutting of wood.
The P°rtU8UeSe
-
' ike the Spaniards
’ natives as ignorant. cuituraliy
C” ildren Wh°Se 'ab0r **— for commercial r, Manuel da
NObre8a
'
Wmin8 fr0m ,he nCW
'-V ^ of Salvador in I54, expired
,ha,
' he coercion of the natives was justified by paternalist arguments which suggested that
lhe na"VCS WOre aC,Ua"y Baining fr°m lheir servil[idc through the acceptance of,he
"
"
r,St 'an 'ai,h “d/" EUr°Pean dVilizali0n
- Do-ningos Jorge Vclho in , 694 explained
"" lhiS " S° diffCrCW fr0m CnS,aVing *“> * * -her doing them a price,ess service,
nee we teach them to till, to sow, to reap, and to work for their keep-something which
'hey did no, know how to do before whites taught them" (in Burns, 1 980: 46).
1 he Portuguese, like the Spanish, found cannibalism, incest and polygamy among
•he Indigenes (also among the degredados), and used these elements of Indigenous life to
denounce the Indigenes as barbarous and uncivilized. And like the Indians of Hispaniola,
many of the natives in Brazil would farm nothing more than tha, needed for their
subsistence. Governor Diogo de Meneses in 1610 wrote “[tjhese Indians, Sir, are a vety
barbarous people having no government and being unable to govern themselves, and they
are so lacking in this regard tha, ever in their sustenance they will no, save for tomorrow
that which is in excess today” (in Schwartz, 1 989: 3
1
).
I he Portuguese crown assumed a very paternalist stance towards the natives
because of its perception tha, they were uncivilized and needed to be helped to develop,
and to be protected from Portuguese who might abuse the Indian's „ u,ting nature.’ King
1 ** -wf"
“•
_
treatment. In 1 759. a law guaranteed freedom to all Indigenes who had Portuguese
surnames and spoke Portuguese (Burns,
,980:47-8,. By the 1 750, the roya, decree was
somewhat superfluous s.nce the natives were no longer being used as slaves, due to the
availability and the sheer number of African slaves. Additionally, Portuguese colonists
could still enslave Indigenes it the causes were just, such as the latter's practice of
cannibalism, or war against the former (Schwartz. 1989: 30) 18
. As for Dorn Manuel's
guarantee of the protection of his Indigenous subjects, it is vety likely that few people
l,Vmg m BrazM Were even aware °f
•*, let alone were restrained by it.
Unlike in Santo Domingo, the Indigenous population of Brazil was never wholly
eliminated 19
,
and despite the large number of African slaves being imported. Indigenes
were the predominant source of labor in the northeastern province of Bahia until the
middle of the seventeenth century (Schwartz, 1989: 28). But the Indigenous presence
was no, a very powerful one. Like the natives in the Dominican R^blic. the natives of
Brazil were subsistence farmers, and the men considered agricultural tasks to be
"woman's work" (Schwartz, 1989. 35). Additionally, many of the Indigenes were
nomads and had difficulties adapting to the lifesty le imposed by the Portuguese (Mattoso,
1994: 9). Like the Spanish settlers in Santo Domingo, the Portuguese noted the
differences between the various groups of natives, making clear their preferences. The
Aimore, who were hunters and gatherers, were much more resistant to Portuguese
Sp
™5 W2S "0t P0SS ' bie in lhe S Panish coioni« after 1530 when the natives were considered free vassals of
Indh.'eZ^n^T 0,he: C0Unlr>,in ,he re8l°n ’ 'here was a very significant decline in the population ofdig nous people. Bums estimates that m 1 500 there were between 1 and 2 million Indians (Bums 198017). There are currently approximately 250,000 Indians living in Brazil (Eakin ; p 0)
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enjoyed human flesh; and so on" (Schwartz, 1 989: 33).
The Portuguese Crown, „ke the Spanish Crown, made varic
... efforts ,o linri, ,he
slave frade. dominated by Portuguese traders.
,« prohibited Portuguese slave traders from
tHe ‘aking °f^ AfnCanS With° Ut firSt baP‘-"8 *em. In Brazi,. baptisms were often
epeated since i, was common, in spite of the prohibition, for traders to bring unbaptized
Africans to the Americas (Mattoso, 1 994: 32). Many were mass baptisms, where the
sermon was in a language alien the new "convert." and a new name was given to the
captive who probably did no, understand the bizarre ritual. Portuguese law also required
tha SlaVCS ^ 8UaranteCd 3 meals and Z662 liters ^ day ofw ater during the voyage across
the Atlantic. The number of slaves that could be carried was also limited based upon the
weigh, of the cargo (Mattoso, 1 994: 33). These provisions were consistently disregarded
as emaciation, disease and death were commonplace on the overcrowded slave ships. Ye,
the Crown seems to have been efficient in protecting the rights of certain mulatto youths
m Salvador. In 1 689. some mulatto youths appealed to the King to allow them to attend a
Jesutt school in Bahia after the Friars had refused them entrance, and the King decreed
that the mulattos were to be admitted to the school (Conrad, 1 983: 220-1 ).
Unlike those in the Dominican Republic. Indigenes in Brazil had access to a larger
territory to w hich they could escape without real fear of being recaptured. This also
applied for African slaves. While the effect of the cima,rones was basically minimized
by 1 546 in Santo Domingo (Moya Pons, 1 995: 41 ), runaway African slaves were a
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20.000 and 30.000 inhabitants (Bums, 1 980: 54; Mattoso,
, 994:
, 39). While Palmares
was an extreme case, there are many others, although the number of people involved is
slave communities, and they relied upon slave hunters
.ho were predominantly natives
-/or free or freed Africans/Afro-Braziiians to destroy the qtlilombos and t0 brmg^
the runaway slaves (Schwartz, 1989: 471
)
While runaways constitute an important part of the stoty of slaves in Brazil, the
majority of slaves performed no such acts of open rebellion. The slave plantations in the
northeast were particularly well disciplined. Wha, is interesting about plantation society
in northeastern Brazil is the amount of control exercised by the master over the slaves
generally without resorting to excessive force (Mattoso, ,994:
,0!) This is no , ,0 say
-ha. slaves were no, beaten and hilled, but the master's paternal authority was often able
to induce slate compliance without the actual use of castigation.
his paternal authority is seen consistently in manumission letters and wills in
which masters free slaves because of loyal service and love. Most manumissions were
bought, often by the slave, and were conditional. However, masters fell compelled to
include persona! and paternal comments into what would otherwise be legal, commercial
documents. These comments would be considered gratuitous were it not for the
20 A 1741 provision defined a quilombo as “any clandestime group of more than five fugitive slaves’
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f Patemal aUth0nt> m 311 rdati0ns in Brazi1
’ Particularly those between
master and slave. Mattoso found that in manumission
.etters i, was common to encounter
Phra$eS $UCh " '"
—^- Wel1"
- » even more intimate
.or the iove that
I bore htm (or her) because I raised him (her)” (Mattoso, ,944:
,66). Children of the
-ter and one of the slaves, who were recognized by the master, were generally freed a,
a young age (Mattoso. ,994:
,75). In addition, two other patterns s.m interesting,
DeSP,te thC rati° °f near‘y tW° me" to
-0 woman among the siave population,
manumissions of female slaves outnumbered those of males by a ratio of about two to
one. Additionally " [i]n the period of ,684-1 745, n, that,os received over 45 percent of the
Bahian manumissions bu, cons, in,ted less than 10 percent of the slave population"
(Schwartz, 1989: 331 ).
Paternal authority was best exemplified by the plantation owner <***,).
Bradford Bunts' description ofthe***, is quoted here a, length because of the
importance ofthe***, and the son of authority tha, he wielded in Brazilian society,
and especially vis-a-vis the free, freed and enslaved Afro-Brazilians. Burns writes:
nded^'
ate
r
tnei
' 3 ‘rUe l0rd °f thC manor
’
was a Patriarchal chief whoru e family, servants, slaves, and even neighbors-unless they were lamees a e owners like himse.f-with absolute authority. The grelfsTze ofTheestate, its isolation from royal officials, and the relative weakness of localbureaucrats all strengthened his power. Furthermore, the estate chaplainand ocal parish priest orbited around him like satellites, lending the
veranda TfWs 5
a *h° f ‘C <
r
hurcht0 al«mem his authority. From the shaded
ot Ins house... the patriarch oversaw the land, listened to
petitions dispensed justice, and in general held court... The rural economy
consisted ot much more than the patriarch, latifundia, slavery and export
"
°ps
,
' e '- thos
,
e features dominated, characterized Brazilian agriculture,
and shaped much of the colony’s social and economic life. (Bums. 1980-’
/4).
(Mattoso, 1994: 138),
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Schwartz adds that the paternalist notion of authority was reinforce. by
-an ideo,ogica,
contest in which the
.netaphors of family, obligation, fealty, and clientage predominated"
(SChWa"2
’
' 989: 257)
' Matt0S
° Paternal form of authority exerted by
•he master, which served to discipline his slaves without needing to resort to excessive
force (Mattoso, 1994: 101).
There was a certain literal element in the master's paternal attitude towards his
slaves, since his sexual relations with his female slaves often produced children. As in
Santo Domingo, European women were quite rare, and masters were able to use their
position to engage in sexual relations with slave and non-slave African and Afro-
Brazilian women which were often coerced. Miscegenation was prevalent, and mulattos
soon constituted a large group. Schwartz writes tha, in Bahia “ [f] ield hands were almost
always slaves, usually black, and predominantly Africans; senhores de engenhos were
invariably free and white; bu, in the intermediate positions of management, technical
skill, and artisan craft were found freemen, freedmen, and slaves; whites, browns, and
blacks” (Schwartz, 1989: 312).
By 1675, sugar production in Brazil crashed due in part to the increased
competition from the tiny colony of Saint-Domingue. The economy, however, quickly
recovered with the discovery ot gold in the southeastern state of Minas Gerais. The gold
cycle marked the beginning of the development of the Brazilian south and southeast. It
also was the beginning of the development of some of Brazil's interior since many of the
gold and other precious stones were found in areas that were inland and in the mountains,
such as Vila Rica (Ouro Preto). Slaves were used in large numbers in mining, but a
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northern Prions. Since the master
.eased
.and and his on,y concern in the .and
WaS "S raPKl eXP'° i,a,i0n
-
' he *"
-
'0 «- a certain amount of precious
metals every day. Beyond a certain figure, slaves could keep what they found
-
..™. «- ,0 ,
—. «™ r»
mmmg rCg,0nS 10 hUy lheir 0Wn IVeedom af,er 0ll|y a few years of servitude. There is
even the stoty of one African. Chico Rei, who not only bought his own freedom, but his
own mine and eventua.iy the freedom of his entire tribe. He was a,so very much invoiced
"i the construction of a church for African parishioners21
.
String this period. Portuguese interest in Brazi, peaked. Co.onia. administration
became much more efficient as the Crown demanded 20 percent of ail gold and precious
atones found in the mines, in order to guarantee that the Portuguese miners were
claim by his or her master would be freed immediately.
fn 1 /63, the capital of Brazi. was moved from Salvador to the southeastern city of
R,° dC Janeir°- THiS Change Was a tes,ame« <0 the amount of growth the southeast had
Witnessed in the las, centuty, and a hint a, what might happen in the next two centuries.
At the same time, rebellions were becoming more frequent in Brazil. In 1 789. prominent
men from Minas led a rebellion against the Crown, in which they declared they wanted
independence for the southeastern states. In 1 80 1 , anti-Portuguese sentiment led to a
tevol, in Pernambuco. But the 1 798 rebellion in Bahia is perhaps the most interesting
h is no. insignificant that the most important sculptor in the town of Vila Rica, Aleijadinho, was a
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republic in order to breathe freely because we live subjugated and because
lor everyone” (in Burns, 1980: 140).
By the end of ,he eighteenth centuiy there was no slowing down the slave trade,
but there was an incredible growth antong the freed and mulatto population of Brazil
Documents began to surface arguing that these people were citizens and should be treated
as such. C ipriano Jose Batata de Almeida writes in 1 822 “Mulatto,, ^bras, and
a i°“!0S; 'ndianS
’
mC‘melUCOS
'
and
our people, they are Portuguese; they
are honorable and valuable citizens... They are Portuguese citizens, the sons of
Portuguese or Brazilians, even if they are illegitimate. Whatever their color, whatever
their status, they were born in Brazil” (in Bums, 1980: 137
,
italics ip. original).
Interestingly enough, between 1 798 and 1 81 8 the population ofw hites increased front
1.000,000 to 1,040,000, that of slaves from 1.500,000 to 1.930,000, that of natives
remained steady at 250,000. ye, that of freedmen inc, eased from 225.000 to 585.000
(Bums, ,980: ,47). There is something curious about these freedmen, and tha, is that
-most freed slaves were slave owners" (Mattoso, 1994: 207). As Maltose writes:
masters were found in every class in society. There were white masters
masters ol mixed race, and black masters. Their behavior did not depend
ut their co or or social position but on their quality as individuals. But for
the slave, the master—w hether rich or poor, white or black—was always a
white master, because to be ‘white’ in Brazilian society meant to adopt
certain superior attitudes, to wield a certain power (Mattoso, 1994: 115).
mulatto.
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Of whiteness with freedom and sta
I his reinforces the association of the discourses voveo uu i a tus
and blackness with servitude, illegitimacy and poverty, while also providing for spacefor
individual negotiation of racial identity.
in
Dominican Republic (1791-1882)
B> the late eighteenth centuty, Santo Domingo was highly dependent upon Saint-
Domingue particularly as a market for beef and leather. Ye, as important as the economy
of Saint-Domingue was for Santo Domingo, i, was its politics that most critically
influenced its eastern neighbor. Saint-Domingue’s rapid growth, and the very low
percent of whites (6 percent) relative to a very large enslaved black population
(Cambeira, 1997: 125) created an environment which was especially propitious for
rebellion. Only two years after the storming of the Bastille in f iance, revolution began
Saint-Domingue, which soon changed its name to Haiti. By 1 794, a significant nun,bet
of Spanish elites, fearing that the rebellion would spread or encourage a slave rebellion in
Santo Domingo, left Hispaniola with their slaves (Moya Pons, 1995: 166).
The most immediate effects of the Haitian revolution on Santo Domingo was the
invasion of the Spanish colony, which was then in the possession of the French
government22
. The Haitians abolished slavery, which won support among the newly
liberated slaves, but was unwelcome to the large numbers of whites and free mulattos and
blacks who believed themselves to be civilized Spaniards, and their invaders to be savage
Africans (Cambeira, 1 997: 1 37). In 1 809. Spain was able to reassert control over its
former colony, and slavery was re-institutionalized, and though Spain easily defeated a
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Caceres declared Dominican independence from Spain.
The declaration of independence was premature. Sensing „le weakness of the
pohnea, situation in the former Spanish coiony, the Haitian government invaded and
quickly conquered the nascent state. The Haitian occupying forces immediately abolished
slavery a second, and final, time, and redistributed many of the lands that belonged to the
Church to former slaves. Hoe,ink comments that due to the absence of large sugar
Plantations, such as those in neighboring Cuba and Puerto Rico,
-‘the abolition of siaverv
in Santo Domingo on.y affected a society where, for a long time, and in large par,, siavery
had existed dejure, instead ofdefect (Hoe,ink. 1994: 91-2). The number of slaves
vsas quite low, and the poverty of the colony had also rendered small the difference
between slaves and other poor Dominicans. The Haitians truly enraged many
Dominicans when they encouraged the immigration of black Protestants from the United
s in an afiempt to da. ken the population (Martinez-Femandez: 1995 : 71 ).
Between 6,000 and 15,000 blacks from Philadelphia accepted the offer of “free trip, free
'edging and board for four months and 36 acres of farmland for every twelve workers,”
owevet. eventually only 500-600 settled in Santo Domingo (Chapman, 1997: 9). The
Haman occupation is remembered by Dominican elites, particularly Euro-Dominicans, as
a time of chaos, violence and cruelty, during which plantations were burned and many
elites left the island. This occupation is one of the more important moments in racial
In 1897, the Spanish territory' on Hispaniola had been ceded to the French.
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consciousness forming among Dominicans,
rejected the Haitians.
particularly the elites and mulattos, who
In i 844, a group called la Trinitaria fthe Trinmo • •( 1 nnit
> ) insisting of Pablo Duarte
«.»»»
s„ hIi D„
, fcl,ta
ori]>
Dominican Republic. o,d, . ,h
, ^ ^
e Tnnitanos could muster, the Trinitarios
,
who were predominantly liberals
were forced to enter into bargains witb conservative caudiiios, particularly Pedro Santana.
Santana con,roiled the militia regardless of the political posts that he did or did not
occupy, and the members of the militia, much to the dismay of the TnnUarios, were loyal
•o him no, to any invisible state or theoretical ideal (Moya Pons, 1995: 159: Betances.
1 995: 20). He used his position to exile the TrinUaria leaders as traitors and was able to
consolidate his authoritarian rule because of the constant threat of Haitian invasion,
which persisted until a, leas. ,855. He then replaced the Liberal constitution of Moca.
which the Trinitarios hud written in icse .; + j.1858, with a constitution that more thoroughly
concentrated power in the executive.
Sovereignty, which always had a powerful external dynamic, was no different
after independence. When Caceres declared the Dominican Republic independent he
wanted it to be par, of Gran Colombia because he believed i, was too small and poor, and
too vulnerable to another Haitian invasion that it required protection „om a larger power.
1 his second independence produced no more security among its elites. Santana disagreed
W ith his lormer associate Buenaventura Baez over which country the Dominican
Republic should surrender its sovereignty: Santana’s preference for the United States was
clear, especially during the 1850s, while Btiez leaned towards Spain. The United Slates
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r°UP' '° eVa
'Uate the SitUmi0n ^ ",e D°minican ReP‘*'ic, since the United
States had long been interested in the Samani Bay.23 The Haitian government invaded
S aVe'h0
'dm8 P°Wer " 3 Sen0l
'S ,hr
- ^ of Haiti 24
. ironicaHy, Haitian
imerferenCe ^ D°miniCan« «*—d the feats of the eiites who insisted
•hat the Dontinican Repubhe needed protection front its neighbor.
The possibility of a US protectorate disappeared once the Civi, War in the United
States began, and Santana turned towards seeking Spanish protection, as Baez had
favored eariier. in , 860, after a report front a finance ntinister that the frontiers were
bemg ‘Haitiani2ed ’’ He fe" m°re 10 “ter into an aihance a European
protecting power. Santana abandoned the progressive religious tolerance position of the
P3St
’ WhlCh IW Had USCd ChaSti
- t,K <**“»* Church and to court the British. U.S. and
the few Black American Protestants. He became much more protective of the Catholic
Church which he believed to be the key ingredient in convincing Spain to again accept
the Dominican Republic as a colony (Martmez-Femandez, 1995:75). I„ iggl.the
Dominican Republic re-entered the Spanish Empire. The reinsertion into the Spanish
period. “Not surprising” toe US Depanmentof Slat^'Tjf
aph ' CS ,hal US observers noted during this
composition of the Dominican Repubhe Virtually all )
b
!?
d 3 C°n
|.
inuous Preoccupation with the racial
proportion with the racia, compost£%2 “7“
independent Dominican Renublir Un Hr , 7 ne first U.S. agent to the new
y
population consisted
• of about ,.* hu„d dT^n'0 [PreSideml Buctana " '*« ">= republic’s'
over one hundred thousand are whites.’ Horan ' |
0IJSand ot whom ,0rty thousand are Blacks and
including lighter-skinned mulattoes Intere -T' i
as aPP - ln8 a vef> liberal use of the term white
,
obviously
blacks and whites,
, „
"7" $ reP° rt eS 'at" ished 3 racial ^ »«e
64
b
“ “ *» ta. Co.lreras
,^ |vtij
nt) >ears ol Ila.tian rule and two and a half centuries of miscegenation
**** •>—
„ ,le
,” SP““' *~**— >~ ... „„ „
“ " r"”’ ™‘
" “« «»».««. of i„„|
1
~
„
opposed to Haitians prior to the return nfSnan 1 \ol Spanish government. However, the return of
Spanish government destroyed any illusions about Dominicans being Spaniards.
The Spanish who came to govern the Dominican Republic were primarily front
Cuba and Puerto Rico, slave holding colonies, and they refused to recognize the
Dominicans as white and European. Moya Pons writes:
[the race and color of Dominicans] was a constant topic of
offended he Don
"8 ' beCaUSe ",e SPa"ia^ ™"rtnually
Pneo p
" ominicans who were reminded that in Cuba or
its effecton he
e
n
W°Uld *^ ™ ? a"itUde °f^Periority hadtfect t Dominicans themselves. The lighter-skinned
people began to avoid contact with their darker skinned friends forfear of be,ng assoc ated w ith them or of being considered inferior
\ the new, Spanish rulers (Moya Pons, 1995: 206-7).
Additionally, the Dominicans immediately felt the burden of the Spanish bureaucratic
apparatus. Be.anees repons that the payroll of Spain's administrators was more than
seven times the government’s income (Betances, 1995: 18).
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‘CanS qU1Ckly remembered
,he exP!«i^tion and the denigration imposed by
' SPamSh Cr0Wn
' "
'
-~
"P- «o remove the Spaniards from
R“0n^ ,hC dark'Skinned S°' di
- °^orio Luperon and Uiisses
, ieureaux, who
were among many Afro-Do, invoived in the battie for independence. Uke the
war of independence waged against 1 iaiti. this war had a raeia, Cement, and like that war
" aPPea 'ed 10 D°miniCanS °f a
" (Mai"80t
-
'«: 232). During both conflicts, racial
cmerta were crucial whether i, was the Dominican rejection of the ‘black’ I laitians or
^ aga 'nSI ' Ia'" ',ad CaMed f°r lhe U°minicans ,0 rePel the invading African/blacks, a
climate which Dominican historian Franklyn Franco believes to have been “highly
propitious for racism" (Franco, 1997: 74). Dominicans rejected Haitians as being a
d, lie,cm people. This was critical since as U.S. agent Benjamin Greene wrote in 1849,
•Dominican blacks and muia,toes acted and fel, like whites” (Martinez-Fernandez, 1 994.
42). The war against Spain forced a slightly different deflnition of national identity.
Hoetink writes that by the late nineteenth century, Dominican nationalism relied upon
“lhe Spanish language, the Catholic religion and the idea of a population whose origin is
predominantly mixed and Spanish” (I loetink, 1 994: 1 23). Admitting to African heritage
would have been too much to accept, but it is noteworthy that the failed re-colonization
effort by Spain made it painfully clear to both Dominicans and Spaniards, that
Dominicans were no longer simply ethnically Spaniards.
By the 1870s and 1880s, due to the immigration of Spaniards, Puerto Ricans,
Italians. Americans and Cubans, there was a growth in the sugar industry for the first time
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in over two hundred vpirc d •years
- Bl lnsmg with them the technology that wa , . .£?) ma s being used in the
plantations of Puerto Rico and Cnha, snch as the ttse of steam engines and railroads ^
Hegan to butld a modem sugar industty which would soon emerge as the most dominant
economte activity in the court* (Moya Pons, ,995: 259-260). As the nineteenth centuiy
came to a close, the growth of sugar made the south the most important region in the
Dominican Republic, replacing the Cibao. The Dominican intellectual Pedro Francisco
Bono warned that
-sugar was the business of large landow ners with great amounts of
capital and was therefore injurious to the small independent farmers on whose progress
the traditional wealth of the country depended” (in Moya Pons, 1 995: 261 ).
The presence ol light-skinned foreigners not only built the modem sugar industry
but contributed to the informal segregation of Dominicans by color. “With the white
newcomers, the issue o, race became more important. As in most of Latin America,
Dominican elites began to gather in social Cubs, meeting places where members could do
business” (Betances. 1997: 42). These social clubs became increasingly exclusively
Euro-Dominican. The importance of race increased even more so as the labor force for
'he sugar plantations became almost exclusively made up of black foreigners, mostly
horn the West Indies25
. This marked a considerable change since before the assassination
of president Heureaux (1899) the majority of the leaders of the Dominican Republic were
mulattos, yet between 1 899 and 1 929 only one president was not a Euro-Dominican
25 oSee the section on the Dominican Republic (1882-1930) in this chapter.
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(Wiarda, 1975:363). How
although less so than in the
ever, wealthy Afro-Domi
past
26
.
means were still considered “white,”
FO"OWm8 the War °f ReSt0rati0n tW0 P01^ P-ties were fanned. the Ro,0s
(COnSerVa,
'VeS) a,’d ^ <Libera
' S)
- ^ were led by Luper6n who used
position as president to beeonte one of ,He county richest men. The abuse of state
persona! enrichment and to institutionalize clienteles did no, begin, nor end
P-od ot time, and the period that followed the War of Restoration wasjust as unstable
- .he period that preceded the Spanish annexation. Jonathan Hartlyn writes that between
1865 ana 1879 there were 21 governments and 50 militaty uprisings (Hardy,,. 1998: 29).
Brazil (1808-1889)
in 1808, the Portuguese monarchy became the firs, European colonial power to
move its capita, to one of its colonies. The Portuguese royal court fied Lisbon on Bridsh
ships when Napoleon s occupation was imminent, and Rio de Janeiro became no, only
•he capita, of Brazil, bu, also the capita, of the Portuguese empire. The arrival of the
Portuguese monarch in Brazil led to increased consideration for the colony, as well as
increased vigilance and efficiency on the part of the government. Colonial government.
Which had giv en significant liberties to slave owners and caudilhos in the early colonial
wTm'If-,h
aS an
w°
gUeS in BrazN
'
“Whe rtch negro is a
negro would be accepted, although not without reservations.
°“gh “meS ,he rich
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^
ureaucracy. I, also mean, a slow growth of anti-Portuguese sentiment that would
eventually translate into proto-nationalism.
Don, Joao, the Portuguese monarch, was quite comfortable in Brazil and he only
Portuguese crown back to Lisbon in 1 82 1 w hen the pressure exerted by the
Portuguese and British parliaments was insurmountable. Before leaving, Don, Joao
fW mdePendenCe
’
he Sh0i"d
movement, because even though Brazil
would be independent, a, leas, i, would be ruled by a Portuguese monarch.
In
.822, Don, Pedro declared Brazil independent and was later crowned Emperor
raz.ll. Although independence was virtually bloodless, Dorn Pedro agreed to pay 2.9
million dollars to Portugal and to assume Portugal's debt to Britain of 6.7 million dollars.
Which meant that Brazilian sovereignty would be limited by its external debt, particularly
10 Britain (Bushnell and Macaulay, ,988: 160). Don, Pedro assembled a group of
Brazilians to put together a constitution for the new empire, bu, he soon butted heads
w ith the Brazilian Andrade brothers, dissolved the congress, and selected ten Brazilians
.0 write a constitution that was more to his liking. The Constitution of 1 824 gave
citizenship unequivocally to free bom people with an annual income of one hundred
dollars or more (Bushnell and Macaulay, 1 988: 1 58). The Constitution did not refer to
slaves nor to race. The right to nationality and citizenship was not tnerefore the
privilege of whites in the empire; it was a right that belonged to the free bom” (da Silva.
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’ 6 r'8htS °f Afr°'BraZ,llan citi«ns were explicitly defended in a decision
ofDom Pedro II’s Councii of State in ! 8492!
,
in which it was declared that “[a]ny
Pr°V ,S'°nS^ make h3tefUl diStinC"- concerning mulatt0 citizens of^ „
freedmen
’
SUCH " e“ iUdin8^
- a religious brotherhood etc are
unconstitutional” (in Conrad, 1983:221).
Emperor's anti-slavety bias was unable to prevent the forma, guarantees
0 e<IUa"
,y °‘ C°nStitUti0n fr0m
subverted by the informal inequa,ity of
Brazilian society. Because birth was so important for citizens, Afro-Brazilians'
citizenship could be questioned since they were more likely to have an
“illegitimate”
b,rth
’
and ,hey Were m°re ,ikel >' 10 be lhe descendants of slaves than were lighter
zihans. For example, m one extreme case, Schwartz notes that in Vila Rica in 1 804.
f children bor„ oi ,ree parents were illegitimate, compared to 98 percent of
children bom of slaves (Schwartz, 1 989: 389). Also, although freed
,.:_ves were
m the military, they could do so only as private soldiers (Mattoso, 1 994: 1 79),
Brazilian political elites were not always sympathetic to the emperor or his goals
to centralize power, but many realized that centralization was necessary to prevent
various rebellions from spreading or snowballing. Power in rural areas still resided
within coronets and powerful cauMkos (local strongmen), however, these men realized
the need to support some of the activities of the government in order to maintain their
ow n position of power (Graham. 1990: 69). Social relations continued to reflect vast
differences in power, institutionalized through the household and the family (Lauderdale
Dom Pedro II, the son of Dom Pedro I. assumed the Brazil ian thrown in 1831
.
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insisting that for every individual tv.^hCre W3S a Vei?
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arti
-'- place...." (Graham, 1990:
—3-4).
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tHUC UaS d SlaVe reV°h ’ n Bah
' a Which was Particularly clear about its
revolutionaries were imprisoned (Reiss,
, 9293, xii). That large number and the racial
overtones left a strong impri „, on Bahians of all colors. ,n general, as ,n the Dominican
Republic, free Afro-Brazi,ians {pardos and
M
who^ par, m^^ fc
political Change, very rarely involved themselves with slave populations. The Sabinda
Revolt Of .837-8 is a good example. Schwartz writes that during the rebellion
“attempts
made to integrate slaves into rebel nrilitaty units met with opposition no, only front slave-
owners but also from free people of color who objected to being placed on the same level
with the enslaved... Even in the midst of revolution, the divisions of slave society could
not be overcome" (Schwartz. ,989: 477). AM members of Brazilian society, just as in the
Dominican Republic, understood the hierarchy of social relations, and the ways through
Which people ol lesser status could better themselves. For Afro-Brazilians, and Afro-
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Dominicans, this meant association with F„
ejection of the same aspects of Africa.
«.—
. .»,«* tan^ iurin,„ „„„„„„„
and piessure from the English inri a -
' ' lnS invading Brazilian ships, forced the Braziiians
without a source ofnew slaves, and given the deplorable conditions of slaves and their
m0r,a"ty ra ‘eS * S ' aVer> ' W°Uld $00n enA ^""-g in
.he 1 830s. the Brazilian
ernmen. began enconragmg immigrants from southern Europe to emigrate to Brazil
;
h the h0Pe$ °f b0lh
the—- Priding a source of cheap labor
avares Bastes explained
‘Wthou, ,he immigrants of Qennany^^^
Brazil will never progress” (in Bums, 1980 - 223 30t He fi ,h’ > ” further suggested that the “pure
hlood of the Northern rarpe” tnn„ue ces would
“renovate our degenerate - tu -r la^e. This immigration
decade of the tw entieth century.
By 1 86, . the majority of Afro-Brazilians were free and the trend towards gradual
ancipation was hastened after the war with Paraguay ( 1 864- 1 870). This war was
especially significant because some 6,000 Afro-Brazilians recetved their freedom when
lhey joined the militia (Bums, ,980: 259). Afro-Brazilian slaves could also take the place
of .heir master or master’s son. and receive their freedom as a result. Despite the promise
of freedom, many of the soldiers who entered the militia were hardly volunteers (Graham.
do not'h'esh^tTtcfaffimuh^ explained “I know our rural districts, and ,
workers grew scarce, not more than 25 to 30 percent of therhVrf"
tredtm
.
ent ° f the slaves that be§an after
adolescent slaves is proof of great child mortal^ (!n^ ^ °f of
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" 0ff,CerS r" up poor Brazilians and Afro-
Brazilians and often coerrpH tv, a •1 ced them into m litarv servrVp nm • ,laiyserv,Ce. Others, including free Afro-
razihans, voluntarily entered the armv ay « a "cans of consolidating their integration into
S°Cle,y and t0 <hat they were truly citizens31
.
Coffee hecante the ntos, important crop in Brazi, during the nineteenth century
tramS
’^ ,eChn0l°8y ‘hat Bra2ilia
" —- exposed to international marhets
was a Liberalism that coexisted q ui,e comfortabiy with socia, hierarchies, and even
slavery. Elites used Liberal ideas to push for independence and freedom of trade Vio.ti
da Costa contrasts the Libera,ism of Europe with that of Brazi, writing:
instrumentK ^?? * ™
merchants
8
.
**
'^^^w-rs'd''
‘‘h
Many of these Liberals supported the gradual abolition of slavery. In 1831, any
P-son who married a free person was considered to be free. By 1 869. the government
prohibited any sale of slaves which would separate a husband from wife, or parent from
child. In 1 871
. the Free Womb Law declared free children bon, of slave parents.
’
“1 °r
Br; 'ai" “ hu, f„u „d that Ihe larges ,tne southern Eu.opeans, which was certainly not the elites’ first choice.
although their masters would be responsible f
raiSmg the children, and could request
work of them In i&Cs ti
sexagenarian law was passed freeing slaves of sixty,
conditionally, and those over sK-tv"
' “condmonally. In 1872, the first national
census showed that there wem a o"e 4 '2
Afro-Brazilians. eon,pared with only
, .5
million slaves, and the free Afm t
•
- ztltan population accounted for some 43 percent of
'he total population (Klein. 1 986: 223 32 ) When p •>• w he Princess Isabel, in absence of her
^ 723
'000 ^ ™ of the population of Brazil a, dte
time (Carvalho, 1995: 36; Bums, 1980: 278).
h
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’
lte Hb°mi0n~ » Brazil began to aniculate itself clearly33
Among the stronger arguments in favor of abolishing slavery was the fact tha, all other
“civilized” countries had done so. The use of the word
“civilized” was interesting since i,
consistently been used, in the past, to denigrate Indigenes and Afro-Brazilians.
The most preeminent abolitionist, Joaquin, Nabuco. wrote, “Brazil does no, want to be a
nation morally isolated, a leper, expelled from the world community. The esteen, and
respect of foreign nations are as valuable to us as they are to other people” (in Skidmore,
free Afro-Brazilian
I'tioC ar fir'
‘°,
'r
fi8Ure ° f 'Candido da Fonseca GalviSo, a
Galvao, included in the appendices are particularly lellinC
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Martinique alffouadeloLipe
6
c^lfm “wrA? "7 "*** Pe°P 'eS “ Sa '"“D°™"-e.
and 467,000 slaves, and 32,000 free colored in th "(InOaC
" d 'eS
’ deSP ' te 3
P
opulation of 53,000 whites
million whites (Klein, 1986: 224)
' & tateS
’
comPare^ w * th 658,000 slaves and 1.3
law^hTesS b>' the Liberals, ever, major
scholars note there was little ideological differed h f
aS PaS
>
Se
|
d by Conservatlve congress. But as many
Vicsount de Albuqueraue co^entSIt T ^^ C°nServatives ' In fact, the
'
(Bums. ] 980: 2 1 9), and the reverse could very easTy ^ ^
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11 Sh0U
'd alS° be n°'ed ,ha ‘ ab° liti0n did no
' rem°™ the power from social
, f
,i0nS in BraZi "an
——
-res,
“[sjince freedom was a
r0m 3 SUPen°r '° a" ln,en0r
’
'10 ’ reSl" tin« » agreemem between equals ir
CXemP" ned^ ™eVen eXCHange "
- c^aracterized mos, reiarionsbips
whether social or... political” (Graham, 1990: 27). Additionally, since Afro-Brazilians
r
Ved the ' r freed°m m°S ' 0fen r"°m P“—ons, and no, from government
egtslation,
.he freedom of Afro-Brazilians was vety clearly a personal gift.
Another idea
.ha, entered Brazil a, this time was scientific racism. Henry Thomas
“ BritiSh reS 'dem in^^- pen* theorized that miscegena,ion in
Bra2il deg“ a"“ °f ** he wrote, has a
-population
totally mulatto, v. bated in its blood and spirit, and fearfully ugly- (i „ Skidmore, 1 993:
30). While drfteient forms ol racial prejudice had existed in Brazil a, various points, the
presence of European foreigners in Brazil made Brazilians even more conscious of their
race and their racial mixture. The French thinker Gobineau. perhaps the mos, famous
author Of scientific tracts on race a, the end of the nineteenth century
,
wrote long
polemics arguing that no, only was the white race superior to the bl.k one, but also that
ure of the two represented a perversion of both. In a similar vein, Georges Vacher de
Eapouge wrote that Brazil was “an enormous Negro state on its way back to barbarism"
(in Burns, 1980: 363).
ZTed :° T'rm h? equality nor
for other American peoples—belonu to AmedcTmen 1
6 VVe Braz,l,ans—and the same can be said
we belong to Europe on all stratified levels As -
e
^
°n 3 neW 3nd fluctuating ,a>'er of our mind, while
over the fomter. Our imagination cannot fail to be
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The Europeans were no, a,one in noticing the degree of miscegenation in Brazil
d
" 0,
'
ten rcfW
- same person might he marked
same time, Brazilians responded to the charges of the scientific racists. Silvio Romero
:
0dUCed
*
-—- rejected the arguments oh
Oohieneau. Nina Rodrigues distinguished between civi.ized and inferior race, arguing
tha
‘ 'a,ter C0U ’d n°' ^ CiVili2ed (Skidm0re
’
1 36. 59). Whtu many Brazilians^ W""n8 t0 aCCeP
‘ ^ AI>-nS and Indigenes they believed that
mulattos mtgh, represent an improvement on those races and
“whitening” was
considered a vtable developmental strategy by elites (Skidmore,
1 993; 64).
Dominican Republic (1882-1930)
In 1882. Uhsses Heureaux, a mulatto of humble origins, came to power in the
Dominican Republic, a position that he would occupy tor the next seventeen years.
through an authoritarian political system maintained by an extensive clientelis, system of
d excessive borrowing. Despite the existence of racial prejudice, I leureaux.
like Luperon before him, was able to attain the position of president. Heureaux was far
more of a dictator than a president, ye, he fel, the need to legitimize his rule by holding
regular elections. While the elections were not necessarily fair, and his opponents often
had ,0 deal with over, interference and repression, Heureaux’s maintenance of an
institutional fagade suggests that political institutions were recognized as important.
However, Heureaux had little problem manipulate or ignoring institutions when it was
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(Bell 1981 - ti- , . .
during his regime
common,canons system (Wiarda and Kryzanek, 1982: 30).
th ,
The S,ab" i,y^ m0demiZati0n °f lte H~ regime created an environment
CUtt,ng ““^ C°nSidered di“' * Dominicans, the government was
^ced to import ,ahor. during the Heureaux period and for the years to fodow, sugar
CaW Pr°dUCti0n beCa'”e in“^— -
-or from the British West Indies and
fr0m Hahi <HOetink
’ '**
— were very poor, wilhng t0 work in
dreadfui conditions that most Dominicans cooid avoid, and were overwhelming, dark-
skinned. Thus, parade, to the ascendance of a white and foreign planter and elite class-
voted (Moya Pons, 1995: 268)
an°rfKr^ UeCtl0n
’
on,y 1 People, out of an electorate of 100,000
As seen in the section on the Dominican Republic (.79,-1882) in this chapter.
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development of a dark. foreign, and. eventually Haitian lab f
force was reeeivedbvhott
•>», or orce. This labor
y both xenophobia and racism (Hoe,ink. 1994: 108).
After Heureaux’s
assassination in 1 899 nolitioc n
^ u
POl " lcs beca™ fairly unstable again”
and the Dominican Republic was saddled by deb, that ha ty a l I d accumulated during
Heureaux-s government. Additionally, the fiscal crisis prevented pohticians from
rewarding both supporters and opposition, which led to more instability and more
_on, Wjth (he Repub
, ic
,
s deb( (o fore;gn gove_ms mou^ ^
'*c States guaranteed the deb, of the Dominican Republic citing the Monroe Doctrine
o guarantee Dominican debt, the US took over the Dominican customs house, used 55
percent of the revenue in r^nxrpay Dorn,mean deb, and for its collection staff, and gave 45™ » «• Dominican The Dom„„ ^ „
*"**-•
•
«,«. were (l,
exclusive source ofincome for the Dominican government.
660 1910 and 1916, the United Slates increased its presence in the
Dominican Rc„W, n
, ^ ^
national economy. While the US brought stability to Dominican finances.
the D°miniCan P°" tiCal Sys,em crumb,ed
' specially without the monetary incentives
traditionally used to maintain clienteles. A rebellion in 1914 was i vith a stem
reaction from the United States government which insisted that the rebeis either lay down
•heir arms or accept a government chosen by the US. The rebels assented, but peace was
ved. Finally, in 1916. US marines invaded the Dominican Republic, as they had
Haiti only one year earlier.
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The US Mannes governed the Dominican Republic for eight years. They
immediately began an effort to disami the popuiation and censor the press Disam ' hpopulation was accomplished fairly rapidly with the
‘ *
. except.on of the gavilleros, groups of“ *«•*
*“ ““ « r»« ideological
“
“*
~l»». 1«
- l.„
Ic Hie meanwhile, [JS Marines were able io ft
leureaux and to stabilize the political arH1 “d systems. During the eight years, the
• « system in the count,, histo, was impiemented, a Natio.,1 Cuard was created.
Is, sanitation, highways and mail service were improved. All this made it easier
t0
'he V3ri0US regl°nS *“**»
-public But the accomplishments of
the occupying government were not gifts, nor were they without cos,. Repression“ Wgh dUring the ® was able to consolidate controlling interest
- many of the nation, industries, most notably sugar. Wiarda and Ktyzanek note
critically that the modernization projects of the Marines were
‘7!l
ghrd Civili2er ’ as a ‘P-gmatic
system allowed American suea^fi
^ omm,can RePubhc, land titles
roads were designed to facilitate th
S
?
exPanct their holdings, the new
forces, and the public work
'"y ° f ,he oecilPa‘m" militaiy
(Wiarda and
^ty'zaneky^S^fsxT/aliTs in origina*!)^^
®om ‘n'can pesos
A negotiated settlement between Jacinto Peynado and Charles Evans Hughes
called for elections to be held, under US observation, and the recognition of the deb,
incurred to the US during the US occupation. The winner of the elections was the aging
37
With the exception of the Caceres period (1906-191
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Horacio Vasquez who was able
.0 win enouohg support to extend his term • .
was able to generate little c ,
S 'X
^earS ’ 1,111
-
.
support thereafter. Despite that, Moya Pons writes "[f]or
,hefirst time in Dominican history there appeared
,0 b’
, .
P 1 a government capable both of
P'ng order and of ma.ntaining civil liberties" (Moya Pons. 1995: 350).
Since Dominican histoty in the eighteenth centuty was plagned by constant
rebellions between nolitinl ; n e o ains and outs, a priority for the I is iw n •> I0 m l IS Marines was disarming the
population and training a National Cua h •Guard in order to instill a more professional police
orce and a more stable environment. Ironically, by disarming the population, the
null,ary support, Vasquez made sure that his most loyal supporter.
Rafael Irujillo, be the head of the National Army And Truiillry- 1 tujillo was probably the most
loyal Horacista, that is. until he removed Vasquez. from office.
Brazil (1889-1930)
The Empire of Brazil was overthrown by a peaceful military coup in
, 889- one
year follow,
ng general abohtion, which launched a period of Republican government
Historian dost) Mnrilo de Carvalho has argued that the Kirs, Republic, was much less
inclusive than the monarchy it replaced. For example, the Constitution of 1 89 1 extended
" m,ted SUffia8e ‘° a" ,i,CTate BraZilia
" **— 86 percent of the population was
•'literate in 1890, and 76 percent was still illiterate in 1920 (Andre..,, 1991: 73. 276 n.
54). The literacy requirement not only removed large parts of the population from
participation, but 1, concentrated the citizenry since literacy was highest, by far. in the
southeastern and southern states. I. is estimated that 50 percent of the electorate lived in
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" «“** Sul. Noi„Slin,|y Sl0
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,or buro-Brazihans (Andrew, 1991: 73 ).
„ T
B"!“”
”>»
'« »
and produced a constitution within less than two years of the coup which removed Dorn
' edro 11 (Burns, 1980- 291) R,„- ) But at the same time, it is doubtful that too much
"Us ol llw Firsi Republic. Carvalho linds ihal
close to those of the 1 Iniw so-,*Untted States, vot.ng under the Firs, Republic decreased
total population voted prior to the creation of the Firs, Republic, while only between 1
percent voted afterwards (Carvalho,
,987: IW
, He explains this saying
,t]he
People knew
.ha, the formal [the institutions of the republican government] was no,
serious. No, having a means of participation, the Republic w as no, for real" (Carvalho,
'987: 160). Rather, abstention was due to a lack of firth in political institutions, an
awareness of the farcical nature of institutional power, the efficacy of clienteles, and a
political system in which participation in official politics was an entirely alien affair.
n. the V\ ar with Paraguay, many uprooted poor and Afro-Brazilian
soldiers who had fought returned no, to their old plantations, but to the growing urban
areas along the coast, most prominently Rio de Janeiro, and later Sao Paulo. Without
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migrants made
“*«*.**M »h„
e Integration of former slaves, the government made no effort to facilitate the
eCOn0miC
- PO ' itiCa
' andSOCiaiint
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Authority remained linked to wealth and status. While the powerful in the
" S 'a,eS^ remai,
’ed “*—d among the older families Two
observations by Engiish traveler James Btyce speak of th ,o e extent to which politics had
-*-*-
—~ «„„
,nd
thal thefe "" "° °rganiZed "alional Polili-' parties in Brazil and
...state issues
279, 307,. J h,s attests to both the continued persona, and unchecked authority of the
Planter, vis-b-vis his subjects, and to the stunted development of organized, nationa,
politics on an institutional level.
Although it began in the 1830s. European immigration to Brazil was most
significant between 1889 and 1 930. Between ,830 and 1930 some 3.5 million
immigrants, mostly from southern Europe, settled in Brazil, the sa-
-umber as Africans
arriving in Brazil between 1550and , 850
. Immigration was mostly directed towards the
southeast and the south, where the coffee economy was still booming, and where Indus,ty
was beginning grow. Demonstrative of this is the vety high percentage of Euro-
1 890 A
l0" PerCen ‘aSe °f Afr°-Brazili»ns in the south and in Sao Paulo l„
13 °' 'hat ln the res t °f Brazil (Marx i 998 . 66) .....
politics Otv ,
1 ’ . ). Additionally, Marx points to the
percent of the Brazilian population. However by 1 950, the next time tha,
race was included on the census39 ,h, ,
B
’
C> aCC0Unted t0r 62 percent of population of
razil (Marx, 1998: 163).
While Brazil was being whitened by the southern K,,. •11 Lmopean immigrants, Afro-
Jazi lan citizens found that freedom from slaverv> Was not necessarily real freedom.
8 at.on into the country s economy and society was slow and marred by strono
—«r,y in the southeast where employers preferred immigrant labor
‘
Andrews writes,
“Blacks were permitted to hold „ .I ... gatherings as long as they kept to a
pectfied area of the park or plaza. In a 1 924 ease in which several blacks attempted to
Cmer 3 Pan ^ PUWiC SqUafe ™ whites, the mayor admitted that
Afro-Brazilians had the Wal rioWw 8 ‘ any part of the sc
l
ua^ but in practice ‘custom
makes law”' (Andrews,
,991:
,38). In so short a response the mayor was able to explain
^ miS,rati0n tha
‘ Afr°-BraZi,ia
- free ones, had been experiencing for
raany years. Legal status was subordinated by social status, and Afro-Brazilians were no,
soctally equal to Euro-Brazilians, and so they could enjoy only an abridged fonn of
citizenship.
Another Mef rndden,
„ri,in^ „„„^
“P“““ «**'*'- «•*-*.M MMr««,
39
Rare "as no, included on the censuses of 1900 and 1920, probably because the government did not want
83
perception that they were » t .
Afro BrazT •
6 ” Wh'tened’” SUStained the low status of given to
- general. After the death of Machado de Assis, one of Brazil's besl
mentioned that Machado like v •actiad , hk Venssimo, was a mulatto. The great ahniv • T
Nabuco was highly cri ticai of this “Nabuco
[mulat(ol . ..
' UC°-
—ded
,he suppression of ,he word
t ], msistmg that Machado would not have been pleased by it. ‘Your article,’ he
wrote to Verissimo.
he was indeed a GreekV krTTW* 'ha ' CaUSed me chills; ‘Mulatto
<hink that nothing would have h u,rt hi ’more'"" muiatt0 and 1remark when you convert your article into
Lg } 011 10 0mit this
Machado was white and I Lr , P
eiinanent form... For me
Costa. 1 985: 241)
'h°USht 50 (in Viotti da
excellent individuals from the 'rabble’ of Afro-Brazilians.
negotiation of racial identity, rather than
throughout Brazilian society an H it me even more prevalent as Brazil continued to
modernize and urbanize, even though
This sort of individual
group contestation had been very present
collectivity, remain very limited.
economic mobility of Afro-Brazilians. as a
Pomica, power shifted within the coffee aristocracy between Mtnas Gera.s and
Sao Paulo during most of the First Republic. But
within one of the two states fell apart as Sao Paulo
the Minero aristocrats and a military
the alliance that kept the presidency
grew hegemonic. With the support of
} supported coup, the southern politician Getul
Vargas came to power in 1930.
10
to know the result, and there was no census conducted in 1910 and 1930 (Marx, 1998: 168).
84
Conclusion
During the approximate,, four and a ha,f centuries of his,or „ .
chapter, political institutions slowly evolved and fi
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e relation of citizens to one or more countries to which they aspired to be like or
^ in$iSted ,h3t **
'»^ countries, race played a vety
different times in both countries. African heritage united the two American countries
especially in relation to the fberian colonizers, however, independence and nation-state
construction w ere the projects of creole elites who did no, use African heritage as a
untfymg potnt. In fact, the elites did jus, the opposite, denying African influences and
attempting to create European nations. Additionally, race relations, like all relations.
-ere characterized by a combination of unequal power and status with paternal concern
and control. In both countries, having African descent lessened one’s legitimacy,
literally, as a citizen, and ye, that did no, prevent individual mulattos and dark-skinned
Dominicans and Brazilians from occupying the most prominent
literature.
positions in politics and
considered white in both countries was quite fluid, although at times
.. was more static, such as when modernization began in the late nineteenth centuries in^ countries. Afro-Oominicans and
^-Brazilians who were success*,, cou,d often
be accepted as white,’ with few people offering protest. What this suggests is that while
miscegenation allowed many to enter the socially privileged space of light-skinned
peoples, the social significance given to dark-skinned peoples was generally no, positive.
miscegenation did no, institute equality, especially since the sexual relations that
were involved were often between people of veiy different levels of status. Additionally,
abolition occurred without a fair integration of the newly freed people.
Finally, in both countries, i, seems that there were periods when racial barriers
were more stringent, diminishing mobility for Afro-Dominicans ana Atro-Brazilians, as
groups. The Spanish rule (1861-5), the rise of the sugar industty (,870-19,4) and the US
occupation (19,6-24) opened up Dominican conceptions of race to European and
American versions, w hich resulted in more clear forms of racial prejudice. Similarly, the
increased presence of the southeastern coffee production made the Brazilians more
familiar with European literature on Liberalism, as well as European
'scientific’
conventions on race, very much affected the means by which Brazilians began to view
race. This is no, to say that racial prejudice in either country was essentially foreign, only
that the type of prejudice that emerged was increasingly influenced by the scheme of
European and Americans, particularly at the highest levels of societv. Racial identity
remained weak, however, and differences along color continued to be dominant.
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CHAPTER 3
RACE AND CITIZENSHIP IN
I HE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (1930-1999)
AND BRAZIL (1930-1999)
Th 'S ChaPt6r Wi " C°ntinUe t0 examine citizenship, race and the political systems
or.he Dominican Republic and Brazil, recusing on the las, seven decades of the twentieth
century,
.n this period eertain social and political developments are especially important,
hirst, the nation-state emerged in both countries as a legitimate and powerful institution,
even if dominated by an individual, the militaty. or an elite class. The nation-state
effected the entry of the masses into politics without compromising the order and
hierarchy considered so critical by elites. Curiously enough, the most significant
extensions of mass politics occurred during authoritarian and corporate regimes.
Second, the nation became an integrative tool imposing an ideology which
assumed integration, particularly of people of different colors. The assumption of a
unified and homogeneous nation denied the possibility of racism or. for that matter, racial
identification. Racial identification tended to be minimal, although discrimination along
color lines did not disappear. Color was perceived in terms of shad.., which therefore
el looted individuals, rather than racial categories, which involved collectivities. Within
such a system mobility and ambiguity of identity was a salient factor. However, the
degree to which individual mobility existed may be questioned, and certainly the
collective perception of negritud/e remained reasonably static. Finally, as development,
urbanization, and modernization occurred at unprecedented levels, the traditional
differences between the extremes of the socio-political spectrum—Euro and Afro, rich
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and poor, even men and women were not mediated, and new democratic institutions
have only had limited success in doing so. Persis.cn, social, econonric and political
inequalities have been significant constraints during the most recent periods of
democratization and liberalization in both countries.
Dominican Republic (1930-1961)
Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, a mulatto of Spanish. Creole and f'rtian descent, rose
qu.ckly through the National Guard formed by the US Marines to head the National
Army. In 1 930, through a coup cTe'a,, he became president of the Dominican Republic.
While the United States was hesitant about supporting a man who had come to power
through a coup, Trujillo immediately legitimized his rule by having an election in which
he won some 99 percent of the votes cast' (Hartlyn. 1998: 91). Satisfied, but still
ambivalent, the United States left Trujillo in power, a position he would enjoy for over
three decades. Even critics of his regime within the Roosevelt administration were
prevented from overtly opposing Trujillo because of the Good Neighbor Policy which
ended US intervention in Latin America (Roorda. 1998).
During Trujillo’s thirty-one year reign, the country went through tremendous
transformations as the processes of urbanization, centralization, modernization and
industrialization accelerated. Due in large part to the development which occurred during
the US military occupation—the development of roads, the mail service, a tax system, the
disarming ol the population—Trujillo was able to build an efficient and powerful
i
There was a 45 percent abstention rate, however (Hartlyn
,
1998: 40).
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authoritarian state. Between 1938 and >960 “the nutnher of manufacturing
establishments almost doubled; cap,,a, investnten, multiplied by 9 ,imes; the nuntber of
workers and employees grew by 2.5 times...,he national raw product used by the
manufacturing sector also multiplied 14 times... industrial sales also multiplied more
*an 12 times from SI3.3 mi„ 10n to S.64.4 milIion„ (Moya ^^^
could point no, only to the increase in investment and the many pubhc works projects
(which also enriched his family) but also to the Trujillo-Hul, pact which returned control
over customs receivership to the Dominican government. Trujillo won back the
economic sovereignty ol the Dominican Republic, and in 1947 he was able to pay off the
country s debt to the United States.
But while Trujillo was concerned with constructing a powerful Dominican state,
his primary interest w as his own enrichment and monopolization of the wealth and power
Ot the small countiy. For example, Trujillo raised tariffs on many foreign capitalists,
particularly in the sugar industry, in order to pressure them into selling their plantations to
him. Moya Pons repons that, within a shon period, Trujillo monopolized the production
of salt, meat, rice, and milk (Moya Pons, 1995: 359). And Trujillo’s reach went beyond
even this, entering into cashing checks and prostitution, and including a 10 percent
deduction trom wages of all workers who were members of the onl, r „litical party, his
Dominican Party (Partido Dominicano) (Moya Pons, 1995: 360; Betances. 1995: 99;
Wiarda. 1975). By 1934. Trujillo was the richest man in the Dominican Republic and by
the time ot Ins assassination in 1961 he was among the richest men in the world (Moya
Pons, 1995: 360, 365).
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This was quite an accomplishment for the mulatto, bom ou, of wedloek, rejected
by Dominican aristocracy, and no, admitted to their social clubs (Wucker,
, 999: 45). A
former plantation guard, telegraph operator, stable boy and pimp, he had been humiliated
by the upper class on many occasions (Diederich, 1 990). I, is likely tha, this rejection led
.o Trujillo's attempt to crush the white social clubs, and also to his use of white powder
er his fact before appearing in public. It is not unimportant that Trujillo believed
‘hat White P°Wder C°U,d make him legitimate among the social circles which
considered him an outsider, or tha, i, made him seem more legitimate to the Dominican
people, and the US. I, is also likely that the rejection by the Euro-Dominican elites
prompted his extreme narcissism and egomania which was evidenced by his love of
lilies
2
,
the obscene number of monuments honoring him3
,
and changing the name of
Samo Domingo to Ciudad Trujillo (Trujillo City) in 1 936. Trujillo even proclaimed his
son Ramfis a colonel at the age of four and brigadier general at nine, and his daughter
Angela queen.
Trujillo built a regime that went beyond personal enrichment and authoritarian
practices. The Trujillo regime was the regime that most closely approximated a
totalitarian regime in Latin American history (Wiarda and Kryzanek. 1982: 37). More s
than any dictator before him, and since. Trujillo extended his control into the most
intimate aspects ol his subjects' lives through a vicious intelligence service (SIM), high
levels of surveillance, and through control over education and intellectual production
When he was president in the 1950s he was addressed thusly: His Excellency, the Generalissimo. Doctor
a lad Leonidas Trujillo Molina, Honorable President of the Republic, Benefactor of the Nation. Restorer
?ooi
e
^'"
anC,al IndePenclence of the Country and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Hartlyn,
1 77oi 94). J
There were 1,870 monuments which honored Trujillo in Santo Domingo alone (Cambeira. 1997: 12).
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(Hartlyn, IW8: S6>. There were really no independent^ ^^
UVed 0U 'Side ,He diCtat° r ' S
- safe from his wrath. In l95, a former
government employee. Jeshs Galindez, working on a dissertation on “The Era of Trgjillo”
a« Columbia University was kidnapped, brought back to Santo Domingo, and -[i]nch by
mch... was lowered into a va, of boiling water” later to be fed to a poo, of sharks
(O.edench, 1990: 9). Eduardo Galeano writes of Trujillo’s reign of terror “[w]hen a
Piece of land interests hint [Trujillo, he doesn’t buy it; he occupies it. When a woman
appeals to him. he doesn’t seduce her: he jus. points” (Galeano. 1992: I06a). By 1959.
Trujillo’s regime became even more repressive. He killed three of- - Mirabal sisters 5
,
who were involved in anti-Trujillo activity, and. in 1 960. he attempted to have
Venezuelan presrdent Romulo Betancourt assassinated. The attempt failed, and after the
Mirabal murders and the fall of Batista in Cuba in 1959, international pressure began to
weaken Trujillo's stronghold.
Modernization allowed the Dominican state to reach into even the most remote
areas of the country, most important of which was probably the border with Haiti. By the
1 930s, ’’Haiti had become the main source of cane cutters for the Dominican Republic’s
cane growers” (Martinez. 1996: 2). The large numbers of foreigners involved in the labor
force of the sugar mills as well as the use of Haitian gourdes6 in the Cibao and the
western parts of the Dominican Republic troubled Trujillo, and in 1933 he began a period
of Dommicanization of the Dominican Republic. That year he passed a law which
AdTioialR
0
Tmiii
n
Vr'
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that
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Saw °" ,he S,reet and they would later brought before him.SfcSr ;ng expecting men Seeking fav0rs ,0 0tTer ,lKir iter’sVirginity to the Dictator. For more on this, see (Deiderich, 1990).
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ber °fWOri“ l"Ve recently dealin8 with the Mirabal sisters (Aquino Garcia, 1996;
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deciared
.hat 70 percent of laborers in cane fields had to be Dominican (Martinez, 1 996:
44). When he received strong pressure from US multinational corporations. Trujillo
allowed those mills to continue to use Haitian labor. In 1 934. Trujillo had 8,000 Haitians
eported (Wucker, 1999: 104). but tt is estimated that some 52.000 Haitians were living
in the Dominican Republic at that time (Maingot, 1992: 233).
In 1 936, the Dominican foreign minister suggested that Trujillo be nominated for
a Nobel Peace Prize, because of his work with Haiti, a suggestion that see.ns especially
misguided considering the events of the following year. In 1937. after a visit to the
border towns, Trujillo w as reportedly shocked by the presence and influence of Haitians.
He later ordered his soldiers to brutally eliminate the Haitians along the border, although
anti-Haitian violence took place to a lesser extent in the sugar plantations in the east and
south. Between 5,000 and 35,000 Haitians were killed during this massacre, most were
ktlled by beatings, since gun shot wounds would have made it too obvious that it was the
work of the army (Wucker, 1 999: 48 7). The official government account of the incident
was that illegal Haitian squatters were killed by local Dominican peasants. In justifying
the event, minister Andre Pastoriza explained ‘“illegal Haitian penetration seriously
obstructed the Dominican government’s aim to improve the low Dominican standard of
lit lng; to defend the clean traditional customs of our citizens; to protect Dominican
property on the frontier from Haitian bandits; and to preserve our rzi'.zl superiority over
them’” (in Roorda, 1998: 136).
7
Haitian currency. The Dominican currency at the time was US dollars.
After international pressure forced Trujillo to recognize the incident. Trujillo agreed to pay the Haitian
government $750,000, but after some reported bribes, Trujillo paid only $525,000 (Moya Pons, 1995: 369).
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Under considerable international pressure, Trujillo decided no, to run again for
president in 1 03, although he stil, eontrol.ed the governor He attended to regain
^ SUPP°n * Jewish P-Ple who were tleeing Europe. By
accepung the Jews, Trujillo took pressure off US President Roosevelt whose hands were
^ dUe '° ^ United States vis-d-vis the war in Europe
I rujtllo offered 1 00,000 visas to Jewish refugees Peeing Germany, and offered to settle
then, on his land on in the northern region of Sosua. Trujillo's magnanimity might be
q tioned by his limits on married Jews, since he clearly was luring the Jews in order to
whiten the population (Wucker. 1 999: 57). In the end, only about 235 Jewish refugees
settled in Sosua (Roorda, 1998: 146). Additionally, during this period Trujillo
encouraged European immigration, much as Brazil had done earlier. He explained “ It] he
urgent need that the Dominican Republic has to attract people of the white race,
particularly farmers of the Spanish race” in order to counterbalance
“the excess of
peoples of Haiti... [who created] complex and various problems with their clandestine
invasion” (in Franco, 1992: 81). In ,937. Trujillo explained a new immigration policy
which would facilitate such a process of “whitening.” He writes “[a] great quantity of
immigrants of the White race is needed. The immigrants shall be Spanish. Italian, and
also of French origin. Immigrants of Caucasian stock shall pay a fee of six pesos for the
residency permit and those not of such origin shall pay 500 pesos” (in Cambeira, 1997:
185).
The combined attempt to whiten the population, and to eliminate the Haitian
presence in the island, became a fundamental cornerstone to Dominican national
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identity8
. And i, was during the period of Trujillo’s dictatorship that a conscious nationa,
den,iw was formed, propagandized and disseminated.
-During the epoch of Trujillo.
Dominican historiographers felt necessary, for the firs, time, to invent an official pas,”
(Nunez, 1 990: ,87’, To do this, Trujillo relied on a stable of intellectuals, most notably
Manue, Arturo Pena Batlle and Joaquin Balaguer. His bevy of intellectual sycophants
created the image of Trujillo as a wamor/hero who had finally vanquished the Haitian
foe. who had defended DomtoamUad (Dominicanness) from the degeneration that Haiti
represented, and who was leading the country into a new epoch.
The Trujillo period was one of the most important for the development of a
national identity with a racial/racist component. Since the late 1880s, black foreign
workers had been used in increasing levels by the sugar plantations. However, it was
only by the 1 920s and 1 930s that the most predominant group among these laborers was
The growth ot the sugar industry' had led to the creation of a very small Euro-
Domimcan or American elite and a caste of foreign laborers of African descent. Cane
cutting began to be thought of as Haitian labor, and the Haitian laborers occupied the
lowest and most peripheral rung in Dominican society. The increased presence and
denigration ot the people of this caste transformed the dark-skinned Dominicans into
.
X\1llle SOme to™ of anti-Haitianism had been present in Dominican society, it did not become a
significant part of Trujillo's nationalist ideology until 1937 (Demby and Turks, l^ n 2: 67).
.,
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na Brea cleverly synthesizes the dominant form of historiography employed bv the intellectuals ofthe rujillo regime. She writes: “[tjhe constant battles in the mountains, the political fragmentation that
d'sseminates the caudilloist power all over the territory, the multiple foreign occupations and interventions,
le difhcuity ot constructing an institutional power, are symptomatic aspects of the obstacles that made
difficult the unification ot the society, and, in turn, the emergence of the Dominican nation and the
constitution of a modem State" (Brea, 1988: 36). Given such a history, a heroic male figure was needed to
unify the people and bring peace to the nation. Conveniently, Trujillo fit that description. For another
analysis of this historiography see (Mateo, 1993; San Miguel, 1997; Moya Pons, 1995: 360).
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since only the Haitians were considered
“negro”
IV «»!«««, „l,h, Trujillo ,o!in, „ chaos„>Wm Wor!
Tnjj'ilo,
,ho massive »„*, j nIU,«d b, Tmj„|„,
„„ ^^
fc i~i.« *iu. They emphasise!
S”"» " »*»»»« ••V. “African" o.lrur, „„ „„
land. Pena Battle writes “we should not forget that this is a Hispanic, Christian.
Catholic nation, that we are Dominicans, emerged pure and homogenous" (Pena
Battle, 1943: ,2). Other work by Pena Batlle emphasizes the Hispanic purity of the
Dominican nation (Hispanidad) and the sanctity of the border. He writes a
Trujillo, no other Dominican governor had understood the phenomenon of the
Dominican-Haitian frontier [and its importance vis-a-vis]... the juridical, political and
economic life of Dominican nationality” (Pena Batlle, 1943: 10); and “[t]he
pauperization, miseiy and productive incapacity of four million angiy beings on the
extreme of the island., constitute, necessarily, a permanent and tragic threat of massive
penetration” (in Gratereaux, ,996: 14). These prejudices are echoed in Lizarazo’s La is,
a
iluminada which explains that «[i]„ as much as in the Dominican Republic the white
predominates, the population of Haiti is integrally black... With the exception of some
select groups... the intense majority of black Haitians represent a comer of Africa, in
their most primitive form, over America” (Lizarazo, 1 946: 97).
The intellectuals helped Trujillo produce a national myth which emphasized the
Hispanic and Catholic aspects of the Dominican people, contrasted with pagan and
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African Ham
. Andres L. Mateo writes that the ideology of Trujillo is best explained
through
“Messianism, Hispanisn, Catholicism. Anti-Communism,
_.d Ami-Haitianism”
(Mateo, 199a: 1 36). The Hispanic, Mateo argues, was a metaphysical creation which was
used to define the Haitian as the Other, and to sene as a unifying symbol for the
Dominican people (Mateo, ,993: 31). Bu, it is important to note that the Anti-Haitianism
inherent in Dominican nattonal identify, as posed by the Trujillo regime, was no, only a
nativist ideology, but also a racist one. Dominican historian Roberto Cassa writes
•'[plrobably the most important theoretical proposition which justified nationalism was
racism (Cassa, 1982: 764). The Dominican nation was a predominantly mulatto nation,
which through its rejection of Haitians, w as able to establish itself as culturally European.
H not phenotypicaily so (Perez Cabral. 1965). The use of an ideology with racist
overtones allowed for all Dominicans to be considered Hispanic in relation to Haitians.
While also allowing Dominicans to distinguish amongst themselves based on their
proximity to the abstractions of “Hispanidad” and “Haitianidad.” Therefore, it could be
argued that there was no racism within the Dominican, while at the same time racism was
used to organize Dominican society through a hierarchical notion of place. This
understanding continues to be dominant today.
Trujillo s policy of Dominicanization was not limited to the slaughter of black
foreigners and the immigration of white ones. He invested heavily in integrating the
frontier lands through construction and development projects, and by sending Church
missions to the border towns (Balaguer, 1947). Dominicanization was also something
The Truj Hoist image of Hispanismo was consistent with the conservative form of Hispanismo which
became dominant following the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Fred Pike notes that prior to this date
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•ha. occurred in .he res. of the country as Trujillo constructed and institutionalized a
nation-state". As Betances writes
‘‘[,]he Trujillo dictatorship consolidated the modem
Dominican state and initiated national control over the economy’’ (Betances. 1995: 6).
as ab
affairs of a nation and to weaken traditional
Through a national identity, Trujillo wa le to include the entire population in the
regional isolation. Through a repressive
political apparatus, however. Trujillo made sure that the inclusion of the populace did no,
mean an extension of civil and political rights. Citizenship was available only for his
most trusted political and business allies. Civil and political rights for all others,
particularly the poor, dark-skinned, and Haitians, did not exist.
Despite the Haitian massacre and the overt anti-Haitianism, the Dominican sugar
plantations (CEA) depended upon Haitian labor. Recognizing the possibility for mutual
gam Trujillo and Papa Doc entered into an agreement in 1952 which
„0vided guaranteed
labor tor the CEA. The Dominican government was financially dependent upon sugar
production, which required the low wages and lack of labor organization that Haitian
migrants made possible. Simultaneously, the construction of a ‘'Hispanic” national
identity in the Dominican Republic depended on the Haitians serving as an Other, a
ethnic/caste which represented the inverse ofwhat the Dominican was.
Hispamsmo, had both liberal (secular) and conservative (Catholic) variants, which both posed the
importance of Spanish culture and the authoritarian and hierarchical ordering of society (Pike. 1971 ).
Trujillo, obviously, did not conjure a nation-state out of nothing. He relied upon much of the
development of the Heureuax and Caceres administrations, and the US Marine government.
97
Brazil (1930-1964)
As remarked in the las, chapter, the Firs, Republic in Braz,H , S80-1930) was even
more exclusive than the monarchy. The new era of mass politics began with the rise of
Getuho V argas through a popularly supported coup (Bums, 1980; Carvalho. 1995: 65).
Mass politics, however, should not be confused with mass participation, and individual
integration into a democratic political system. Although Vargas did no, use a pluralist
system to integrate individuals, he did extend the reach of the State through the
construction of a corpora, is, state apparatus. The recognition of the need to enfranchise
large portions of the population was similar to that of the Trujillo regime; however, the
size of Brazil, its diversity and its relative institutional development made totalitarian rule
impossible.
In contrast to the federal system of the First Republic which produced a weak
central government, Vargas empowered the national government, particularly the
executive. He saw a strong and efficient central state as the only way to achieve national
unity and development (Reis, 1983: 13). During the various governments he led (1930-
,945
’
195°-4 >- he increased the role of the state in the national economy, created a large
bureaucracy, and invested heavily in national industry. Economic policy was
protectionist and populist, limiting foreign imports, aiding national producers, investing
in construction and infrastructure projects, and raising wages (Page. 1995: 133). A
Ministry of Labor was created and a series of pro-labor laws were enacted. Through a
corportatist framework, Vargas used the State to channel worker demands while at the
same time de-politicizing the growing (especially urban) worker population. He was able
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>0 use a corporate state and his personal charisma i,
among the poor. Page writes “it was easy for Vargas to
n order to engender a paternalist state.
which was especially popular
substitute the government as the authority figure that w ould take care of the needs of
employees, just as the landlord or employer had done in the countryside” (Page. 1995-
203).
Vargas also expanded the voter base significantly by extending suffrage to
eighteen year olds and working women who were literate, and provided for a secret
ballot. However, he was not a democrat, and in 1937 he dissolved all political
associations establishing, with the help of the military, the proto-fascis, Estado Novo
(New State). In radio addresses justifying the coup, Vargas emphasized his cotporatis,
understanding of democracy saying that political parties were licentious, and democracy
must be based on collective rather than individual rights. He explained “in periods of
crisis, such as the one through which we are now passing, the democracy of parties...
subverts the hierarchy, menaces the fatherland, and puts in danger the existence of the
nation by exaggerating competition and igniting the fires of civil discourse” (in Bums.
1980: 407). He later asserted that the “decadence of liberal and individualistic democracy
represents an incontrovertible fact... Individuals do not have rights; they have duties.
Rights belong to the collective!” (in Bums. 1980: 410). Vargas's discourse met with little
resistance.
Despite his authoritarianism, Vargas' government was the first government to
institutionalize the nation as a collective and the state as an institution. The construction
°f the natl°n-state meant mass enfranchisement, even if this was not achieved through
especially democratic procedures. The Brazilian historian Jose Murilo de Carvalho
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" ri.es “there was, a, least, some process of font, a,ion of a Brazilian identity, to the extent
.ha, sonte movements of authentic politic, participation sprouted- (Carvalho, ,995: 66).
Similarly, Elissa Pereira Reis writes “[a]s a constructed reality the nation provides for the
ideological reconciliation between bureaucratic domination and soc,, solidarity... „
niy within the authoritarian modernization experiment under Vargas ( 1930-45 )
that a national ideology gamed relevance in politics" (Reis, 1983: 3). On a more concrete
level. Vargas created political parties, which were used as vehicles for his popuiist
propaganda, bu, which nevertheless continued to produce presidents afier his death.
Vargas also dabbled with a nationalist rhetoric, including the 1931 Law of
tonalization of Labor
,
which ended the century of European immigration. Among
the principal beneficiaries of this law were Afro-Brazllians who had had a difficult time
competing against the foreigners, especially in the southeast. But Vargas's support from
the Afro-Brazilian community went far deeper than this. He encouraged Afro-Brazilian
culture, "such as samba, candomble, and the spiritist umbcmda, in which he reportedly
participated. In 1934, he supported the first national Afro-Brazilian Congress. He signed
the 1 95 1 Arinas anti-discrimination law, and partially opened the civil service" (Marx.
1998: 170-1, italics in original). He also advocated the idea ofracial democracy" which
would become Brazil’s single most important national ideology.
The concept oi "racial democracy” is associated with Brazilian sociologist
Gilberto Freyre (1934) who challenged the scientific racism of the previous three to four
decades. Unlike many of his contemporaries, he argued that the socio-economic position
1 ^
The Law of Nationalization of Labor was part of Vargas’s nativist/nationalist nolicies. The law required
that at least two-thirds of employees of any businesses, particularly industry, be native bom Brazilians(Andrews, 1991: 147). This is similar to the legislation passed by Trujillo in 1934.
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0f Afr°'Bra2llianS WaS nW^ 10 ***- problems, bu, due t0 the disturWno
effects of slavery and the patriarchal system that it had engendered” He argued that the
.™e Brazilian was a mixture of the Portuguese, Afrtean and indigenous raees (aithough
(The Masters and The Slaves), Freyre argues that due to the cultural disunion of the
Portuguese, the climatic conditions of Brazil, widespread miscegenation and the cultural
influence of the Africans, violence between whites and blacks was rare (Freyre. 1946:
mu). Freyre equated Brazilianization with racial and cultural hybridization (Freyre. 1946:
ixiv), and suggested that the depth of hybridization made identities within Brazil piastic
and fluid, contributing to a situation in which racial tensions were very rare. The notion
.ha, all races were peacefully integrated into a racial paradise, a naive simplification of
the work of Freyre, was propagated as the fundamental mylh of Brazilian nationality.
Afro-Brazilians identified themselves no. as negro, Afro-Brazilian or mulatto, bu, as
Brazil,an.
14
Samba was considered to be Brazilian, not Afro-Brazil;.....
Vargas also seemed to be very sympathetic to Afro-Brazilian politics. The Sao
Paulo based Freme Negro Brasileira (Black Brazilian Front), the larges, of several Afro-
Brazthan organizations, mostly located in the southeast, supported Vargas, until, like all
other political organizations, it was closed down in 1937. The relationship between the
Freme Negro and Vargas deserves some mention. In one case, despite laws preventing
discrimination in the civil service, the Civil Guard of Sao Paulo had an informal policy of
preventing Afro-Brazilians from entering. When the law opened up the legal possibility
Frew's' dbl7sion?f
S
thTp
r
^
dily aCrep
,
,ed byal1 elemenls <*«* «*c*ed elite. One critic insisted tha,r yre s iscu si o he Portuguese colonist be separated from the “Negro,” since the latter more nronerlvbelong among “beasts of burden” (Freyre, 1946: Ixiii).
p p y
of the entrance of Afro-Brazilians, the contender of the Guard exceed
-Now tha,
h 1"^ 5 C3n eMer
’
W C3n °Pen *he d00r t0 leP« ™d cripples” (in Andrews, ,991
: ,5 , )
When i, became dear that the Guard would no, hire Afro-Brazilians, the Frente Negra
"appealed directly to President Vargas, who, after receiving a delegation of the Front
leadership, ordered the Guard to enlist immediately two hundred black recruits”
(Andrews, 1991: 151).
Vargas’s Estado Novo was cu, short in 1 945 by a militaty coup, which ushered in
a twenty-year period of restricted democracy, wherein the militaty was an important
political actor. In 19o0, Vargas returned to power through direct elections. However, he
found an active Congress which resisted much of his legislation. With veiy serious
allegations of corruption against top aids and mounting pressure. Vargas composed a final
literary work to define his legacy 15
,
and then committed suicide. Jusceiino Kubitschek
was elected president in 1 955 and promised ’fifty years of development in five.’ During
his regime Brazil continued its impressive economic growth, built ^,01S
, aborts,
hospitals, won the World Cup, invented and exported Basse Nova
,
and began
»
°f J°rge Amad° PreSen ' Bra2 ' lian cal,ure as especially mulano
attain* me
°
folbwte desttav^llV"* ‘"T*
aSainS' ,he pe0ple are newl >’ coordinated and raised
P opie that now fall abandoned. I cannot give you more than my blood... I offer my life in the holocaust I
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’ humilialeW fou will feel my soul suffering at your
,
,
& beatS 3t y°Ur d°°r
’
y0U wil1 teel in y°ur chests the energy for the fi°ht for yourselvesand your children. When they humiliate you, you will feel in my grief the force for reaction My sacrifice\v ill maintain you united, and my name will be your battle flag... I fought against the looting of Brazil I
not beat dow'
^ l00t
.'"g of ,he people ’ 1 have foual" bare-breasted. The hatred, infamy, a°nd calumny did
« rry !'nl gave you my life. Now I offer my death. Nothing remains. Serenely I take thefirst step on the road to eternity and 1 leave to enter history” (Bums, 1980: 448)
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construction on a new capital Brasilia nil „ i • u c-P , rasi , all ot which figured into a 'Golden Age’ for
Brazil, and particularly for Brazilian national identity.
Kubitschek's government was followed by Janio Quadros, whose belligerent
political style was countered by an obstructionist congress. Claiming the country
ungovernable, he resigned, hoping that the countty would beg him to rescind his
res,gnat,on. Instead, his vice president, the popular, and populist. Joao Goulart. became
Goulart s presidency encountered many obstacles, primarily from the military
who considered Goulart a communist. 16 especially considering some of Goulart’s radical
policies as Vargas’ Minister of Labor. Goulart’s government witnessed a rise in inflation
from 25 to 100 percent, as foreign loans dried up and the economy slowed (Eakin. 1998:
54). Increasing pressure applied by the military and the Right was me, by Goulart’s move
tardier towards the Left. He attempted to mobilize the masses in order to counter-balance
the power ol the military. When Goulart supported the unionization of lower ranks
within the military, the military removed Goulart from office (Siquiera Wiarda. 1990:
1 82). One point that should be noted is that in 1 963 when there was a plebiscite which
would remove military limitations on the president, in effect since 1961. the Brazilian
electorate voted five to one in favor of presidential autonomy (Eakin, 1 998: 54). This
was an unambiguous sign of support for democratic institutions, however, one year later,
the military coup was met with little resistance.
16 He was in China at the time of Quadros’ resignation.
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Dominican Republic (1961-1986)
After the 1961 assassination ofTrujillo. the Dominican Republic suffered from a
veo significant power void. For a brief period. Ramfis Trujillo and other members of the
Truj.llo family attempted to maintain control of the country, while also investigating and
ertng almost all ol the members ot the group that assassinated irujillo. A changing
environment in the United States and the Dominican Republic made a continuation of
Trujillo family government unlikely, and puppet president Balaguer was able to
encourage the Trujillo family’s exit. Balaguer dissolved the Partido DomMcano. used
its funds to reward friends and members of the armed services, and nationalized the vast
lands and industries belonging to the Trujillo family (Moya Pons, 1995: 384). After
Balaguer was exiled, a provisional government was set up to observe elections which
were won by author and former exile Juan Boseh. and his Dominican Revolutionary Party
(PRD). But some of his proposals seemed too radical for a military that remained very
conservative, and for elites whose fears of a second Cuba were shared by the United
States. Alter only seven months in power, the ineffective Bosch government fell to a
military coup. Again, provisional governments were set up, but in 1965 a group of pro-
Bosch supporters launched a counter-coup. That year, the United States invaded the
Dominican Republic for the second time this century, and in 1966 instituted elections in
which the US favored candidate, Joaquin Balaguer, former Trujillo ideologue and puppet
president, won (Sanchez, 1992: 303).
Balaguer was elected president three consecutive times, although twice his
opposition abstained from participation. During his twelve years, the Dominican
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Repub, ic had pc, idea, parties, congressiona, assemblies, and a judicial, as we„ as news
agencies. The effectiveness and the freedont of these organs, however, is a point for
debate. Balaguer promised order and “a path without danger" and spouted ideology
consistent with that of the Trujillo regime. He relied on a mixture ofeconomic
nationalism, large works projects, centralized decision making, personalism, and an
obsession with peace and order. He w rites "Peace is the major good that a People can
enjoy" (in Mateo, 1993: 117, Under Balaguer there was a relatively free press, and a
more independent economic elite, and Balaguer was also less intimately connected to the
Armed Forces than Trujillo (Hartlyn, ,998: ,09). A„ this represented considerable
progress iollowing the thirty-one year dictatorship oi Trujillo and the five years of
instability since his assassination.
Nevertheless, Balaguer's “path without danger" translated into a continuation of
authoritarian policies and a very significant repression of all politically active members of
the Left, particularly around elections. During the 1966 presidential campaign alone
more than 350 political activists were killed, while candidate and former president Juan
Bosch s campaign was limited to radio messages broadcast from his house, since the
military kept him under virtual house arrest. During the twelve years. Balaguer used
classic carrot-stick incentives to the political opposition. Between 1966 and 1974. 3.000
political activists were murdered. At points, despite the regular elections and the
constitutional appearance, Emilio Betances notes, it was not safe for Leftists to walk the
streets (Betances, 1995: 119). At the same time, Moya Pons notes that an inordinate
amount of Leftists, who were wholly unqualified, occupied academic and administrative
positions at the growing Autonomous University of Santo Domingo (Moya Pons, 1995:
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390-5). This was the softer side of Balaguer's authoritarian politics, the side dependent
on large and inefficient state budgets.
Balaguer continued in the tradition of Trujillo, Heureaux, Santana, Baez, and
other Strong-tnen who ruled the Dominican Republic through a powerful executive and
through public works projects which employed supporters and provided lucrative
patronage for associates.
‘'Public officials and high ranking military officers generously
doled out contracts for public works among themselves, enjoyed exemptions for the tax-
free import of all the consumer goods they desired, and became rich enough to play the
roles of investor and entrepreneur in unfair competition with traditional commercial and
industrial groups" (Moya Pons, 1995: 401-2). The projects of the Balaguer government
were initially financed by massive amounts of US aid. however, aid gradually decreased
as the Dominican economy grew at high rates.
In 1978, the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) candidate Antonio Guzman
was elected president. Or at least, the voting favored the PRD candidate until members
of the National Police closed voting polls and stopped the vote count (Sanchez. 1992:
309). A coup seemed inevitable. Pressure from US President Jimmy Carter prevented
the coup and led to a settlement in which Guzman was allowed to be president, while
Balaguer s party (the Reformist Party—PR) gained four seats that it did not win, in order
to maintain a majority in Congress (Espinal, 1998: 95).
That Balaguer was a candidate in the 1978 presidential elections, and that he tried
to prevent fair and free elections, constituted nothing new in the Dominican Republic,
considering the considerable precedent (1966, 1970. and 1974). However, there was
something new and exciting about the fact that Balaguer was leaving office, even if his
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party still maintained a majority in Congress. As Ramonina Brea et al write, “[,]he
eleetions of . 978 no, only marked a transition from semicompetitive to competitive
elections but also an ascension to power of the PRD which allowed for an impulse of
expansion of citizenship (e.g. respect for public liberties, more respect for civil rights,
disarticulation of military groups
...) and democratization" (Brea e, al. 1995: 86). But. as
much as civil rights were more respected, and a more safe and democratic political
environment was instituted, i, did no, take long for Guzman to disappoint the electorate,
as well as segments of his party.
Guzman attempted to duplicate the patrimonial politics of Trujillo by not only
relying on elientelism. a traditional and legitimate practice in the Dominican Republic,
but also by involving his entire family in the government. In his first year in office
Guzman hired 8,000 people, and the public payroll swelled from 129,161 in 1978 to
201 ,301 in 1982. The public sector had grown so large that it accounted for 85 percent of
the national budget, and Guzman was forced to resorting to printing money (Moya Pons.
1995: 406).
Despite the disappointment with the Guzman government, and Guzman’s suicide,
the PRD candidate, Salvador Jorge Blanco, was elected president in xv82. Blanco
promised to deepen Dominican democracy by instituting an “economic democracy.”
However, the debts and fiscal indiscipline of the previous administration and the debt
crisis, which would soon hit all Latin America, forced belt-tightening. While publicly
denying any negotiations with the International Monetary' Fund and continuing to spout a
rhetoric ot economic democracy, the Blanco government was secretly involved in
negotiating an austerity package with the IMF. The severe package accepted by the
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Blanco govern, resulted in mass strikes, to which the govern, responded with
harsh repression. One three-day uprising in ,984 challenged the govemiWs^
tunraround. and led ,o 70 murders (Moya Pons, ,995: 4,5). During ihese strikes i,
remamed undear whether Santo Domingo Mayor and PRD Secretaty-Genera, fosd
Francisco Peha G6mez was supporting his own government, criticizing his government’s
actions, or fomenting popular unrest.
In the midst of increasing political instability and economic crisis. Bala. aier was
elected in 1986, this time over PRD candidate Jacobo Majluta, by a margin of 40.000
v°te, Balaguer represented, as he had said, a safe and predictable path. While i, was
•™e that he was no democrat, he offered stability, and people remembered how the
economy grew during his administrations, averaging 7.6 percent growth between ,968
and 1 974 (Hartlyn, 1 998: 1 09). There was a considerable amount of evidence to suggest
•hat the re-election of Balaguer was no, a good sign in the democratization of the
Dominican Republic, since his election meant a return to a centralized, personalized
executive, and impotent institutions. Dominican sociologist Rosario Espinal explains ‘ as
with Trujillo, the Law under Balaguer did no, really acquire any important position, and
as always was subordinated to personal dictates, and it would have
..-imited effect or, the
rmation of the new political identities in Dominican society'" (Espinal, 1987: 107).
As corrupt as the PRD presidents were, government institutions, particularly Congress,
seemed to be reasonably empowered. Guzman and Blanco were also able to weaken the
presence of Truji Hoist officers within the armed forces, and the election of the two PRD
politicians legitimated a transition to an electoral system.
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The overwhelming presence of Balaguer. one of Trujillo's anti-Haitian and racist
ideologues, for more than a decade during the
had considerable effects on the
twenty five years discussed in this section
concretization of negative attitudes towards Haitians and
government and the CEA
continued, even through PRD governments. History books and educational materia,
Afro-Dominicans, although the agreement between the Haitian
continued to be dominated by terrifying portraits of the Haitian occupation and the
\ anous Haitian invasions in the nineteenth century.
Durmg the Balaguer regime, new historical perspectives benan to emerge,
particularly those of Franklin Franco and Roberto Cassa, who emphasized the racist and
anti-Haitian roots of Dominican national ideology. During the 1970s, a small group of
“conscientized” Dominicans created a folkloric organization which celebrated native and
African roots of Dominican culture. These intellectuals were able to capitalize on a shift
m merengue, which had begun following the death of Trujillo, in which merengueros
accentuated more
-African'’ roots. Merengue. the national dance and so vital a par, of
national ideology, became increasingly
"Africanized” as i, left the parlor and, entered
more clearly, the popular realm. Trujillo was actually responsible for much of this,
ironically, since he destroyed many of the all Euro-Dominican social clubs. He also
promoted merengue since he was a notoriously suave dancer, although he preferred a
refined type of merengue, as opposed to the more rhythm-driven merengue which
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s.
Fradique Lizardo argued that ‘“merengue’s origin is in Africa’” (Austerlitz, 1997:
o). This sentiment was not universally well received, and one composer called it
unpatriotic.”
"Afro-Dominican music found advocates also among members of the
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meVa CanC,°n (ne'V SOng) movement
> originated in Chile in the 1 960s and spread
throughout Latin America, using local music in the struggle agatns, rightist authoritarian
regimes, economic inequity, and U.S. imperialism.” (Austerlitz,
.997: 109). Also as the
number of Dominicans living in New York increased. Dominican merengue adopted a
more Afro-Caribbean sound (Austerlitz, 1997; no).
There was a small Black Soul” movement during the 1970s, following
international cultural trends and production in other areas of the African diaspora.
However, the political effects and the visibility of these people were limited.
Simultaneously, there was the rise in the number prominent Afro-Dominican politicians.
Most prominent among these is Jose Francisco Pena Gomez, who was the Secretary
Genera, of the PRD. the most power*,, political party. However, it should be noted that
Pena Gomez continually employed a class-based analysis, avoided discussions of race,
and did not identify positively as an Afro-Dominican.
Brazil (1964-1985)
The military coup that removed President Goulart in 1964 led to military
government that would last for twenty-one years, the longest period of direct authoritarian
rule in the Brazil's modem histoty. While the regime was in no way as totalitarian as that
oi Trujillo, it was slightly more authoritarian than the Balaguer governments in the 1960s
and 1 970s, particularly between 1 968 and 1 974. Like Balaguer's governments in the
1960s and 1970s, the military government in Brazil left a strong imprint on Brazilian
political culture, however, the military government was fa • •' min far more institutionalized than
was the government of Balaguer.
Despite the military’s criticism of Vargas, i, adopted similar corportatist poiitics
whtch were seen as means of incorporating different sections of Brazilian society, while
a« .he same time limit,ng mobilization” in this regard, it is interesting to note the
military 's attempt, through institutional means, to justify its rule. Braziiian politica,
scientist Bolivar Lamounier explains:
[tjaking the period 1964-1 9R4 qc n j- .
i
«
ertain
dear (and after
, 974virtS^^^^^
game and to avoid
Dlections were regular, although congress was fairly impotent, and opposition victories
were increasingly recognized. The military also, oddly enough, passed a series of
Institutional Acts, as a means of legitimizing what would otherwise be arbitrary
authoritarian politics.
The first two Institutional Acts, passed in 1964 and 1965 respectively, gave the
prestdent the right to declare a state of siege, to intervene into states, to dissolve political
parttes, and to remove the political rights of persons considered to be threats to national
security for a period often years (Bums, 1 980: 508-5 1 5). What is striking about this is
that the military used an institutional act to deprive citizens of their rights, but constrained
gov?™enf^37H
elWaS,Ve0,rCh,fUenCed ' a" d KaS indeed advised ' * Harvard professor ofovernment, Samuel P. untington, whose 1968 Political Order in Changing Societies warned of theanger ol too much mob, I, ration without institutional means to peacefully channel i, (Hunting! 1968)
ns own authority by limiting these extraordtnaty powers to o„,y ten years. Cear.y the
military' government feh
.ha, its government had to be legitimized, although its legitimacy
depended mos, heavily on the success of the economy which placated elites and
discouraged mobilization against the regime.
The period of ,968 to ,974 was the mos. repressive period of modem Brazilian
history 18
. Beginning with the Institutional Ac, 5, essentially institutionalizing mass
censorship, this mos, violent period of military rule attempted to eliminate the very small
subversive revolt,,ionan' groups, labeled
“communists.” During this period of repression
•he military government benefited from remarkable growth rates. Between 1967 and
1 973, the Brazilian economy grew a, rates close to 1
1 percent per ycu . inflation fell
from 100 to 1 7 percent per year, and import-substitution-industrialization seemed to be
paytng oil as domestic demand was growing (Eakin, 1 998: 227). This growth, called the
"Miracle.” was halted by the increases in the price of oil in 1973 and 1977, since Brazil's
industrialization was highly dependent on foreign petroleum. Nevertheless, the military
was able to contain a passive population as long as the economy continued to grow.
I he military also extended the reach of the nation-state through a variety of
projects such as the construction of the Trans-Amazon highw ay, the Niteroi Bridge, and a
nuclear power plant. The military government offered low-interest loans for citizens to
buy television sets, a policy which extended the reach of national ideology (in a country
PRMn Mexico"
6 mili 'ary C°nSidered trying 10 make i,s P3"* (ARENA) serve as a hegemonic party, like the
18
It is significant that at least as late as 1968. the Brazilian militaiy allowed Marxist literature to be easilv
ivestld T974 kT'
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19921 l26 -9 >- Th* most significant crackdown was between968 an 19 but as Mattelart and Mattelart write “even when censorship was at its most repressive
E! T v Med 'n 8°vernmem - 11 ca,mot be^ that this totalizing/totalitarian project of a'
,9
m stry of Truth was really concretized" (Mattelart and Mattelart, 1990: 57).
The highest rate of growth in any country in the world with the exception of Japan.
where dhteracy ra.es were still very Hi*) <Pa8e. . 995: 169)
. The p^^
identity in an authoritarian context meant that national identity became synonymous with
national security.
,n 1968, Professors F.orestan Fernandes. Octdvio ,anni and Fernando
Henrique Cardoso were removed from their positions a, the University of Sao Paulo
ostensibly because their sociological research asserted that Brazil was not a racial
democracy.
“In 1 969 Brazil, National Security Council identified studies and repons on
racial discrimination in that country as subversion" (Fontaine, 1985: 2). The 1970 census
did no. contain the category of race, and by the end of the decade the US based
InterAmerican foundation was pressured into eliminating all research on race in Brazil.
and eventually was “expelled” (Skidmore, 1992 : 10 ).
National identity revolved around the belief that racial identity was no, salient in
Brazil, and if Afro-Brazil ians were more likely to be illiterate, poor, etc, it was a
consequence of their economic class, and no, the result of racial prejudice. Flores,an
Fernandes and a team of scholars funded by UNESCO in the late 1 950s and early I %0s
challenged this idea, although the number of people aware of this criticism was relatively
small. Afro-Brazihans continued to identify, in general, as Brazilian, and did not speak
out or complain about racial discrimination. A growing group ofnew scholars in the
1 970s began to view this as a matter of ideological hegemony. Afro-Brazilians. they
argued, fooled themselves into accepting the idea of racial democracy, when it was clear
that this was only a “myth." Carlos Hasenbalg argued that the cornu,nation of an
ideology of whitening and the idea that racism is absent in Brazil, was “a legitimize
mechanism destined to absorb tensions... a means of anticipating and controlling certain
areas of social conflicr (Hasenbalg. 1998: 115).
Hasenbalg writes that the
-social perception of race according to a continuum, of
shades of color, had led to a fragmentation of racial identities'- (Hasenbalg, ,996: ,65).
Nelson do Valle Silva in 1 979 explained that the belief tha , pardos are treated better than
Pre‘°S W!>S n0 ' SUPP0"ed by Sta,islical evidence which showed thatpardos faired only
slightly better thanks, and far worse than broncos (Valle Silva, ,979). Nevertheless,
despite academic falsifications of the “myth of racial democracy,”20 the majority of
Brazil's population accepted the idea of race/color conceived of as a continuum, and that
there was little racial prejudice in Brazil. Comparisons with the United States were
common, although the lessons learned diverged. Afro-Brazilian activists claimed that the
goals of US civil rights leaders in the 1 960s was similar to those that they were trying to
consolidate. The populace, in general, saw a very frightening situation and a country in a
virtual civil war over racial distinctions, which appeared to be wholly different from the
experience of daily life in Brazil.
By the late 1 970s, as the Military regime began to liberalize, there was a swell of
local organizations which focused on identity politics and mobilization. Middle class
Atro-Brazilians were finding that they were marginalized in the state universities and in
the companies that employed them21
. In the year of the ninetieth anniversary of the
abolition of slavery, Sao Paulo black activists attempted to create a -black” movement.
Alter the murder of an Afro-Brazilian worker by police officers, and the removal of four
Atro-Brazilian volleyball players from a social club, the newly form-H Movimenlo Negro
bnificado (MNU, Unified Black Movement) was able to gamer some support. The MNU
also promoted Afro-Brazilian culture, following the "Black Soul" movement and
~°(Spanakos, 1999a).
employed a
-Black is Beauiifu," rhetoric. Prior to the fonttation of the MNU there had“ Sma" Afr°-B
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•— Programs
,
and even exchange
Pr08ramS Wi,h Af"Ca
' ~ «* - different cities across the count.
'
During the Geise, 0974-8) and Figueiredo (1979-85) admin,
.rations the
Braztltan government allowed for a gradual abertura (opening process) in which the
government reduced repression and opened iimited space for opposition. Bu, the
government was no, willing to give up power without a fight. In 1 984. the government
pany drafted a hi,, delaying direct eiections in Brazil. The response to this was
immediate and unanimous as large rallies filled the streets of Brazt, demanding
-direct
elections now” (dire.asja). The government proposal faded, and Tancredo Neves, the
opposition's candidate, was elected by the electoral college in ,985 o„e interesting sign
of change and democratization was that, in 1982, the state of Alagoas, where the
Kingdom of Palmares once stood, began Project Zumbi, a program which offered
education about Afro-Brazilian history and themes in schools. Other such projects began
to appear in other cities, most prominently Sao Paulo, whose Project Zumbi featured
films, conferences, exhibits and other educational programs (Andrews, 1991: 218).
Dominican Republic (1986-1999)
Balaguer returned in ,986 and immediately suspended deb, payments, ignored the
recommendations of the IMF, and pursued an aggressive campaign accusing former
president Jorge Blanco of corruption. By attacking Blanco so intensely, Balaeuer
Interview with Amaury Mendes, 14 ,h of October, 1998.
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and a decrease in foreign investment.
Reelecting Balaguer mean, a return to a well-known polities, which would
-deepen the lack of institutional!* and the personalization of the state” ,Brea e, al 1995:
•00). This was obvious by his investment in pharoanic projects, such as the multi-million
dollar Columbus Lighthouse22
,
and by his designation of Haitians as “Others.” Although
Balaguer had always been consistent in his disdain for Haitians, in 1986 the formal
agreement between the Dominican Republic and Haiti over Haitian labor ended (Wucker.
1W: 95). The numbers of Haitians willing to live in deplorable conditions did no,
decrease, although they now had even less protection and legal status than they did during
the 34 years of official agreement between the two governments.
In 1 985, Balaguer published La isla a! reves (“The Island Upside Down”), an
updated version of his La real,dad dominicana (“The Dominican Reality”), in order to
assert Dominican nationalism, reinforce Dominican fear and hatred towards Haitians, and
thus reinforce his own popularity. The timing was particularly relevant since Balaguer
used his stereotypical and offensive portrayal of Haitians to discredit Jose Franciso Pena
Gomez, the dark-skinned PRD leader and former mayor of Santo Domingo, who was
believed to be of Haitian descent. Pena Gomez, a very emotional speaker, was blamed by
many for inciting the riots in 1 984. a view that 14,1
„
Ba 'agUer See"led 'o suggest through racial
„„ D„b!0 , „„„„ orwTOio> h;_pamsh and traditional Puebio in America” (Balaguer 1985 - 651 n' . 1985.6a). Despite its ability to
conserve its Hispanidad,
“contact with the black [i e ‘HaY , eWack[l ' Hainan] has contributed, without aingle doubt, to the relaxing of our nnW8 PUb“ C CUS,0mS’” which results in “the progressive
ethnic decadence of the Dominican population ”,RiP p on... (Balaguer, 1985:45). Balaguer also
explained that the difference between n„ • •Dominicans and Haitians is no. exclusively
cultural, but also biological, writing
“[,]he excess of no , • .U ° SS Population in Haiti constitutes an
*-
"•
—
.
,„„
species of vegetables” (Balaguer 1
9
RS- d i° • 983 ' j7) ' Balaguer s “scientific” treatise declared that
"“h"““ « »-”j
»v—
- *.„
"***•“W*= «M, „ do ,0 fc i» o«„
subsistence" (Balaguer, 1985: 52).
Balaguer's argument is unclear since i, seems difficult to believe that Dominicans
are the most Hispanic people in the Americas and that Dominicans have devolved
because of the cultural exchanges with Haitians. While Balaguer recognizes that
Dominicans are of mixed blood, he seems to use the terms “Haitian,” ‘-negro" and the
“Ethiopian race” fairly synonymously suggesting that Dominicans are light-skinned
J7
™«
- „„,„ ot .fcl, . Wlii ,1;wii
coml [
PreJUd 'CeS^ n<>t S ‘mPly H,era0
'’ md ,hM lK Used “* Position as president to
Haitian laborers. During one three week stretch in 1 99
1
Balaguer
.ssued the deportations of some 50 000 I laiti, rr~ A Hait ans (Ferguson, 1992: 89 )
When Balaguer returned to power in i oca .
,n 1 986. he sttrprtsed few people with his laek
art, cult,tor of soctal demands and proponents of the extension of citizenship the PR
[Ba,a8Uer
’;
Pa"y] f°™ed
- 01 a
project, atomizing and deposing
•he masses tn that ‘reform only was capable of being an instrument of a pauperizing and
corrupt clientelism”’ (Espinal in Brea etal 1995-85, it,,’ x s
-o- Balaguer narrowly won the
elections in 1986 1 990 anrl 1 qq/i «.d ’"4
- 3 lnbute t0 his brilli™‘ ability to manipulate political
situations, such as the 1991 coup in Haiti the t ns ,P •am, the US embargo and the 1 994 US intervention
to maintain power, even when he had clearly los, and violated the law.
, 990
, the
official margin of victory showed him beating Juan Bosch by fewer than 25,000 votes.
I our years later, he won. over Pena Gomez, by only 0.7 percent of the votes (Espinal,
,998:
' 06)
' b°,h CaSeS
’ aCCUSati°nS of doctoral fraud were rampant and vety credible,
in 1994, many scholars, NGOs, and international monitors, including former US
congressman Stephen Solarz, spoke ou, against the fraudulent elections.
1 he pressure that followed the 1 994 elections led to the passage of a law which
prevented immediate reelec, ion for the president, and to a negotiated
.Clement in which
clear. „ is dea2
“r“— — i.™.„,ta*fahtw„
Bosch s protege Leonel Fernando? p* ,man ez and Balaguer formed a “Patriotic
°^,,, "“'“• “'"""J “M* <>.« P.~. (Espinal. ,» ,,„,
Brazil (1985-1999)
The promise of Brazil democratization quickly Iurned t0 dismay^ ,he^
death ofpresident-elect Tancredo Neves in Apri , of 1 985, and the ascent to the
presidency of** Same, Samey had been a member of the government party (now
calied the PDS) who
.eft in
.984 to join the Fren,e MenL Uniike Neves, who had
backing of the MDB. the largest political
the
Samey had no real base for his political
party, and who was elected by popular vote,
power. Since Samey was the candidate of few
people, he had virtually no mandate when he entered office and faced an intimidating
military' institution, which had just surrendered power after twenty years of rule, and
newly empowered Congress which saw him as a weak president.
however, that this comment was not aimed, specifically. at the subjects of the Ethiopian state.
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•Zl! W3S &Ced W“h Se' eral daUnting eC0n0mic Pr°blems
—massive deb, high
” a ,c*n, and an abundance of inefficient and costly state bureaucracies. Civiiian
‘ ’
Politicians, who bad finally achieved power si„Ce ,he milftay retreat t0 barracks
H,
n0
‘7"“ CnSiS interfere ^P—- .belt personal0n$ ’ " """^ ***
- agencies were among the
m0$‘ abU$ed inSti,Uti0nS
' BraZiI^«—-
-is, economies outsideJ
communis, w orld due to decades of economic nationalism, and to the traditional practice
0 US '"8 PUW,C agenC,eS " f0r
— NO. only were bureaucracies a means of
staving unemployment of the politically connected, they were considerably corrupt.
Brazt, was rated by the German non-govemmenta,
organization Transparency
International as one of the most corrupt countries included in their survey (Bakin, 1 99,
204)
- BraZiliamS
' J°SePh^ of,his corruption is in the relations
between state agencies and industries and politicians rwmicmn
- Businessmen overcharge the
government and. in turn use mrt nftu r-
’ 6 Pan °f 'he Pr0fit ,0 the politicians who awarded
them the contracts initially (Page. 1995 - P? 24 j
The firs, directly elected presidency in Brazil ended as inauspiciously as the firs,
indirectly elected one had. The young and charismatic Fernando Cello, de Meiio became
President a, the age of 40, defeating long time Leftist, and brother-in-law of .lode Goulan
Leone. Brizola, and the leader of the relatively new Worker’s Party, Luis (Lula, Ignbcio
da Silva. Conors campaign capitalized on his heroic battles against corruption in his
home state of Alagoas. During Collor’s two years he was abie to briefly gain success
fightmg inflation, although his economic team’s radical measures failed and the economic
This seems to be a practice that has continued.
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cns,s soon worsened. Ironically, Collor was the firs, ores', •
, f, .
tl t p '*n, impeached and removedfrom office in the history of the Western He • ,• w Hemisphere because of very serious allegationsof corruption, made by his brother.
Itamar Franco’s presidency25 was marred h, • •,
.
' by a similar inability to control inflationhe economic crisis, until his selection of sociologist Fernando H '
...
„
,SI 2 ma o° enrique Cardoso as
Cardoso’s economic plan brought down inflation
UC1"8 3 neW CUrTenCy
’
S°me,hing PreVi0USly at,emPte« during the Samev and
Collor governments. Cardoso’s plan the Real PiP . Plan, was so successful that Cardoso
became president in 1994, beating da Silva handily in the firs, round of elections.
C ardoso’s four years were characterized by adjustments to neo-libera, plans, negotiations
a"0Wed f0r ' imi,ed PriVa,i2ati0
" »'*** companies, an increase in foreign
' d“" in “ *“'«• •» <**.
amendment which allowed for presidential re-election. Despite the Mexican crisis of
1 994, and the Asian and Russian crises of 1 997 and 1 998. Cardoso's economic team was
able to maintain inflation at a veiy low rate and limit devaluation by maintaining high
interest rates and spending government reserves of dollars. With the crisis in Asia
‘
deepening and threatening Brazil. Cardoso defeated da Silva for a second time in the
presidential elections of 1 998. also in the first round.
Afro-Brazilian mobilization probably peaked between the celebra,ion/con,esta.ion
Of the centenary of the abolition of slavery in 1988. and the three hundred year
anniversary of the death ol Zumbl, the legendary last king of Palmares who died in 1695.
In 1988. “President Samey used the opportunity [of the centenary of the abolition of
'as Collor's vice president. He assumed the presidency in 1 992.
Braz,han headed by [Abdias, do Nascimento” (Marx. 1998: 261). The Moving,o Ne..ro
SC,Zed" °PPOrtUnity °rgani2e~- marches throughout the C0lmm, m^
•hey caned abolition
-an act of po, idea, romanticism’’ (Fernandes.
,989: 78). Others
argued that the abolition was a farce slavprv ct-ii • ,0 i existed, and the holiday that should be
celebrated was the death ofZumbl (20. November, However, the politicized members of
•he MNU have been unable to ntaintain the success of that period due to a ,ack of
dentiftcation among Afro-Brazihans with the radicahsm of the MNU (Burdick.
,998,
and the persistent belief
,ha, racism does no, exist in Brazil.
Despite the be,ief that racism does no, exist in Brazih statistics suggest that the
llfC Cl’anCeS ^ Afr°-BraZilianS
- * lower- Euro-Brazilians (Wood and Love,,
>998), the number of Afro-Brazi.ian students encoded in universities is disproportionately
ow (Silva. ,998:
, 64), and the number of Afro-Brazihans who are V,„ed by po|ice
officers is disproportionately high (Fagundes and Aquino.
, 997:
, 9). Despite the Cao
law, which sets constitutional punishments for racial discrimination, and other forma,
attempts to penal,ze racism, two major problems exist: there is no consensus on when an
incident is racist since the race of the people involved is no, always clear; and preventing
racism faces a severe obstacle from informal, social and political perceptions. As Teresa
Caldeira notes, the ‘criminal’ in Brazil is associated with “the poor, with black people,
with migrants from the Northeast of Brazil, with single mothers, with consumers of
drugs, with promiscuity, and with conicos andfavelas” (Caldeira, 1 996: 20
1
). Given the
assumption that Afro-Brazilian have lower class culture, poverty, crime and violence, it is
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of society, and are not the victims of prejudice.
Conclusion
The growth of a nation-state has been central ,o the many unsuccessful attempts to
build democratic government in the Dominican Republic and Brazil, and particularly in
terms of developing citizenship in terms of rights and positive freedoms for Afro-
Dominicans and Afro-Brazi.ians, The nation-state in both countries was truly bull, and
institutionalized by authoritarian governments. Thus, the increased capacity of the
government to implement policies occurred during non-democratic governments. Worse
still, increased capacity w as often linked to a lack of self-constraint on the part of
government. The most critical difference between the two countries in this regard is that
the authoritarian state in the Dominican Republic under Trujillo and Balaguer was
especially personalist, or “sultanistic” (see Hartlyn, 1998a, 1998b). Only Getulio Vargas
could clatm the sort of deference that Trujillo and Balaguer received, although
personalism was very much a factor in local Brazilian politics. Brazilian authoritarianism
was less personalis! and far more institutional than Dominican authoritarianism. Vargas
did not hate the powers that completely eclipsed institutions in the way that Trujillo did.
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and even a. „s most brutal, the militaty government in Brazil limited its own authority
and even made vety careful notes records about torture*
^ common denominator between the two countries is that corpora,,sm was used
homogenous nation and an ordered state. Democracy was often
zation meant the pol.ticizat.on of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. and the
specter (reaiistic or no,, of Revolution encouraged eiite support of authoritarianism
dictatorship and/or milittny rule. Contesting politics and opening polttical space for the
ost marginal members of socety was seen as a threat to stability, far more dangerous
<han simply an opposition victory. Bosch's election in 1962, the counter-coup i„
, 965
and the election of Guzman in 1978 raised significant fears among elites, much as did
Vargas' popularity among the poor, particularly labor, Gou, art’s radicalization of the
political sphere, and eventually, to a lesser extent, Brizola and da Silva’s campaigns in
989. That the Gass and color element of the “marginal” populations commingle is no,
surprising, given the perception of race in the two countries.
During the pas, seven decades race in the two countries has been conceived of in
terms of a color continuum. People consistently identified themselves along a color
scheme, and no, through the use of racial categories, and they did no, recognize the
existence of racial discrimination. However, discrimination along color lines has been
clear, whether i, was Trujillo’s destruction of the Euro-Dominican social clubs, or his
support of the “whitening” ideal by powdering his face before public speeches. Both
countries encouraged immigration to further “whiten” the population, although Brazil was
26
See (Weschler, 1990).
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far more successful in this reearH At ug d. A, the same „me, daring the 1930s and 1940s a
salience (in Brazi,) of racial ldeMity was propaga(e, ^^^ f
mtnican nationality argued that the Dominicans were culturally Spanish and European.
ome racial mixture. Racial discrimination was not possible since there
-s only one race in the Dominican Republic. Similarly, Brazilians began to believe that”^^ ^ WWCh
- racial divisions more mild than in
legacy of its African, European and Indigenous ancestors.
Even if these nationalist
“fictions- were believed in both countries, which they
"ke 'y t0 ^ het,er ^ ~ Haitians made up a^ caste in the
Dominican Republic, and although Dominicans often considered dark-skinned
Dominicans to beW and not dark-skinned Dominicans predominated
alongside Haitian migrants and residents. Brazil’s/^ (shanty-towns) are perceptibly
darker than its middle class neighborhoods. While i, is true that miscegenation was and
is high in Brazil, i, is also true that the extremes-the poorest and riches, sections of the
population tend to be very ethnically homogenous. The same holds true of the
Dominican Republic.
There is individual mobility, often considerable, for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-
Brazilians. Mobility tends to be greatest for those who are mulatto, rather than very dark,
and for those among the lower and the lower middle classes. Mobility correlates with the
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idea of
“whitening,” which is conceived of,
increased education, high paying job,
^^
are typical examples ofwhat has pejoratively beT^” liS '’ ,er lha" °',eSe ' f'en called
“whitening ” \vu
or educational success is def n •
*' ^n economic
-s
, defined mtenns of co,or, i, isclearlhat
,hemobi]
individual Afro-Dominican or Afro-RrwT • .
* °'
azilian is contingent on their
different from the stereotype of Afro Do • •
'
” ”
„
.
-D m,means and Afro-Brazihans. Therefore theexception reinforces the marginalization of the rule,
e political cultures in both countries is based on an understanding of politics which is
r*" ——
—
serves a specific putpose, but i, is also given a certain val • v-rta. value withm society. Dominicans
razi Ians itave a specific
“place” in the order of their social and political systems
"
.
Var'°US memberS^ ofgovernment, such as the police, the
nnlnao and the courts, wii, remind other members of their status should the former
^e.. This idea of place most clearly limits the citizenship ofAfro-Dom,means and
Afro-Brazihans who are generaily assumed to occupy the positions of lowest status
among citizens.
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PART III
LIBERAL AND REPUBLICAN ciTi7i?ve.»»r.
IN contemporarySSTAM) BRAZILIAN POLITICS
I he previous section (chapters 2 and 3) discussed
which race and citizenship have been
the historical conditions under
conceived in the Dominican Republic and Brazil.
^ give insi
cultural, and political systems which have been democratizing, on and off. for the last
,W0 deCadeS
' " iS CrkiCal
,0 begi" b> ™d"i„g
-ha. one-s identification by color
(generally no, race) is determined by context and no, by one's positive and inevitabie
commitment to a specific "race." However, although Afro-Dominicans and Afro-
azt tans do not always identify and arc not always identified as Afro-Domini
Afro-Brazilian, discrimination and
nn ican or
persecution are not uncommon. This has considerable
consequences for democratization as i, limits the extent to which Afro-Dominicans and
Afro-Brazilians can exercise democratic citizenship, whether defined a
Republican.
its Liberal or
This next section examines the extent to which Liberal and Republican notions of
citizenship apply to Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. While the presentation of the
cases in the previous section was used to follow the significance of race and citizenship
m each country's specific history-, so as to avoid making uninformed generalities about
ry and culture, the two chapters in this section are more explicitly comparative. The
goal is no, only to present evidence that addresses the (lack of) institutionalization of
citizenship for Afro-Dominicans and/or Afro-Brazilians. but also to compare the two
-e. Such a c„mparis0n gives insight into countries with significantly
( demographical ly speaking) racial groups who consistew)y^ ^
no, organize politically along
-racial” lines. „ also gives ,he opportunity for the
successes and failures in either count™ tn'° '° COmnbU
'e *° a more Eeneral knowledge and
aid in the construction of new strategies.
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substantive claims. Advocates of th^ fxocate oi the former pose that democracy’s
-ength lie in the
institutional and legal procedures that ensure universal political and civil rights.
Advocates of this point subscribe to the Dahl, an vision of polyarchy as the minimal set of
institutional arrangements necessaty for democracy. Procedural,, are no, alone in their
advocacy of a minimum se, of recognizable and enforceable rights, as New
Institutionalists support similar claims, and. although the scholars in the above groups do
no, always cite them, so do classical Liberal, libertarian and neo-liberal theorists.
Republicans who argue that democracy must make more substantive claims
would insist that democratic procedures, institutions and rights are not enough to
maintain democracy if they are not enforceable. These scholars choose more maximal
Visions of democracy which propose not merely elections, and free press, but also
attention to socio-economic disparities and alienation. Substantivists are joined by those
who study political culture as well as a host of post-Marxists who argue that socio-
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political reality, seems to be quite similar.
A study of Liberal citizenship, conceived in tcnns ofcivi, and po.itica, rights as
outhned in chapter I, is conducted in chapter 4. Liberal ideas within the sub-field of
democratization studies are considered and then sonte pre.iminary comparisons between
1116 'W0 C0Umr
'eS Wi " be made
' EmPirical ev‘dence from the two countries is then
presented, dela.hng the respect and violation of civil and political rights of Afro-
Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. Finally, the evidence from the two countries is
compared and some evaluations about the quality of. and the posstble improvement of
Libera, citizenship for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians are considered.
Chapter 5 examines the extent to which Republican citizenship, in tenns of
political agency and activity, exists for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. Like
chapter 4, chapter 5 begins with Republican ideas advanced by literature on
democratization before moving to a brief con,ex,ualiza.ion of Republican citizenship in
he two countries. This is followed by empirical evidence from the two countries,
particularly addressing the role ofNGOs in increasing self-conscious identification as
nc-gro, and mobilizing Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians along political lines. The
Chapter concludes by comparing the successes and failures of groups in both countries to
attract Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, as well as to improve the conditions of
Republican citizenship for both groups.
CHAPTER 4
THF nn,
1!!®' 1- C'TIZENSH1P IN
individual rights
Liberal nottons of citizenship are dependent on a bot,om
-Hne recognition of the
cv.l and political rights of a„ citizens. The institutes of Lihera, dc.ocmcy are
designed to protect these rights and to ensure that abstract universa, quality of ah
ndiv,duals can be transited into the practical and legal world. In the Dominican
Republic and Brazil, Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Braztlians have faced serious challenges
m eXerC
' S 'ng Libera
' Ci,i2enShiP
' ^ of .he very institutions-,he police
•he courts, and the government in genera,
-who are supposed to defend those rights
-hile
.he exercise of political rights has received increasing support in both countries
-he guarantee of civil rights remains illusory- in both the Dominican Republic and Brazil,
particularly for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.
Procedures, Institutions and Democratization
In the concluding essay of their multi-volume 7>
Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter focus
unsitions to Democracy series
on the unpredictability in the
transition period of the liberalization of a country's political system (O'Donnell and
Schmitter, 1986). This essay, considered one of the more influential pieces of scholarship
on democratization during the most recent wave of democratization, has been challenged
by more recent research, which argues that democratic institutions can impose structural
limitations making transitions more predictable (Karl, 1990; Mainwaring and Scully,
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19 ^5 ). Some scholars even suggest that Hpmr. ,• •"g 31 dem°Crat,C lns"' l"ions provide an incentive
s> stem which gives actor's pp * c
' Pa> '0ffS f°r behaWn® ‘democratically’ <i,. with the m,es Qfthe system) (Rustow, 1970; Geddes, 1994 ).
TheSC SCH0,arS^ °"^ lm“ ***“*- institutions and ,He procednra,
n0mS °fm°dem Hberai d“y ' be,iefis
- if the formal retirements for
cmocracy are me,, tins constitutes a marked improvement over the previous government
and that institutionalization of formal political structures is dependent upon the
empowerment of institutions while less formal structures wane in importance.
Understanding democratization through the use of institutional structures and
titutional procedures is consistent with Liberal notions of citizenship, in that
citizenship
... or,gl„
„„ |[<n
o
_ d> .
“““ *— U
go\emment institutions are charged with th^ rthe responsibility of protecting political and
civil rights.
Scon Mainwaring writes '' [democracy's fundamental Cain, to legitimacy is no, a
substantive one (greater efficiency, equity, or growth), but rather a;., cedura, one:
guarantees of human rights, protection of minorities, government accountability, and the
opportunity to get rid ot rulers who lose their popular support” (Mainwaring, 1 992: 306).
Th *S iS Simi 'ar ,0 HuMin8,0 »'s cWm that "democracy has a useful meaning only when i,
is defined in institutional terms" (in Robinson, 1995: 50). Citizenship, thus, is
understood within a poiyarchic system, a government that provides a minimum of
poh.ical access and the maintenance of civil liberties through institutional protection
(Dahl, 1971 ). The role of the citizen in "liberal democratic" politics, according to this
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line of reasoning, is not one of political engagement. In f , •
Peeler argues that ”,he establishment oflibera! democracy isfi d^
^^^
elUe action" and that r , r
' °^
(P , ,
^^nelitesinliberald
^ocracy is revive,y marginal”eeler,
,998: 190, 192, italics in the original).
Citizenship, according to Liberal th™ u*8 Sra th°Ught
’
IS a col|ection of political rights as well
“ Pr0
d
teC"0n °' Vari<>US dVil llbertieS
' ^ ne0'Hberal
— °f Liberalism, which has^ dominant in^^ ^^ ^ emphasj^^^ ^
77
n8htS
’
Wh
‘ ,e 8180 Pr0m°ting inJiVidUa
' righ'S *
-ruts of preferences
^ mUCh m° re
-—tic citizenship was proposed hy
orski Wh° dGfined dem°CraCy as the ri§ht to be arbitrarily killed (in
Wanderley Reis, 1996: 121).
The spectrum of literature which examines procedures and institutions in
‘“ 1“"—« -"'«*. «
““
“— — .
-
'V»« »—»»» «, focus „ „c,dura „d ,ama
,na “*""*“•*•'««* i.«-
thetr essay in the firs, issue of the Journal ofDemocracy, Lany Diamond and Marc
Planner exp,ain that democracy has "three essentia, features": real and considerable
competition for political positions: an inclusive system that allows political participation;
and "o high feve/ ofcivil andpolitical liberties ’
" (Diamond and Planner, 1 990: 5, italics in
original). These liberties include "freedom of speech, religion, opinion, and information:
freedom of peaceable assembly; freedom to form and join organizations; and equal
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the criminal justice system and to protect individuals or members of who are
systematically denied their rights.
Democratization in La , in America from the standpoint of po, idea, rights has been
relatively outstanding in the las. decade. Elections are a regular feature of the political
scape of ail Latin American countries, with the exception of Cuba, and suffrage is
universal to all people of majority status. Elections are generally mandatory which is
intended to increase citizen participation as well as decrease feelings of anomie among
citizens
. Additionally, both the Dominican Republic and Brazil no longer employ
literacy requirements.
The electoral system has been fairly successfully institutionalized in Latin
America. This may best be illustrated by the fact that although 44 percent of the
Venezuelan population supported the coup to remove President Carlos Andres Perez in
1992, 93 percent believed that democracy was the best form of government (Brooke. 6
Dec, 1996). Former coup leader Hugo Chavez became president in Venezuela in 1998
only via an election. Perhaps a more striking show of support for institutional structure is
the expression of popular and elite disapproval through increasingly institutional channels
With impeachment a real political option and a decrease in serious coup attempts in Latin
America. For example since 1 989. there were serious coup attempts in Venezuela in
1992, Paraguay 1993, and Guatemala 1993, three presidents were impeached and/or
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removed from office by the legislatures of their countries (Colltn ollor in Brazil 1 992 Perez in
Venezuela 1993, and Bucaram p . .’ tSuc in Ecuador in 1996), and the Peruvian rCongress proposed
impeaching Fujimori in December of 1991
The institutionalization of e,ect,ons has led scholars to examine
.note deeply how
&r an<i free th°Se e 'eCti0nS m°St °bvious
'y. by analyzing the partv systems
(Mainwaring and Scully,
, 995
, Some scho|ars^^^ „ a^^
between the mstitutionalization of a pany system and the institutiona,ion of
democracy (Peeler, 1 998). Mainwaring and Scully write
"(t]he nature of parties and party
SyS 'emS ShaPeS lhC Pr°SPeCtS *hat S,able d^racy will emerge, whether it will be
accorded legitimacy, and whether effective policy-making will result" (Mainwaring and
Scully, 1995: 2). Jonathan Marilyn's examination of the Dominican electoral system
distinguishes between free, fair, frequent and open elections (Hartlyn, 1998: 221-2,.
While Mexican elections are frequent and relatively free, the degree of fairness and
openness is questionable. This was most obvious during the 1 988 presidential elections
when computers crashed after electoral ballots from Mexico city gave opposition (PRD)
candidate Cuahtemoc Cardenas a lead over Carlos Salinas. Mexican elections are also
unfair in that the ruling partyfPRI) uses the State's budge, to finance its campaigns, and if
enough popular pressure challenges the legitimacy of its local governors, i, w ill remove
and replace them, regardless of whether they indeed were the winners of the contest, or
the replacement was even a candidate (Oppenheimer. 1998).
One of the most significant problems in institutionalizing party systems, is that
poht.cal parties, like other formal institutions, provide a democratic veneer which hides
This is not to say that it is necessarily effective, since many voters produce "blank" and "invalid" ballots.
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Peronists in Argentina.
Aside from political rights, procedural,s and institutionahsts look a, the
P otection of civil liberties as a fundamental cornerstone of Liberal democratic
dearly articulated and protected by law. Protection of civil liberties requires laws that
civil liberties be recognized by a legal system which has the capacity to ensure those
liberties. Latin American constitutions are without fail Liberal and, very often,
progressive documents. Citizens are protected from arbitraiy arrest, from torture and
death, from acts of discrimination, and are given the freedom to express themselves.
These are all rights tha, are defined by national governments, and are considered the
privileges of those who are citizens of the respective country. In addition t0 these rights.
Latin American governments have signed numerous documents in which they show their
solidarity or commit themselves to various international standards of human rights.
On paper, all Latin American governments have legally independent judicial
systems as well as police forces trained to maintain order and to not violate individual
rights. In recent years, almost all countries in Latin America have moved in this
While living, the monkey Tiao, a fan favorite in the public zoo of Rio de Janeiro
,
received many votes.
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direction,
.though some seem to have moved much closer to this institutional idea, than
others. However, the majority of the judicial systems in Latin America are s,i„ weak
dative to the presidency, to e.ites, and even, a, times, to po.itica. parties. The judicia,
system does not tend to serve as an independent branch of government which checks the
power of the executive and legislative branches, but more as an institution which tries
criminals of vio.ent crimes. The buik of the indicted are poor and considered marginal,
having a clear bias against this group. One of the reasons that the
majority of those mdtcted are poor and marginal is that police tend to arrest only poor and
marginal citizens. In many countries in the region, po.ice torture is commonplace, and
disappearances remain an option, although i, is nowhere near as commonly used as during
the 1 970s. Such conditions obstruct the rule of law and decrease popular legitimacy, but.
more importantly, they contribute to the maintenance of a hierarchical system in w hich
certain people are considered to have more recourse to rights than others. In more
extreme cases, some groups are considered to have no rights at all. This seems to be
occurring even in Costa Rica, where Nicaraguan refugees constitute a virtual caste.
Elizabeth Leeds writes that since it is generally assumed that “the duty of the state
[ts] to protect its citizens against certain basic dangers-such as threats to personal safety,
property, and civil and human rights-then we must also assume that all segments of
society have the right to be equally protected..." (Leeds, 1 996:5
1 ). That right seems to
underlie all other claims to civil liberties and. indeed, even political rights. However,
since political rights are generally understood in terms of ability to vote and the potential
to associate, political rights in electoral systems seem relatively secure, even if they do
not resemble any "democratic ideal." What this means is that other political rights, such
as participation, open choices in eiect.ons, fair campaign opportunities, open and
democratic political parries, are neg,ected. or are considered too much for a
defini, '0n °f dem0CraCy
' ^ ***“
are more obvious threats within
electora. systems, especialiy ones with societies which are hierarchical
in which vioience towards marginal groups is considered acceptable.
ly structured, and
In an analysis of state-sponsored violence i
explains that it is difficult to
n Brazil, Paulo Sergio Pinheirc
ensure political and civil rights "in countries where
structural violations' ot economic, social, and cultural rights seem to be a permanent
[h t,lls chapter posns that the structural
feature ot society" (Pinheiro, 1992: 262). Althom
hierarchies in the Dominican Republic and Brazil are largely responsible for the failure to
consolidate rights-based notions of citizenship in those countries, these hierarchies are
dynamic and show some capacity to change. As a result, they are better described as
enduring, rather than permanent2
.
Liberal Citizenship in the Dominican Republic sand Brazil
The New York based Non-Governmental Organization Freedom House annually
rates countries on the degree of freedom in their political system in terms of political
rights and civil liberties5
. The ratings range from 1, the most free, to 7, the most
repressive poiiticai system. In 1 988-9. both the Dominican Republic and Brazil scored
fairly well with the Dominican Republic being assigned a 1 and 3 and Brazil receiving a 2
J
See Diamond (1996) Wiarda ( 1995).
ofltienliflc sfudfrf
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aken
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vnv lfccdomhouso nroiOntin.. par These „umbers are
cientifi tudy o objective phenomena, but are merely comparisons of the degree which analysts
and a 3. for political rights and civil liberties respectively.
bit better than the Latin Amer
liberties.
B°th recorded scores quite
can average of 3.35 for both political rights and civil
'he m0St reCeW S,Udy
’
*he^
countries seen, to have caught
UP 10 'he D°miniCan RePUWiC “d^**- radngs for the Dominican Republic
and lira,, have worsened. The
, 999 surveys rated the degree of political rights and civil
liberties, respectively, in the Dominican Republic as 2 and 3, and in Brazil as 3 and 4
win, the La,, American Averages were 2, and 3.4. Dominican political rights were
"S,ed " " 4 ^ 1994
- election of foac, Balaguer, and so
,He nUmber 2 Sh°Uld * over the previous several years. I lowever
.he institutionalization of democracy in the las, ten years has no, greatly increased
political access for the majority of citizens nor have civil rights improved across the
Hoard in cither of these two countries. Democratization has opened up some countries to
...ore self-criticism and to foreign critics of human rights violations, but I, has also
endured an illiberal backlash.
h. some ways, democratization has improved Liberal citizenship. The autonomy
Of the press in the Dominican Republic and Brazil is considerable. There are many
NGOs and other pressure groups, especially in Brazil, which try to improve political
access and civil liberties particularly for marginal sections of the population. Voter
registration as well as electoral fairness, always problematic in the Dominican Republic,
improved considerably in 1 996. The election of Leonel Fernandez in the Dominican
Republic led to a change in the style of political leadership, to a less centralized and
consider political rights and civil liberties guaranteed.
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au.hon.anan political system. as well as ,o a govern. more in need of coahtiona,
support, and ntore willing «0 negotiate. Elections are regtdar in Brazil and challenges of
fraud are rare. During bo,h his firs, and second ^^^J
Cardoso appeared to differ front his predecessors in tha, he has heen very successfu, in
maintaining the support of a coalition ofpolitical parties*, which are normally qu i,e
-undisciplined.” This style seems much more democratic than the centralized and
exclusive governing cadre of Collor. or tha, of the militaiy government. Bu, as much as
democratization has occurred, in some areas at the i i c •, at the level of national politics, local politics
continue to he dominated by socio-economic and political structures which lend
themselves to hierarchy and to the empowerment of informal political processes.
Liberalization has also made i, easier for NGOs as well as international
organizations, such as Human Rights Watch (formerly Americas Watch) and Amnesty
international, to make evaluations about the condition of civil rights5
. While these groups
are often criticized for challenging the nation's sovereignty, they are nevertheless less
restricted and less subject to violence than in the past. However, the beating and deaths
of human rights activists is still no, uncommon in both countries. In the Dominican
Republic, international organizations have been invited, although they face much
domestic opposition, to help observe presidential elections. Jimmy Carter was present in
1 990 and 1 994. a, the request of Dominican candidates, and the presence of international
monitoring organizations is believed to have been a factor in restricting police violence
prior to the second round ot the 1996 elections (Hartlyn. 1998: 266).
tr.H v°
f
'
?
9
u
Cardoso ' s contro1 over his allianee shifted, and Brazilian political parties reverted to moretraditional obstructionist and rent seeking practices.
It is possible that greater access of said organizations have led to more critical assessments of civil rights
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ofGeography and Statistics (IBGE)
includes color in the census and produces data which is published by mainstream media
and which demonstrates income disparities betweenW,o,« audios. No
such data has been published in the Dominican Republic, and as of this writing i, is still
unclear whether such data exists. Chapter 5 discusses the nascent ueoate over racism, as
a sidebar to discussions of anti-Haitianism. However, racism remains a topic that is no.
acknowledged or discussed on a large scale in the Dominican Republic. Additionally,
since the census does no, include an option for color or race, since •'race" (c) is often
synonymous with "nation" (nacion), and Dominican society does not acknowledge color
prejudice, no data is "available” which can statistically prove impressionistic claims that
darker skinned Dominicans are disproportionately poor, harassed by the police, and
poorly served by the judiciary system.
There have been quite a number of obstacles to implementing a universal rule of
law and respect for civil and political rights, and for empowering democratic institutions.
Recent literature in democratization studies, which focuses on democratic consolidation
as well as how to
-deepen,” “construct,” or “build” democracy, recognizes that
democratic consolidation requires that the government be perceived to be legitimate
in the two countries.
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(Gunther, Dia„,andouros and Puhle,
, 995). Linz and Stepan write „e mean bv a
consohdated democracy a pohtica, situation in which, in a phrase, democracy has heconte
institutions are seen as the “rules of the game” and the proper channel, respective, ,
th 'S Und“in8"d~C * employed rigorously , it wou,d he hard
•o apply it to either the Dominican Repuh.ic or Brazil, or prohah, any other count, i„
•he region. In both case, democratic procedures and institutions certainly provide a se,
o( rules and channels. However, they are no, the
-only game in town ,, and often^^
even the dominant
-game in town. In a major survey conducted in 1 994, Isis Duarte e,
al found that Dominicans still prefer extra-institutiona, means to problem solving, and are
quite skeptical of institutions. When asked about the “utility of political parties. 56.2
percent responded that panics “serve only in order to panieipate in elections” (Duarte e,
al- 1994: 70). A survey conducted in afare,
a
by the Brazilian Order of Lawyers (OAB)
"found that 56 percent of the sample surveyed preferred
‘infernal channels’ of resolving
conflict, as compared to 20 percent who preferred formal processes of adjudication and
24 percent who expressed no preference” (Leeds, 1996:62).
Prelerence for informal networks and patronage is based on the perception that
institutions are slow, ineffective, biased and uncooperative, as well as the ignorance of
citizens of formal options. Citizens are also aware that clientelism is an efficient
mechanism in which the relatively powerless can gain access. The presence of clienteles
and their importance in Dominican and Brazilian politics is quite old (see chapters 2 and
3), and it has become a very salient ordering principle of the political and social system.
Of course, the military was in power at the time.
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In 1975. Howard W.arda wrote that patronage and clientelism were so ingrained in
D““
~'> •«*« fc
following the end of ,he Tnij ill(ldiclalorship(w|alda |97j| |n oavid Mnvbur.
L.»,
-The P,„i„„ PatronageW«ta 1»h,ie.
P.I.O..,. h„ in ,h, Brazilian Ihtetlo, I,
beginning of Brazilian history'' (in Sumrn. 1995: 154,.
Three decades later, a small elite maintains its privilege through clientelistie
Practices, although it is not limited to rural areas. As one analyst writes of northern
Brazil, “Wrue power, derived from wealth and influence, is vested in a relatively small
segment of the population and is accessed through complex chains of patronage.
Government is frequently little more than a venue for patrons and cl,wits to negotiate
favors" (Butler. ,998: ,59). Clientelism is pervasive, and it is especially powerful in the
regions where the agency of clients is weakest relative to their patrons, and that includes
rural areas of both countries, the border with Haiti in the Dominican Republic, the north
and northeast in Brazil, and the ghettos and shanties in urban complexes in both
countries. Clientelism is also strengthened by high unemployment figures, shrinking state
involvement in the national economy, and considerable payoffs for political support
(Hartlyn. 1998. 22o ). In short, clientelism most constrains the economically, socially
and politically marginal, for whom clienteles and patronage, rather than through
institutions, are often the most available, immediate or efficient recourse.
Roberto da Malta's work on Brazil (1987, 1991) attempts to address how
clientelistie systems can become so embedded in social practice that they can engender a
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particular rather than a universal vision of citizenship. He writes
‘-.here is a form of
universal citizenship, hui.t on modem roles which are tied into ope~.,n ofa
socety and a market; and also other forms of affiliation to Brazilian society-other forms
ot citizenship stem from the intimate
, re|ational^ ^^^ ^
Ma«a, 199,: 321). This is because, he asserts. Brazihan society is ignora„, of the
'individual - and of “neutral" modem bureaucracies.
,n Brazil, there are no individuals,
only persons, and persons are not equal. This inequality is determined by one's "place"
within society, or as da Malta clearly writes "fwlhn t
.
rite [ J ho you know versus who 1 know, is the
fundamental fact in the Brazilian social calculus" (da Matta, 1991: 322).
Ramonina Brea e, a, observe a similar recognition of the “person" rather than the
'individual" in Dominican political culture (Brea e, al, 1995: 125). The use of the person
rather than the individual as the basic agent of political life aids in the construction ofa
system which institutionalizes hierarchy according to personal identity and socio-
economic status. “The acceptance of hierarchy, authority, power, priv ilege, rank, social
condition is linked to a vision of a differentiated society cut across by inequality.
ponsibihtie,s andpi n ileges are learned as attributes derived from social conditions,
from power" (Brea et al. 1995: 125, italics in original).
Equating one's agency within a democracy with one's personal attributes or socio-
economic position is clearly antithetical to Liberal claims for universal membership and
equality be,ore the law. However, recognizing that a “relational universe,” as da Matta
puts it, coexists with, if not dominates, a legal and bureaucratic one, 1, necessaiy to
understanding the institutionalization of citizen rights in the Dominican Republic and
See also chapter 6.
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Brazil. Da Matta explains the coexistence of a Ltberal and a partictdar notion of
citizenship writing “if I am assuredly a citizen on Independence Day^ i„ the poIitica|
ral'y, in no way do I want to be only a cittzen when I an, struggling with the police... or
when 1 need a bank loan...- (da Matta,
, 99
. : 320). Coexistence should no, be confused
WUh eqUa,ity
’
and " C 'ear fr°m *hiS ^ in situations where power is necessaty
better positions will not only seek the anonymous rights of citizens, but will use
clientelistic relations and hierarchical status to ensure results.
This system of hierarchical relations is most deleterious to the protection of the
rights of the marginal. Marginals are distinguished in the Dominican Republic and Brazil
b> the very tenuous socio-economic and political positions that they occupy. For
example, Hartlyn estimates unemployment in the Dominican Republic in the last two
decades to be consistently between 1 9 and 25 percent, with the informal sector and micro-
rprises pro\iding the chief source ol income for one in five families in 1992-1993
(Hartlyn, 1998. 14 j). The infant mortality rate for the Brazilian northeast is 1 16/1.000.
"one of the highest in the hemisphere and comparable to the poorest parts of Africa"
(Scheper-Hughes, 1992: 279). Haitian workers in the Dominican Republic, even those
with official papers, are subject to constant abuse by police officers who routinely
disregard or tear up their documentation, demand bribes, or torture them. Those who
woik on plantations are often not allowed to leave the compound. Between 1988 and
1991, an estimated 5,644 streetchildren were killed in Brazil, and 16 percent of the
population supported the use of brutality to eliminate streetchildren
vDudley. 1998: 35).
In worlds where rights are recognized by status, it is difficult to prevent violence
against those ol limited or no status. The same political culture that recognizes people as
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"marginal" a,so perceives ,hc, as “frith,” “trash,”
“demons,”
“thieves,” and “animals,” to
cite just a feu ep, diets
. In a survey conducted in the Dominican Republic in 1994. 66.43
percent of the sample agreed that "Haitians bring problems to the countty" (Brea et al.
' 995: 227), Most societies are unaffected when people considered to be marginal within
•heir borders are arbitrarily arrested and harassed, yet Dominicans and Brazilians seem to
strongly support violent methods used to deal with “marginals.'” particularly in Brazil
Where citizens have protested the imprisonment of leaders of death squads which killed
streetchildren (Dimenstein, 1991 ; 48)
It ts necessary to elaborate the perceptions and discourses that surround
citizenship in the Dominican Republic and in Brazil in order to situate how Liberal
notions of citizenship apply or fail to apply to Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. It is
clear that the majority of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians are adversely affected by
negative stereotypes which associate negritud/e with illiteracy, poverty, lack of culture,
stupidity, violence, and, in the Dominican Republic, with Haiti. Despite legal guarantees
of equality and. in Brazil, constitutional provisions against racial discrimination. Liberal
rights have been very- difficult to achieve for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.
One reason lor this is that there is a clearly understood hierarchy in which Afro-
Brazilians and Afro-Dominicans occupy a very marginal position. As one expression-
among academics—in Brazil says, “there is no problem with race in Brazil, because
negros know their place. Along similar lines, Livio Sansone found that there tend to be
three different domains in which Afro-Brazilians operate: "tough" domains such as the
workplace, encounters with police, and searching for a spouse; "soft" domains such as
One could trace this idea of dehumanization of the Other back to debates during the early slave trade.
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leisure activity and sports; and "Black Space" such as cantaval, Afro-Brazilian relimons
capocra. etc (Sansone,
,997: 470). in the "tougher" areas, racta, discrimination is often
more clear and racial identities are less flexible, i.e. a„ Afro-Brazilians ntay be considered
razihan. In the softer
' areas Afro-Brazilians face less racial discrimination and
their racial identities are more flexible and far less relevant. For example, the color of
soccer players in Brazil and baseball players in the Dominican Republic is rarely relevant,
if noticed at all. Finally, the areas which are traditionally considered Afro-Brazilian
spaces are ones in which Afro-Brazilian identity is valued and is considered quite
positive. Since this is an investigation of rights and liberties, the essay will concern itself
mostly with wha, might be considered "tough" spaces. The result of this is that the areas
in which Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians suffer the most prejudice will receive the
most attention, whereas areas where race/color is less important w:P . .eeive little
attention. The intention here is no. to overstate racial prejudice, only to emphasize the
conditionality of the political rights and civil liberties ofAfro-Dominicans and Afro-
Brazilians.
Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic is one of only a handful of countries in Latin America
where the protection of political rights worsened during the last decade, especially in
election years, although it has improved since 1 996. Electoral fraud prior to the 1 996
presidential elections was as certain as was the candidacy of Joaquin Balaguer for the
presidency, and this was no spurious relationship. The most blatant area of violation of
about whether the natives and Africans had souls.
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political rights in the Dominican RepubHc has been electora
,^^^
Peoples' names from electora, lists, paying citizens in exchange for their voting cards, or
allowing the mi,itary-.onsti,utiona„y banned front voting-,o vote. Every e.ectora,
contest since Banner's 1 966 victory has been denounced as fraudulent by the losing
opposition, although no, all have been. As detailed in chapter 3. repression was so
significant that serious opposition withdrew and abstained front the 1970 and ,974
presidential elections. The 1 978 elections involved the awarding of a majority of seats in
Congress to the PRSC
, as pan of a deal that allowed Antonio Guzman to take power.
Charges of fraud were also made in 1 982 and 1 986, although the fraud was no, nearly as
substantial. No, surprisingly, despite compulsory voting, abstention rates increased
between ,978 and ,990. and only ,994 showed a decline in abstention (Hart,y„. ,998:
231).
There were numerous claims of fraud following the 1990 and especially the 1994
elections which were voiced by national and international groups. In 1990. due to
d, visions within the PRD and Balaguer's lack of popularity, the PLD's Juan Bosch made a
strong run at the presidency. Since the PLD had a very shallow electoral base, the PRSC
began to buy electoral ID cards from people who were believed to be sympathetic to
Bosch for the price of 100 and 500 pesos, roughly SI 0-50 (Moya Pons. 1995: 439). The
voting fraud that Moya Pons reports was mostly confined to the poorer classes of the
Dominican Republic, and it is common knowledge that Reformism technocrats bought
votes in the areas where they knew they were not likely to win. Poor Afro-Dominicans
who were urban residents made up a majority of those offered money for their voting
cards. Moya Pons also reports that approximately 8.000 members of the armed forces
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and national police were provided with electoral cards so that they could vote, despite
Constitutional provisions against this. Finally, the Catholic hierarchy and the armed
forces, both very pro-Balaguer institutions, spoke openly against Juan Bosch, and rumors
prohlerated of a coup if Bosch were to be elected (Moya Pons. 1995: 440),
Jimmy Carter's electoral monitoring group as well as the Dominican Central
Electoral Board (J.C.E) were unable to detect clear evidence of fraud, and Joaquin
Balaguer was declared the winner, winning by 1 .
1 percent of the valid votes. In contras,,
even the most casual observers recognized massive fraud in the 1994 elections which
Pitted Balaguer principally against Pena Gomez, who now led a more unified PRD. Even
the J.C.E., which has generally been considered weak, conservative and corrupt,
established through an investigator)' committee that
more than 28,000 voters had been deliberately disenfranchised by having
fr°m tHe electoral lists at the 1.500 polling stations"..
.
' the
V
500 P°lm8 stations represent about 16% of the country’s total
simple arithmetic supports the PRD figure of 200.000 frustrated voters
’
nationwide. In the end. the JCE merely ignored the committee’s findings(Ferguson, 1994: 1 1; also Espinal, 1994: 11).
Balaguer's victory by 0.7 percent of the valid votes in 1994 was even more
contested than his victory four years earlier. However, due to the crisis in Haiti and
Balaguer's political savvy, Balaguer was able to negotiate a two year presidency, while
the opposition finally was able to pass a no-reelection amendment which prevented
Balaguer from running in 1996. The voters whose names were absent from the voting
lists in 1994 were, not surprisingly, PRD members or people that Reformista surveys
believed would sympathize with Pena Gomez. Again, the fraud was limited primarily to
poor and urban areas w here Balaguer's support was weak and where Pena Gomez's
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fraud simply negated the political riohts of AfW, n •P ,s ot Afro-Dominicans altogether. The political
rights were no, the only rights of Afro-Dominican citizens that were abridged durino the
elections. Because Balaguefs message of order and security and national sovereignty was
dependent upon his nationalist discourse which denigrated Haitians, negros, Africans and
the Ethiopian race” (terms he used interchangeably), the civil rights and liberties of
Afro-Dominicans were also abridged during these electoral campaigns.
Perhaps the most clear and documented case of this is Balaguefs nationalist
rhetoric that attempted to challenge the nationality of Pena Gomez. The mass public
relations campaign aimed a, undermining of Pena Gomez's domMcanidad was evident as
early as 1 985’ when Balaguer published La is,a a, reves. Through., his campaigns
against Pena Gomez he echoed the racist and xenophobic rhetoric of,ha, book. While
many Dominicans, including some scholars, say that Balaguer's attack on Pena Gomez
was not racist but anti-Haitian (Interviews, 1997), it is hard to make such subtle
differentiations when an ideologue purposely conflates the terms Haitiano, negro, and the
“Ethiopian” race. For example, even though his book is concerned with the presence of
Haitian culture affecting the Dominican one. he writes ”[c]ontact with the negro has
contributed, without a doubt, to the relaxing of our public customs” (Balaguer. 1 985: 45.
emphasis added). Thus, ”our” customs refers to both Dominican and non
-negro customs.
Pena Gomez’s dominicanidad was often challen
immense resources of the office of the presidency,
ged even prior to this, but not with the same v
and without the same consequences.
igor, the
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which clearly denrarca.es the Haitian as other, while also placing the Afro-Don,inican
an ambiguous position vis-a-vis Dominican nationality.
Balaguer's campaign was no less subtle. James Ferguson reports that the Balaguer
campaign attempted to call into question the nationality of Peha Gomez by using “TV
ctals [that showed]... a gesticulating Pena Gomez accompanied by a frenzied
drumming or a map of Hispaniola in which a dark brown Haiti gradually spread over and
covered a bright green Dominican Republic” (Ferguson. ,994: ,2). This was exacerbated
by the perception that the dark-skinned Pena Gomez had a 'volcanic' temper, and
Dominicans were reminded of his presence in the riots of 1984 i0
.
The message of Balaguer's campaign was simple: the Haitian negro who opposes
me is going to unify both countries and then we are going to be 'African' and barbaric
like them. The only protection from Pena Gomez, and in order to protect the "Dominican
destiny from its neighbor (the threat involved in the subtitle of Baiter's book), is to
elec, a ''real” Dominican: the bianco, educated president who has maintained Dominican
security, stability and sovereignty for over two decades. One billboard declared
"Dominican: Your destiny is in your hands... Defend your nationality, conserve the
peace, liberty, order, and the progress of the country....'' Pena Gomez was presented as a
man who could "not be trusted.” who was “not good,” who would “bum the country ”
who believed in “satanic cults",” and who would "open the border to Haitians.”
Another Balaguer poster read “Think: We cannot risk the future of our country on a man
ii
imP !lcatlon being that Pena Gomez fomented the riots. See (chapter 3)
This was a reference to a videotape in which Pena Gomez was in attendance during a ritual performed by
razihan spritist. This sort of ritual, like Santeria, Gaga, Vodu and other Affo-spiritst and syncretic
^Haitians'
C°nS 'dered dem°niC by the Catholic hierarchy- They also perceived as being the "cults' of
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like I HIS (Espinal, 1994-6-7} All7). of these comments about Pena Gomez used code-
words for stereotypical portraits of Haitians.
Although some may find such blatant prejudicial politics out of place in a
democracy. William Connolly argues that “[electoral politics con, a,ns powerful
pressures to become a closed circuit for the dogma,ization of identity through the
translation of difference into threat and threat into energy for the dogma,ization of
identity" (Connolly., 991: 2,0). This certainly explains the
"Haitianization/ etherization
of Pena Gomez during the 1 994 presidential elections. Yet i, is critical to remember that
identity can only be 'dogmatized' during specific periods, such as elections, if elements
of alienation and marginalization already exist in daily life. Therefore, i, would no, be
possible to assert Pena Gomez’s lack of Dommicamdad if the Dommicamdad of million!
of Dominicans, particularly Afro-Dominicans, were no, perpetually threatened,
challenged and negotiated in everyday life.
In the Dominican Republic, many children of Haitian workers as well as many
poor Afro-Dominicans, particularly in rural environments, are bom and never properly
registered. This is due to the shallowness of state institutions, the ignorance of the
parents, and/or the lack of money required for the birth registry. As a result many Afro-
Dommicans do not have documentation to prove they are Dominican. Sam Martinez
observed that there "[t]he Dominican Constitution is unequivocal on that matter... states
that any person bom in the Dominican Republic has the right to Dominican citizenship.
\ et the authorities do not necessarily respect the valid documents of Hatian-
Dominicans...” (Martinez, 1996: 10 ).
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ans. those who are without papers are deported regardless of their place of
bifth P°' iCe are reP°rted t0 C°nSiSteml >'
“fficia, docun,..:s of iegal Haitian
residents, who are sondes deported. June of ,99,, Baiaguer decreed that Haitian
tmmigrants under the age of 16 and over 60 be expelled from the country 12
. James
Ferguson writes:
§SS=~3=-'
~=B?l!SassaSRr
(Ferguson. 199^9?
“ ‘° ‘ C0Um,y they had never seen
There were no government investigations into the militaifys activity, nor any
preventative measures installed to avoid future repetitions of such ine,dents. As usual,
the government ignored the political rights of dark-skinned Dominicans. Dominicans of
Haitian ancestty and Hatian workers, with or without documentation. Additionally, being
-strong" with the Haitians has traditionally been considered a means of increasing
prestige among politicians. Baiaguer used the "threat of Haitian infiltration" as a means
ofjustifying the brutal security policies of his police, his arbitrary decisions to deport
Haitians, regardless of legal status, and in the formation of his "Hispanic” vision of
Dominican nationality. But Baiaguer is not alone in this. When Leonel Fernandez
entered into an alliance with Baiaguer after the first round of the ,996 elections, the
alliance was called "The Patriotic Alliance” (El Frente Palriotico), a clear attack on Pena
Those between 16 and 60 were allowed to stay since they were considered workers.
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' DOminiCa" °b
—~,y consider this to Have Heen a* teCt""" “ "**
-
- Dominicans interviewed for th is
mixed racial heritage (Interviews, 1997 ).
O.Her than Baiaguer, ihe most conspicuous of the ami-HaHian ideologues
invoived in the , 996 elections were the PLD S Mauricio Vinicio Casiiiio (Hartlyn, I998:
2j9> 243) ' THe re‘ired ye‘ Sti" aCtiW Bosch
' wh° oddly enough wrote some of the
seem the least bit bothered by his association with Baiaguer.
H’““” * “ ““ >*."
. praig(
,
Pena Gomez.
igue , or the rampant use of anti-
d^ai^f th^DominicmTRe^^
^essssSt#-
The use of police repression and the obstruction of basic civil rights prior to an election
was nothing new in the Dominican Republic. In fact. Baiaguer gave the ruthless Genera,
Perez y Perez" the position of head of the police prior to the firs, round of the elections,
for the express purpose of browbeating would-be PRD voters. I, was only with
international pressure, particularly from Jimmy Carter, and public statements from
Fernandez himself that the repression ended (Hartlyn, 1 99 8: 265-6). What was new.
See also (Hartlyn, 1998: 263)
General Perez y Perez was well-acquainted with this role since he was responsible for the repression of
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however, was tha, violence, anti-Haitianism and blataw violations^^
Dominican citizens were being exp,oiled by someone other lhan Baiaguer.
Fernandez supporters, inciuding some scholars, justified pragmalic^^
tHat) 35 be ' n8 P°' itiCS neCeSSary
(Interviews,
, 997). Ye, they were positive
that Fernandez would rule democrat, ly and that bis election would represented a true
transition to democracy, since the transitions of 1961, 1963, 1966, ,978 were all
somewhat disappointing (see Hartlyn, 1 998). And the Fernandez government has been an
improvement over the previous Baiaguer regimes, although it is strongly aided by a
massive economic boom. Fernandez has avoided the authoritarian ruling behavior of his
predecessor and seems to represent wha, political scientist Jacqueline Jimenez-Polanco
considers a transition from a “charismatic leadership to contingent leadership- (Jimenez-
Polanco, 1999).
However, the contingent and less charismatic leadership of Fernandez may be due
lo his weakness relative to a very obstructionist congress where his party was unable to
maintain even tenuous alliances. In this sense, his governing style, rather than being
something new. may actually be more like that of earlier presidents Antonio Guzman and
Jorge Blanco whose lack of caudillista prestige and party majority and/or unity made
them weak presidents, not necessarily democratic ones. One reason to believe this is
Fernandez s resorting to the abuse of Haitians to protect himself from opposition within
his party (PLD), his fragile alliance with the PRSC. and from the PRD. In March of
1 997, Fernandez sent the police in pursuit of undocumented Haitians, especially in
political opposition in 1966.
Sam,ago Where
.here was rumored to be a ‘'Haitian beggar network.” Wucker writes
'[« Dominican
„„ ^^ ___
least these by P°inting out tha< at
authorities and that efforts were marip a
' cooperation of the Haitian
as possible. “Nobody can deny the Do
° ^ Haitians as humanely
undocumented workers to their countn T” 8°Ve™mem
'
s riSht t0 relum
back, expelled from Puerto Rim h
'
’
^
7
day Dommicans come
when the U.S. re r
™^ “y anythin§- Every day,
because they know the U S ha ti?
S 5°™!^ border ' nobody protests,
> x u n .S. s the right.” (Wucker, 1999: 247)
Interestingly enough, six years earlier President Joaquin Balaguer defended his
deportation of Haitians saying that he had “the right to treat the Haitians the same way as
the United States or Puerto Rico treat Dominicans” (in Ferguson, 1992: 89).
The abuse goes beyond periodic deportations during moments of waning
pres,dent, al Popularity. There is also an everyday aspect of abuse, principally perpetrated
by the police. It is well documented that during the harvest, Haitian workers are
restricted to the plantation on whieh they work (Wilhems, 1 994). In the neighborhood of
San Carlos, also ea.led Little Haiti, Haitian and Afro-Dominican residents ate regularly
stopped, harassed, and forced to pay bribes to police officers (Wuck... 1999: 89). This
harassment is not limited to undocumented Haitians, bu, also to those with papers, and
dark-skinned citizens of the Dominican Republic. If Afro-Dominicans do no, cany their
papers, they are often fined (for a bribe) and can be sent to a detention center or a
Plantation that needs labor. This repression has been exacerbated by the growth of the
drug trade, especially in San Carlos, and the creation of the DNCD (the National
Directorate of Drug Control). It is the DNCD which has been actively involved in
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invasions of San Carlos nnH ,v«i, ^other areas populated by the darkest members of Domini*.
society and which has been cited r trepeatedly lor human rights violations, including beating
killnv people who refuse to pay bribes (Human Rights Watch, 1097, 199^
been little effort by the police or any other governmental institution to
prevent police from heating those who do not observe the unofficial curfew, from
accepting bribes, and from torturing and civilians. The Fernandez government
does no, seem to be much of an improvement in terms of limiting^ impunity
(Human Rights Watch, 1 998), although he has rhetorically supported
.indicia, reform and
ending police impunity. Whether it is because he is a weak president or because police
Violence is no, a primary concern for him, Fernandez has done little to institutionalize a
police force more respectful of civilian rights' 5
.
1 he documentation of civil rights abuses tends to be limited to describing the
routine abuse of Haitians. For example, I luman Rights Watch wrote "the human rights
Situation in the Dominican Republic in 1 992 continued to be dominated by official
mistreatment of Haitians who crossed the border into the Dominican Republic” (Human
Rights Watch, 1993: 100). In 1997, some 21,000 Haitians, Dominicans of Haitian
descent and Afro-Dominicans were expelled from the Dominican Republic (Human
Rights Watch, 1 998). Again, there are no numbers which can detail how many Afro-
Dominicans have been deported, just as there is no evidence ofhow many Haitians with
documents were deported. Additionally, Dominicans on the darker end of the color
continuum predominate in prisons, where prisoners are dealt with severely (i.e. torture
onion,
researcher was able to prolect various Afro-Dominicans and 1 lailians from forced bribes,pote tial beatings and possible detention by pretending to be an American reporter when he noticed police
stopping people in San Carlos. The police allowed the Afro-Dominicans and Haitians to leave after the
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ath) for noting and where as many as 90 percent of prisoners in some jails
await trial (Human Rights Watch, 1997: 96).
The Nationa, Office of Statistics (ONE) which conducts the census and produces
some of most imponan, demographic information in the country has no informat,on
broken down by coior or race, in fact, the census docs no, even ask individuals to
identify by co,or/race. The
, 994 Demos study represented a change since i, included
questions about color, bu, the overwhelming majority of the questions involved in the
survey were differentiated by sex. urban/rural, and class factors, and no, color/race. As of
the writing, some ol this data is being broken down by color/race 16
One statistic that was included in the ONE'S evaluation of the Dominican census
of 1 993 and was a chan which broke dow n the number of suicides by race and sex. The
information was provided by the National Police. The National Police have not
responded to several letters requesting access to their data, and i, is unlikely that other
similar data will be published. In the absence of other data, i, is wonh speculating on the
statistics for suicide, the only available statistics differentiated by "race."
In the Dominican Republic, the number of suicides in 1 993 by race are 20 for
b!mC°S
’
101 f°r mestizos, and 171 forties. The numbers are oau when one compares
them to national demographics (16% blancos, 73% of mestizos, and 11% of negros).
When the number of suicides per 1 00,000 people of each racial categoiy are tabulated, the
rate ot suicides is incredibly high among negros (1.6/1 00,000 blancos, 1 .8/1 00.000
mestizos, and 2 1 .2/1 00.000 negros). Thus, the suicide rate for negros is more than 1
4
“reporter" said he was unaware that a curfew existed (Turits, interview).
recon?erol
a
„
C
f,h
0 'Vle<
l
Smenl “ °'Ved “ l$is Duarte and Brea who are facilitating the
conversion o these statistics. *
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, while for mestizos
,o
mestizas
,t ,s 7.42 ,o 1, and forWgros ,o negras i, is ,0.61 to 1.
Any explanation of this isolated statistic calls for speculation. However, given the
above discussion there are probably two possibilities. The first, being that Afro-
Donrinican. particularly negro, suicide rates are so^^^^
DOmi" iCanS^ ** Hfe
—---h more depressing, confining and
were not indeed suicides.
In 1997. 30 civilians were hilled by police in
“self-defense," and 35 extrajudicial
flings were reported in ,996 (Human Rights Watch, ,998. ,997). “Dominican police
routinely ignored due process, such as providing access to lawyers and observing the
forty-eight hour limit on holding detainees in police lockups. They also arbitrarily
detained criminal suspects' family members as hostages, to entice the suspects to turn
themselves in" (Human Rights Watch. 1 998: 1 3). Reports like these and the
disproportionate number of negros (men) who committed suicide bring into question
Whether the deaths were actually self-inflicted.
,f other police records indicate a similar
bias, it would seem to be an indication that Afro-Dominicans are more likely to be
harassed, abused and killed by police, and. therefore, that their civil rights are, indeed,
abridged v is-a-\ is Euro-Dominicans. In the defense of the National Police, the same
statistic for suicides when broken down by nationality shows that almost all suicides were
by Dominicans, only 3 were by Haitians and 1 was Asian. The low number of Haitians
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suggests that using suicides to cover up murder mayy not account for the very high number
of negros.
The National Police is no, the only Dominican institution that is reluctant to make
information available. In a report to the International Convention on the Elimination of
All forms of Racial Discrimination, the Dominican government's position was "since no
ractal discrimination exists, no legislation has been enacted in this connection" (IERCD,
14 Oct, 1988). In the 1990 Report to the International Convention on the Elimination
Racial Discrimination, Mrs. Bonetti Herrera gave a very brief repo.. „n the lack of racial
discrimination. Members of the advisory committee expressed concern about racial
minorities and asked for an update on this in the next report filed, which would be due in
1992. In their analysis of the condition ofhuman rights in the Dominican Republic in
1998, Human Rights Watch noticed
[a]t this writing, the Dominican government still has not submitted its
report to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
which was due in March, and the committee considered the report
excessively overdue.' The Dominican government, which is obliged to
submit reports to the committee every two years last satisfied this
requirement in 1990 (Human Rights Watch, 1998: 1 15).
As ol this writing in the summer ol 1999, no such report has been filed.
Brazil
I here is a very long tradition in Brazil of legal protection of rights and negative
liberties. However, legal protection of rights has remained something that is elaborated in
law, but not actualized in practice. As Caldeira and Holston write:
I
i ] n Brazil, every democratic constitution since the first Republican charter
of 1 891 has contained adequate provisions for due process and the
fundamental rights ol life, liberty, and property
—
provisions directly
inspired, in fact, by the U.S. Constitution. In reality, however, Brazilian
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thar
° nl> ' C°"sifntl> Protecled P«V«y and only certain kinds atat (Caldeira and Holston, 1998: 275).
What is interesting is that while rights to vote are guaranteed to all Brazilians, and
Brazilians face few official obstacles to political access, socio-economic structures and
political hierarchies essentially marginalize most Brazilians. This is especially so for
Afro-Brazilians who do not have a 'racial consciousness’ which is connected to their
political and civil rights, the means and time in which to approach political institutions,
and/or the perception that political institutions may actually help. The next chapter will
examine obstacles to mobilization of and expanding political rights of Afro-Brazilians.
This section, however, will concern itself with violation of the civil rights of Afro-
Brazilians, as well as recent low-profile denunciations of racism. Understanding the
condition of civil rights lor Afro-Brazilians requires understanding the hierarchy of
personal value in Brazil, and the society's relative indifference to homicides among its
“marginal” populations.
Former Sub-Secretary of the Military Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro Jorge
da Silva explains that police, in any country', have two responsibilities:
law enforcement... and the maintenance of order... [The former may be
somewhat clear, however, the latter] is more ambiguous... What if the
order is not equal? [what il there is a savage order which undermines the
law?]... Will the police maintain an unequal order or execute the law'?...
A unequal society does not want an egalitarian police force (Interview,
30 th of October, 1998).
The police in Brazil seem to consistently maintain a hierarchical order in which lighter
skinned, more educated and wealthier Brazilians occupy a higher place than darker
skinned, less educated and poor Brazilians. Brazilian military police, and to a lesser
extent civil police, routinely arbitrarily arrest or pull over potential suspects, who they
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'a,er find 8Uiky ° f S°me Crime
' Tte two P^Ple groups that suffer from police
harassment, groups which overlap, are the
Afro-Brazil ians.
poor, particularly residents offavelas, and
Phefmelm are C0nsidered 10 be “li-ninel types of social spaces: they are
residences, bu, no,
-proper' residences” (Calde.ra, ,992: 83). Favelados tend be dark
or brown skinned (a,
.hough no, necessarily negro/prelo) and/or from the „ortheas(
although^ are inhabited by Brazilians from all over Brazil and of all colors. There
is some animosity between Afro-Brazilians and northeastern migrants, and many brown-
skinned northeasterners do not consider themselves to be itegru, bu, rather caboCo, India
or bianco. However, their location within thefavela "darkens" (the opposite of
"whitening") them, and they are seen to be like, although no, the same as, the negro.
The ratings cited from Freedom House show that Brazil is r.:‘ the only Latin
American countiy where civil liberties for ethnic and racial Others have worsened during
democratization. However. Brazil is particularly exemplary in this area. The end of the
militaiy regime coincided with economic crisis as well as massive penetration of the
/ is in urban areas by drug dealers, as well as by the considerable growth of favelas.
During the 1 980s and 1 990s, a virtual war has raged in manyfavelas at night between
police and off-duty police and citizens, police and drug dealers, drug dealers and rivals,
and drug dealers and local residents. Among the various groups, the violence of the
This section will focus on police responses lo urban violence, especially u-,in» Rio de Janeiro and SiloPau'o; Police violence is no, limited ,o Ihese cities, or ,o urban areas for lhat nST H„we«r Polte
in the cmf "“T
Pe°P
‘l
S $eemS 10 be somellli
"S that pervades throughout Ihe couMrv For exampleenter-west squatters, often associated with the Landless Movement (Movimemo Sew hZJZeoften removed from property with considerable violence. Also, ihis will no, address dai™ of
Human Rights Watch"
™™'
)
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r ' <* forced and underage prostitution in Brazil (see
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40.4% of informants felt it was justifiable in some cases to use violence in older 10 get a
confession (Carvalho et al 1997-10 T ,
' 20)
- The use of violence is justifiable because
° f,e" dark'Skinned °r PerCdVed t0 be ' - considered
,o be less civi,i zed and.
'herefore. less human. In one moment of political bravado, former governor of Rio de
Janeiro Marcelo Alencar exclaim^ri "milaimed [t]hese violent criminals have become animals
^
->
wi,h
•Hem can't be civilized. These people don', have to be treated in a civilized way. They
ha\e to be treated like animals" (in Cavallaro, 1997: 1 ).
The statistics of number of citizens killed by police officers is staggering.
1991, the Military' Police alone killed 1 104 peode in San p , aP pit o Paulo during
‘confrontations
with criminals’” (Caldeira, ,992: 159). Rio.
“...between Janua^ of ,995 and
February of ,996 the militaiy police killed, on average, 3.65 people per 100.000
tants. The number in Sao Paulo was 2.68 deaths for every 100.000 inhabitants.”
(Fagundes and Aquino. ,997:
, 8 ). ,992. Sao Paulo military police killed 1.470
18
See (Spanakos, forthcoming a).
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civilians. In 1 QQ9 a~>a . .
’ 4 street ch^dren were killed in Rio iic n ,m
Kl0
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1 1 8 more than the year before
( luman Rights Watch. 1993)
Public Securi
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ns than the combined
police forces of the United r *
- tates ol America (Cano 1998- i a a -
•
V , i V . 208 ) In addUlon
^ severaJ
acres stand out. mcludtng the killing of 1 10 inmates a. the Carandiru Prison in Sao
fam0US Cand£,aria ChUrch
-
the“
-— ofthereto of Vigario Oera, one
th later, and the ratd on thejavela Nova Brasilia in 1 994 which killed 1 3 drug
Rio de Janeiro (Human Rights Watch, 1993, 1 994). These deaths are often
implicitly supported, if no, explicitly funded, by local businessmen, residents of
apartment complexes and others, who encourage private securityf_ t0 protec
, the,
businesses and residences.
No, only does the level of police violence show a blatant disregard for human life.
bUt “ " 3lS0 dear ,ha ' ‘here are Cenain Pl3ces has little value. This is the more
troubling par, of da Malta's relational citizenship, since those who are "absolutely poor"
or are a, the "absolute" bottom of a relative scale have little recourse to rights and
protecon. Brazilians of all colors responded that a negro would be treated more
rigorously than a bronco for the same crime (64.5% of Broncos, 67.2% of Pardos, and
70.9% of/w, Carvalho e, al, 1 997: 49). Responses are no, surprising since the coups
are believed to have a bias in favor of the wealthy and powerful, and Afro-Brazilians are
general among the most poor and powerless. That Brazilian coups do no, treat Brazilians
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crime rate.
Of d lffcren, colors the same is very much a result of discourses that are embedded into
Brazilian culture. The
-criminal,” for example, is conceived as generally poor. Afro-
Brazilian, a migrant from the northeast, the son of a single mother, a drug user, and a
resident of afavela (Caldeira. 1992- 84- 1996- oni i e; ,
-84,19 6.201). Since anywhe.c between 40 and 60
percent of Brazil's population could be identified as Afro-Brazilian (Idles, I8'V
December, 1998), and i, is unlikely that any state would ever have such a high
h is clear that Brazilian police interrogate, and often torture, many Afro-Brazilians
assuming a priori that they ate criminals. As one police officer bragged to Roberto Kan,
de Lima, the police use torture to extract confessions when they are already certain that
•he suspect is guilty" (Kant, 1994: 40). The Brazilian police gain their certainty not
through Promethean visions, bu, through access to thick cultural and stereotypical
discourses which are validated by some experiences that the police officer has had or has
been told about. As Jorge da Silva writes, "the police produce fantastic explanations a
P oii to later look for evidence that conforms with an imagined reality" (Silva. 1996: 3)
The combination of a police that is aware of who is a criminal, often before a
crime is committed, and the discursive depiction of criminals lead to routine police
violation of the rights and liberties of Afro-Brazilians. A 1997 report on police violence
in Rio de Janeiro found that of the victims, 34.7% were identified as “bronco," while
37.1/o were pielo and 28.2% were "pardo" (Fagundes and Aquino, 1997: 19). The
racial breakdown of Rio shows a very different set of numbers: 55.96% are
-broncos:'
34.55% are “pardo, ” 9.36% are “negro,” and 0. 1 2% are “amarelo” or “undeclared”
(Silva, 1998: 164). This suggests that Afro-Brazilians, especially those considered
-prelo" are over-represented among the victims of police violence. 1 hese deaths often
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S- Pauio, is on,y s,ightly less deadly
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as the rate js . striking^^ ^
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73% of the Sao Paulo population is branco onlv 47 fio/ nf •°* > .6 /0 of prison population is, and
while 22.5% of the population is pardo or nreto 57° nf •/ p eto, 32% of pr.son population is (Caldeira.
'992, ,23). Similarly, in the s,a,e of Rio 1988, “2/3... of the total 126,, 52 prisoners
-e b.ack or mulatto” (Silva, 1998: 53). And in a study of -,97 ^
880 PaUl°’ S'r8i° Ad°m° f°Und 3 ** ^ three blacks [Afro-Brazilians] to one
white [Euro-Brazilians]” (Caldeira and Holston. 1 998: 275).
International organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International have been able to pu, a significant amount of pressure on the Brazilian
government, especially with Cardoso as president. A,though the pressure to eliminate
police violence is generally focused on the abuse of«os, reports do contain
infonnation about the disproportionate presence of Afro-Brazilians among the victims of
police violence. Some small NGOs. particularly those identified with the Atovimemo
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• ha\e also served to pressure government from a more local level 19 This is
especially significant since poltce are controlled by state governments
President Fernando Hemique Cardoso has been ve, receptive to human rmh.s
groups, and has been very active in •
. tn proposing various measures to limit police
prerogatives and impunity InIQQS af uuy. m IW5, Cardoso created a commi«in -immissiOi. numan rights and
introduced legislation to compensate family members of those who disappeared during
the dictatorship. ln 1996, Cardoso invited various NGOs to participate in the
O' courts to try military police was eventually passed in 1996 as a bill which
allowed civil couns to try military police for homicide, bu, no, manslaughter. This
Elution is significant since homicides are often written up as manslaughter, and because
evil couns would no, be allowed to ay cases of harassment or torture. Cardoso later
proposed the use ol a w itness protection program in order to protect those who testify
against police violence^, the elimination of al, militaty courts, as well as the possibility
eliminating the military police altogether (Human Rights Watch. 1995; 1998 )
C""°
— 1 N“”“ *» *.
— Nta -«h „«
activist Cardinal Ams of Sao Paulo (Pinheiro, 1997).
However, as much as Cardoso has introduced important legislation and as
important as i, has been tha, he has opened significant public space about the violation of
rights, his government has been unable to end police impunity.
1 998. Human Rights
20
The NCoTh
5 f°r 3 nT detai,ed account of their success and failurespo>“^ 6)" “ aUth°ritieS '’^** ^ was vital to the construction of
federal level (Cavallaro,
protectlon pro2ram in Recife which was being considered at the
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Watch reported that in an appeal trial, all the police officers accused of the ntassacre at
Candelaria were acquitted, despite the testimony of the one man who they w ere unable to
kill (Human Rights Watch, 1998). On the 9'" of December of 1998. police officers
accused of the massacre in Vigario Geral were also acquitted. The coordinator of the
Grupo Cultural Afro-Reggae, which offers services to the community of Vigario Geral.
explained that he was no, sutprised by the verdict given the historic protection of police
by the courts (Interview, 10, December, 199822).
These acquittals were only a small part of what has been occurring in Rio de
Janeiro the las, few years. The city invited the military to panic,pate in its war on drugs
and criminality in thefavelas as part of a program called Operation Rio. Military
involvement coupled with a generous incentive system for “bravery" has led to a marked
increase in the number of civilian deaths caused by police (Cano. 1998; Cavallaro. 1997).
Many officers accused of murdering civilians receive bonuses or promotions within
months of the homicides (Cavallaro, 1997: 40-1). Internal investigations are hardly
neutral, and when it is clear that the victim was a "marginal,” the investigation is
generally closed. This is a serious obstacle to allowing justice for Afro-Brazilian victims
of police violence who are generally assumed to be “marginals.”
In contrast, the police in Sao Paulo have made incredible progress. A very
progressive series of policies in Sao Paulo has led to a massive decline of civilians killed
by military police, from 1 1 90 in 1 992, to 243 in 1 993, 333 in 1 994 and 33 1 in 1 995
(Cavallaro, 1997: 51). Police who are found to have killed a high number of people are
removed from active duty and are provided psychological counseling. Even though it is
Curiously enough the interview was given the day the after the verdicts were announced, on December
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difficult to fire police officers because
ot Public Security took 200 police officers
homicides.
they are part of civil service, Sao Paulo's Secretary
Off of active duty because of their role in
Afro-Braztlians are the immediate beneficiaries of the progran, in Sdo Paulo and
l0n8^ effeCt "^ S3°**— - -e,y to improve, slc,- tbe relations
between ctvthans and police, and perhaps also the justiciary system. However the
vo'ence of the poliee in Rio, as wel, as other urban area, encourages anti-police and
senttmems among the marginalized populations, and engenders an environment
•bat is often quiescent if no, completely suppose of local drug dealers (Ungar, ,998,.
That son of situation reinforces Afro-Brazilian use of informal channels rather than
forma, institutions, thereby weakening the latter, while also alienating themselves from
the official, legal political system.
Pol,eng the pol.ee will obviously improve the condition for the primaty victims
ot Pol.ce violence. However, there have been efforts to no, only limit police violence, a
general demand among activists and scholars, but also to raise consciousness about
racism23
,
and to encourage denunciations of racial discrimination. Titulo I Article 5 and 6
of the 1988 Constitution guarantees “life, liberty, equality, security, and property...”
,0 all
Brazilians regardless of race, and Article XLII declares that “the practice of racism
constitutes a [terrible]... crime [for which there is no bail], subject to imprisonment,
according to the terms of the law” (Fundacao Cultural Plamares, 1995: 39). The Cao
2j
0
’
the international day of human rights.
See chapter 5.
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racial discrimination.
raC1Sm make thClr Way mt° the Brazilian public. Perhaps the most
of Anna Flavia de Azaredo who "was insulted by an apartment manager
(Pa86
’ 1995: 60)
- The inddem
— Wh“ was told to take the service elevator,
since the manager assumed she was a main tu-is enraged Flavia, who happened to be the
daughter of the Governor HiaF ntwn • • •8 'P fi e Cntlcism of racism has also come from former
senator and current vtce-govemor of Rio de Janeiro, Benedita da Silva, who has always
Positively identified publicly as woman and«n, and as a result, has been’
repeatedly called "monkey" and "crioula" (Mendonca and Benjamin. 1997,.
During the field research for this study there were only three cases of racism
claimed that a couple in a social Cub called them “monkey, (Globo> H
Oct, 1998). The couple denied this saying i, was the children who were harassing them.
In another case, a woman was arrested for cursing a, and biting a mi.itaty police office
Who claimed she called him "monkey, shameless negro" (Globo, Oct 20. 1998 ), The
accused denied the use of any racist slang saying “My father is mulatto and my husband is
Japanese. My children are all mixed. How could 1 be racist? I. like almost the whole
world, have a foot in Africa” (Globo. Oc, 2, 1998). In the third case, a nanny decided to
press charges against the Metropolitan theatre because she was not allowed to enter a
children’s concert. The Metropolitan’s policy is that children under 14 could only enter
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with their parents. The nanny was ashed whether the children she was accompanying
were her own. Metropolitan reported that the guards asked her because they felt that she
was too young to be the mother of the two children. She claimed that they asked her
because of her race since she saw Euro-Brazilian nannies inside (Globo, 27 October.
199825 ).
Pushing aside the truth claims, the cases are interesting because they point to
certatn places where the civil rights of Afro-Brazilians are abridged occause of
stereotypes and cultural discourses of negritude which are similar to the “informal” and
'social” discrimination that Afro-Dominicans experience. For example, the children of
the police chief were in a social club, an area that is considered socially exclusive. It is
likely that the couple would not have found the children so rude were they simply
walking down the street, a public space. However, since there are certain spaces that
Atro-Brazilians have been historically denied access or been given limited access, it is
often in these areas where racial discrimination is clearest. It is also likely that the
children of the chief of police were more aware of racial discrimination because of their
position in the club as a "minority" and because of their relatively high degree of
education (Guimaraes, 1997)‘ 6
. Further, because the children were the children of a
, 5
B raz ’l s most popular daily which tends to be on the conservative side.
These cases are culled from issues of O Globo between August of 1998 and January of 1999. It is
probably only coincidental that all three incidents were reported in October, the month when presidential,
congressional and gubernatorial elections were held.
Claims of racism in Brazil are highest in cities with the lowest percentage ofpretos, which also tend to be
the cities with the highest literacy rates (Guimaraes, 1997). For example, die number of cases of
discrimination per 1 00,000 preto inhabitants demonstrated that the number of cases was highest in Brasilia
(11.51), Curitiba (9.87) and Sao Paulo (6.50) where the percentage of the population which is preto is 3.7,
2.5 and 4.6 percent respectively. The rates of illiteracy for those cities are 9.12, 7.97 and 9.15 percent
(Guimaraes, 1997: 64, 66). The number of cases for the cities of Recife (2.43), Salvador 4.23) and Rio de
Janeiro (5.55) where the percent ofpretos is much higher (5.6, 15.6 and 10.5) was much lower. Similarly,
the rates of illiteracy in the three cities were 15.42, 1 1.60 and 9.08 percent.
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and
.ha, ,hey had the ability ,o enforce it The couple was jai.ed for ,he offense of racism.
an anomaly in Brazilian law Certainlv ™• y, no response would have been that fast were the
mother not a chief of police.
I"
.1. c.
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. cpM,
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among the lower and lower middle classes (see chapter 6). The woman was prevented
from doing what she wished by a person who, she believed, was clearly her social
inferior. This led to her setting him straight by reminding him of his lower position on
the S0Cial t0tem POle
’ Simi,ar t0 ,he "d0 *>“^ who you are talking to?" phrase which
da Matta comedy associates with putting someone in his or her place, while
simultaneously establishing his or her own.
Her response is also vety interesting because it mimics much of the national
urse on race in Brazil, or the Dominican Republic for that matter. She claims there
is no way that she is racist since her father is a “mulatto” and her husband is Japanese.
However, she does no. identify as mulatto and she married "up" in terms of Brazilian
hierarchy, consistent with "whitening" ideology. This is no, to say her claim is false, only
that most of the Brazilian nation (and practically the entire Dominican one) can claim an
ancestor, loved one or friend who is dark-skinned or mixed. Bu, this does no, mean that
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race
c third case demonstrates the power of discourses. Euro-Brazilian nannies
were allowed to enter with the ch ildren of their employees, but this particular Afro-“—--
-curity guards asked ifshe were (he namy onhe two chi|dren
because of her skin color she claims n • •
• They insist that i, was because she looked too
mother 0f the children. Regard less, security guards, salespeople
policemen, and others make judgements and decisions everyday based on their
percept,ons. An Afro-Brazilian woman at a concert for children, where tickets arc fairly
expensive, is assumedW be a nanny, whereas a Luro-Brazilian with the same
doubt. Here, Brazilian culture reinforces these beliefs since other areas that are
considered
“exclusive^ also show a dearth of Afro-Brazilians. for example, the foreign
service, businessmen and women, social Cubs, high political officers, the president, and
members ol the cabinet and eongress are highly disproportionate* Euro-Brazilian. So i,
should be made clear that i, is no, merely the police who impinge on the citizenship of
Afro-Brazilians. although they may do so in the clearest and most quantifiable ways.
Comparative Analysis
Procedural and Institutionalist claims about Liberal democratic citizenship focus
on the importance of institutional structures and officially prescribed channels for interest
articulation. I, has been argued that relational and particular conceptions of identity
27 . .
Ih.s is particularly relevant in the Dominican Republic where the Dominican nation is considered to be
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hierarchies of citizenship have persisted during democratization.
Political rights, understood within the neo-liberal tradition, involves voting and
•he expression of political preferences. Elections are regular in both countries and
officially recognized victors of elections enter into the positions for which they ran. This
is significant considering the vast number of years spent under explicitly authoritarian
governments during this century for both governments (at least 5, in the Dominican
Republic, and approximately 28 in Brazil). In Brazil, unlike the Dominican Republic,
electoral results have been reliable, and losing eandtda.es have had little opportunity to
claim fraud. Perhaps certain candidates suffer from media bias, as da Silva did in ,989
against Collor. However, voters for the Worker’s Party (PT). or any other party, are no.
systematically denied the right to vote.
Voting in the Dominican Republic has been highly problematic, especially in the
1990 and 1994 elections. Electoral irregularities weakened the legitimacy of the electoral
system and undent,ined the political rights of Dominican voters, particularly Afro-
Dominicans. The relatively clean electoral results in the 1996 presidential and the 1998
municipal elections may have restored some faith in the electoral system. It remains to be
seen whether this was a result of Balaguer not being a candidate or whether this
represents a new transition (Hartlyn, 1 998). Regardless, some criticism is due since prior
to the second round of the elections, Fernandez’s party benefited from, if not was
one of mixed race, and that therefore there can be no racism.
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and Haitians. This was a sea,
'a0 ''0 'hat* Afr°-DOminiC
-- Haitians, and seems to he a c,ear infringement
°f lhe ' r r 'Sht 10 freC CXerdSe °fp0li,ical Fernandez also used the
.'Haitian
problem" as a means of salvaging his popularity after less than a year in office.
Despite the generally positive picture of regular, if no, institutionalized, elections.
and the success in in,proving political rights in the Dominican Republic and Brazil in
rccen, years, the quality of political rights for Afro-Dominicans and poor Dominicans
worsened during this decade, although i, shows some signs of improvement since 1 996.
Idee,oral fraud, a perennial thorn in Dominican democracy's side, been limited.
although political round-ups still continue. More troubling than the ineffectiveness in
building deep universal political rights is the inability of the Dominican and Brazilian
governments to protect the civil rights of their citizens. Worse still is the fact that organs
° f ‘he D°mln,Can and Brazilian governments, most obviously the President, the police
and the courts in the Dominican Republic and the police and the courts in Brazil, seem to
consistently violate the rights ofAfro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.
What has been demonstrated here is that the two most recent presidents of the
Dominican Republic have encouraged the violation of rights of Haitians and Afro-
Domimcans, and even if they claim to have only dealt with undocumented aliens they
never placed any limitations on the National Police to protect Dominican negro*. It can
also be shown that the nationalist discourse of Dominican identity (Domimcamdad),
constructed in large during the Trujillato and by Balaguer, is not only anti-Haitian, but it
espouses a racist ideology which denigrates Afro-Dominican influence, culture, and
people, while presenting itself as Hispanic and “Indian.” It can also be shown that the
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National Police and the DNCD
skinned Dominicans
are employed to maintain an order in which darker
’
m general
' are ^legated to the bottom rungs, and that the areas
which these organizations tareet for th~
Af n . .
°Pera"0nS are also Populated principally by
ro- ommicans and Haitians. The situation is highly pr0pitious for racism, which
'mUS ‘he C ' V" r '8h,S °f Afr°-DOmi
--* beyond the "informal barriers to social and
adV“m " tha ‘ 'he^
—
-tined (Department of State,
The vtolat.on of the evil rights of Afro-Brazilians is a little easier to demonstrate
'st.es abound, S,at, st.es cited earlier demonstrate the
^proportionality of Afro-
Brazilians relative to Huro-Brazilians in prisons. The Sdo Paulo example is particularly
te ',m8 SmCe P0PU 'ati0n °f Afr“'ians is so low in the state, and ye, very high
among the prison population. This is not enough to prove that Afro-Brazilians have
tvtl rtghts abridged, only that they make up a larger part of the prison population
Bu, when the criminal population is determinedW based on discourses tha,
assume a natural proclivity for crime among Afro-Brazilians, the poor, migrant, res,dents
offavelas, the question of racial discrimination becomes more clear. When police
methods which include arbitrary arrest, harassment, and torture-are combined with
Police results signed confessions or civilian deaths in
'confrontations'-^ne can
speculate further on a systematic infringement on the civil rights of * ^-Brazilians.
Brazilian police brutal methods, interrogation of people they ‘-know” are guilty
and impunity from investigation, are similar to tha, of the Dominican police. Both targe,
.he poor and marginal sectors of the population who are leas, capable of asserting their
rights and are the leas, likely to be defended by a lawyer, le, alone receive a hearing. The
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difference for the purpose of this comparison is ,ha, sla.islics show that the poor in Brazil
and the majority of victims of police violence are disproportionately Afro-Brazilian. The
government of the Dominican Republic has no data which breaks down economic class
by color or race. The Nattona, Police of the Dominican Republic may have information
that would correlate race to victims of police violence, but the release of such information
is unlikely. From a more qualitative perspective, months of direct observation of
“soctety” sections of Dominican newspapers shows an almost homogenous Euro-
Dommican or very light-skinned population. These are the citizens whose citizenship is
consistently recognized, and this reinforces the idea that Afro-Dominicans, whose photos
typically appear only in the sections on “crime” and “entertainment, are not proper
members of society.
During the summers of 1 990 and 1 997 when field research was conducted in the
Dominican Republic, there w-ere no cases of racism which w ere reported by mainstream
media. I here are also no cases as high profile as that of Ana Flavia. nor are there
politicians, like Benedita da Silva, who have publicly reported racial prejudice
encountered. During follow-up interviews with Bienvenida Mendoza, coordinator of an
NGO which teaches against racism (see chapter 5), she indicated that she had considered
running lor office. It she were to do this, denunciations of racism would likely be part of
her campaign. In the meanwhile, victims of racial discrimination in the Dominican
Republic do not report such activities (see chapter 5).
An area where civil rights protection has improved in Brazil, albeit slowly, is in
the area of denouncing racism. As Antonio Guimaraes writes " the publication and
denouncing ol these attitudes as racist by the press constitutes a sign that the times are
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changing, though sM, (Guides,
.997: 68
, Whether peop, ^^
jail time as a result of racial discrimination, or whether a case of racial discrimination can
survive a trough tria, remains l0 be seen
. In the meanwhile
, „ „ ^
'hat raC 'Sm
'
‘n abS,raC
‘- " n°‘ 3 8°°d ,hin* «** *a, one should be agains, racism
T^ C°nS,itU,eS an imPr°Vement ” the
ofAfro-Brazilians who now have a
" t,le m°re legal reC°UrSe l° Pr°,eCt themselves fro™ arbitrary abuse. However the
amount of protection offered on a practice, ,eve, is minima, because i, is rare, used since
many of the police officers violating rights are also Afro-Brazilian. and most Afro-
Brazilians do no, see violence or discrimination committed agains, them as racial,
especially when the aggressor is also an Afro-Brazilian^ Although racial consciousness
" hiSh£r in BraZil
’
ln 8eneraL 'han in *he Dom™-n Republic, Afro-Brazilians and Afro-
Dominicans tend to see prejudice they receive as a result of their class, and not their
race”. This does, however, change among the more educated and those in more highly
“skil!ed”/”white-collar” positions.
Conclusion
Political and civil rights in the Dominican Republic and Brazil fall far short of the
ideal. Institutional structures and democratic procedures have been undermined to the
point where the most marginal people have the least recourse to the very institutions and
procedures which are designed to protect and fortify their rights. Worse, organs of the
government-such as the police, judges, the military-are complied, if not the actual
aggressors, in the abridgement and violation of those political and civil rights. The last
28
See (Spanakos, 1999a)
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deter'0rat '0n ° f C"'2enship has affected n,ost profoundly the groups who
0CCUPy l0WeSt^ °fhiC^ «» ««* that the societies pose. ThusWh"e deVe,0Pmem °f Liberal*—*
*
Domincian Republic and Brazil i s
’
Sha"0W
’
h iS m0S
‘ if"°* *— **-. for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-
Brazilians.
^ dCVCl°PmCm °f Uberal*—>^ certainly improve democratization
" ,h£ ‘W0 C°UmrieS
-
’ «" -^— at least three preconditions, which
^ 8" q“ i,C Pr°blematiC
- ^ ”« iS ' "*^
-a, would he guaranteed hy police and
enforced hy the courts. As Pinhero writes " [t] he failure to enforce ti, law no, only
affects the equality of citizens before the law. but also makes i, ntore difficult for
governments to strengthen their legitimacy and perpetuate the illegal circle of violence"
(Pinhero, 1992: 271). The Sao Paulo military police seems to have made headway in
terms of decreasing the number of civilians killed, however police internal investigations
arc half-hearted and police impunity continues. Police violence in Rio de Janeiro and
Santo Dom.ngo has increased, due to incentives for "bravery" and the involvement of the
military in Rio. and the growth of the "war on drugs" in Santo Domingo.
A second area which would need to be improved is the hierarchical structure of
power in the two countries, particularly punctuated by the presence of a small elite, an
effective system of clientelism and relatively hollow institutions. Democratization has
no, weakened clientelism and strengthened institutions across the board, contrary to the
29
Sec chapter 5.
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neutral institutions. But ,t is clear that some institutions are not neutral and that rights are
not universally recognized and protected, therefore privileging the wealthy, those with
powerful family and personal connections, and those with more European features over
.he poor, those without connections, and those with more African features. countries
where ghettos and shanties contain poverty that is considered
"absolute,” and where the
inhabitants of these spaces are much "darker" than the inhabitants or more wealthy
netghborhoods, the relational citizenship has an "absolute" bottom. The bottom of this
hierarchy is for
"marginals" whose political civil rights are routinely ignored and violated
hnough government sponsored policies, primarily a, the hands of the police, and through
less fonna, discourses which continually
.ocate them a, the vety bottom of a hierarchy of
status as persons, citizens, and human beings.
176
CHAPTER 5
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Pl l!UCAN cit>zensiiii>in
POL
,
p'^K AN ^PUBLIC AND brazil •>U flCAL ENGAGEMENT AND CONSCIOUSNESS
Republican theorists find minima, is, visions of citizenship and Libera, democracy
troubling. They argue that democratic citizenship must be constructed through active
participation and they focus on political agency and positive political rights. Republican
CU 'ZenSh
'P a 'S0 COnSiderS
,hat 3 Cili2e
" <* from domination” LPetit.
,997) and
mforma! structures of domination. Scholars who study democratization with a
substantivis, perspective make similar comments about Libera, and institutional
democracy. They argue that, by themselves, the institutions of Libera, democracy are no,
pros ,ding a democratic political environment because they do not give enough
attention to the hierarchization within societies where identity and Cass politics have
made political agency weak, if no, nonexistent, for large portions of the population. This
is especially true in areas such as Latin America, or in other areas outside of the
“developed world,” where there is a highly unequal distribution of wealth and power
across elements in society. Republican concepts of citizenship which focus on the depth
Ol citizenship rights and commitments are particularly important in the Dominican
Republic and Brazil, where rights have been so difficult to institutionalize, especially for
Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. This chapter will examine effons to politically
mobilize and consciemize Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, the strategies employed
bv activists and Non-Governmental Organizations, and the success and failures
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encountered in the effort to construct a political identity, community, and a Republican
form of citizenship for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians
Civil Society, Political Activity and Democratization
1 his section will examine some of the literature that analyzes democratization in
Latin America, particularly in the Dominican Republic and Brazil, from a substantive
perspective. Perhaps the most clear example of this perspective is the recent work of
Guillermo O'Donnell. In 1996, he writes “the definition of polyarchy is silent about
important but elusive themes such as if. how, and to what degree governments are
responsive or accountable to citizens between elections, and the degree to which the rule
ol law extends over the country's geographic and social terrain.” (O’Donnell, 1996: 36).
Polyarchy provides minimal requirements for a democracy, but it assumes a reasonably
blank political slate prior to the transition to polyarchy, it also assumes: that traditional
hierarchies have not become so imbedded as to obstruct the rule of law; differences in
socio-economic status will not be so stark as to problematize the universal legal rights of
the poor and marginal; and the norms, expectations, beliefs and behavior of the people of
the new democracy can sufficiently be constrained by democratic institutions or that they
will be given enough of a “payoff'’ to behave democratically (see Rustow, 1970).
Challenging these assumptions, O' Donnell writes “[institutions are resilient, especially
when the) have deep historic roots; particularism is no exception. Particularism is a
permanent teature ot human society; only recently, and only in some places and
institutional sites, has it been tempered by universalistic norms and rules” (O’Donnell,
1996:43).
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Many of the scholars who study Latin America, particularlyy those who study
ind micro-politics, challenge the
social movements, Non-Governmental Organizations
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democratization. As Joseph Foweraker writes “[wjhere a
the public sphere, social
93).
uthoritarian regimes compressed
movements asserted their right to expand it” (Foweraker, 1995:
Mass protests in Brazil in 1984 which demanded direct elections (dlre,asja), and
therefore the hastening ol democratization, were not only successful in their goal, but
constituted the most large-scale and inclusive political ae, of citizen politics in Brazil's
history. There was quite a hi, of political activity before and since then which pressured
lhC mililary S,ate
’
indudinB Pressure from new labor unions, the Movimento San Tara
(Landless Movement) and even the Movimemo Negro Umficado (Unified Black
Movement). These groups were successful in pressuring first a declining military regime
and later a fragile civilian regime, both of which faced legitimacy and economic crises.
Although the Dominican Republic experienced no protests similar to Dire,as Jd
during its transition to democratic government 1
,
popular resistance and small-scale
organizing was growing during the 1970s. and activists as well as popular sectors
increased their activity during the PRD governments, which they believed would be
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s\ mpathetic to their causes
R •
mos
^gmficunt acts of protest in the Dominican
pubhc dur,n
« the 1
9
«0s also occurred in 1 984 i„, m response to the Jorge Blanco
government’s negotiation of an austerity package with the IMF, While this protest was
activity wh,ch suggested the idea of a somewhat engaged citizenry.
Neither Brazil nor the Dominican Republic were exceptional in Latin America
U""8 th ' S time Pen0d f°r haVing
-
-testation of political and
economic decisions, an increase in associational activity, and a movement in discourse
"a' fr°m hUman n8htS ,0 ri8h*S yclin, 1 997). It was in this context that
ntany scholars, some ofwhom were involved in social movements, nongovernmental
organ,zations and other forms of political activism, wrote how this new form of politics
was radically transforming the societies in which i, was taking place. Writing of social
movements in general, and the MNU in particular. Flores,an Fernandes believed that
ments allowed for self-emancipation” (Fernandes, 1989:23). While some
authors focused on the idea of civil society, as a democratic alternative and a separate
sphere from an authoritarian state, others emphasized more clearly the role of social
movements and other new actors within a democratic society. Emblematic of this
Tilman F\ ers work which argues that "these new political actors are not
secondary to poltttcal parties, but at least parallel” (Evers. 1 985. 48). He goes even
farther writing
"social movements are not questioning a specific/,™ of political power,
but the centrality of the power criterion itself (Evers, 1985. 61).
' There was, however, significant p„pular response the perceived electoral fraud foliow i„g ,|K
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ore recent studies of democratization have been f?n ar more sobering. For
example, although Alvaro n,8 1Varez
' Dagnmo and Escobar write “r<w; i
have sometimes succeeded in , , •
m°VememS "0t ™'>'
translating their agendas into public policies and in" b0UndaneS" inS,itUti°na
' POli,i“ **
-— to
P and
' “ 3 C°nSeqU“-’ democracy itself (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar.
Alvarez and Escobar explain “
‘social movements are unlikely to radically
transform large structures of domination or dramatically expand elite democrac.es,
certainly not in the short nm”’ / rm n run
( ln Foweraker, 1995- 1 pv Rllth .) ixuth Cardoso explains that
movements played a critical role in the transition to democracy in Brazil she
“ l'P“ °r ' h”' "*“
' ">»'
- «- Joseph Fowe.ate,
-Ml. Jo. eiheenship
» '» «* » OePendeis ,„d
promoter of legal and poJieica, tights” (Foweraker, 1995: 1 05>_ Citizenship not only
moved from the civic to the constitutional sphere, bu, i, became increasingly defined
through institutional terms which oave » ,,,,ms. W g a comparative advantage, in many cases, to
Political parties and to more formal structures.
The obvious difference between the enthusiasm of the early to mid 1 980s in Latin
America, when i, seemed as though “new actors" were of a, leas, of comparable
importance to more traditional ones, and more recent work is the predominance of
democratic government in Latin America. Much of the agenda of the new actors was
taken by more traditional actors as countries became more democratic and elections
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become more institutionalized. Some of the new actors were absorbed by political parties
on the Left, while others entered into government or civil service. Others found their
funding, mostly international, dry
authoritarianism, seemed to be
mg up as much of their raison d'etre
, challenging
gone. Yet, some social movements have survived and
Non-Governmental Organizations proliferate, even if their scope and resources are very
limited, and these new actors still can affect politics.
What contemporary scholars and scholarship from the early 1980s have in
common is its belief that through participation and conscientization in civil society or
social movements, individuals are capable of constructing their own political subjectivity
(Evers, 1 985. 59). 1 his ability of citizens to engage themselves within the politics of
collective action allows citizens to become actively involved in both making political
sions, as well as shaping the system that makes those decisions (Dagnino. 1998: 51).
Tins offers the potential for a radical type of subjectivity which could seriously transform
the discursive norms and power networks of even very hierarchical political systems
(Spanakos, 1999b)
. I otential. however, should not be confused with reality, since the
potentially transformative capabilities of the "new citizenship.'' as Dagnino calls it. is
contingent on many factors.
Another appealing aspect of this sort of participatory driven u^d associational
concept ol citizenship is that citizenship is constructed, at least in theory', from the grass
roots level. Bryan Turner writes that when citizenship is developed from below and
public spaces are open, citizenship is active, while when citizenship is “handed down”
and public spaces are limited, citizenship is passive (Turner. 1993). In her analyses of
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’
E"Sa RdS ar£UeS ,ha ' CitiZenShi
‘’ a'’d
-'-on projects in
a in America have been essentially elite ,ed projects (Reis, 1997, ,998).
citizen rights and agency at local levels, as the obverse of previous incremental and
trickle-down theories, wou.d therefore he able to contribute to the deePe„i„e of
democracy.
At the vety least, grass roots activism, associational life, social movements andNGO service providers are abie to perform various functions for specific people, targeted
y thClr fce°8raph,C
’
SeXUa1
’
raC,al
-
ethnic
> religious, class, etc, identity. Foweraker notes
^t these small-scale organizations can serve both as “schools ofd~mcracy” where
norms of deliberation and contestation are learned (Foweraker. ,99 5: 9 ,r, They C£m a|so
serve as watchdog organizations which keep vigil over the State, its policies, and its
institutions. In this chapter, the “school of democracy" idea will be more closely
examined. A caveat should be issued in advance. Even scholars who are sympathetic to
tire politics of these new actors, recognize that the politics in civil society are no. always
democratic (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1 998: 1 7; Lehmann and Bebbington. 1 998).
Another point tha, should be made is that dense associational life, as well as high degrees
or political consciousness, are most likely to be found in abundance among the most
wealthy, and lacking among the poor. As Laurence Whitehead writes “[i]n most neo-
democracies the main attributes of civil society tend to be highly concentrated in specific
sites; are often reserved to a minority of the population; and are no, infrequently derived
from privileges conferred by a pre-demoeratic structure of power” (Whitehead. 1 997:
The idea of a citizenship which involve
space throughulSSSS."' 10 P«
There has recendy hee„ a trend for N0Os ^ ' >overnment.
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102). It is important to consider these points in order to view the role ot'NGOs critically,
and no, to sin,ply endorse any action on the part ofNGOs because i, seems to be more
“genuine,” “organic." or “grass-roots based" than other actors and institutions.
Social movements and NGO service provision can serve to contribute to a
Republican form of citizenship in their ability channel individuals with similar political
goals and interests for the purpose of improving the political, social and economic
conditions for their constituents. There are limits to the effectiveness of such social
movements and NGOs, which are due to their strategy, the conditions of their targeted
population, and the willingness of the government to cooperate and assist, among other
things (Foweraker, 1995: 102).
Republican Citizenship in the Dominican Republic and Brazil
Republican forms of citizenship pose the importance of positive forms of liberty,
and particularly the citizens' ability to define and create his or her political community.
1 he freedom to vote has by and large been available to Afro-Dominicans and Afro-
Brazilians during the last decade of democratization. Compulsory voting actually forces
their inclusion and exercise of their vote, which as a compulsory act becomes a duty
rather than a freedom or a right. Voting fraud and problems with registration in the
Dominican Republic until the 1996 elections were common and obstructed the ability to
express pieferences through voting. 1 hus, even though voting is compulsory, many
Dominicans, particularly Afro-Dominicans, often found their names missing from voter
which suggests a possible return neocorporatism (See Wiarda, 1995).
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registration lists or there names were registered a, t8 « poles on the other side of the city 4
This clearly impeded them from exercising their most basic political right
Afro-Brazilians and Afro-Dominicans are hoth ahle to enjoy an environment in
< ,ey be free to express opinions, those opinions may no, he well received or may no,
be taken senously. Second, should an assembly of dark-skinned Dominicans or
Brazilians acquire large enough numbers or make enough noise, i, is likely to receive
pressure from pol.ce
.ha, aims to silence or coopt it5
. There has been a very traditional
silence about ractsm in Brazil, and those activists who have attempt to
-break the
silence'" have no, always been well received by Brazilians of all ends of the color
continuum (Marx.
, 998 : 250). Despite the reluctance, quite a bi, of movement and
conscientization has occumed in Brazil in the las, two decades, due primarily to the
M°Vmen,° Nes''° as vve" as other groups. There is no similar
“movement- in
•he Dominican Republic, however, a small group of activists, with the help of
intellectuals, arc attempting to revise national fictions about Haiti, Africa, and Dominican
identity
There is little coordination among these individuals and the
groups and institutions that they may represent.
One of the features w hich differentiates Latin American racial systems since
abolition from that of the United States “is the absence of shatply defined racial groups..
.
[T]here " "° SUCh thing “ 3 group or a white group.
. .never the A^-oes nor the
4
See chapter 4.
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d
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nnxetl or mulatto types or the u i,;.whites may be said to cons, by ,:._dvcs
i entitlable, significant sociel segments” (Harris, I974: 54, my
ted0U
‘- dlKIOCei
racial mixture, clear and singular racial
—
develop c cy,
mCTiCa
'
dll"'re WSS n<>1 Pre i lKl'ce across groups, or even
• *»• I hts also does no, mean
.a, in America,t societies W differences
in skin color, physical features, etc. The nican Ke, and Brazi, are cry
C0,0rC°nSC: * * common Tor someone's nickname, often the same name they
USC bUSmeSS
' ,0 bC " a "‘"'
Prk'°'m words
e or superlatives are
,y added(-v«/rr«0
,«/»„, Typically, the terms and /;rtoo//;),,„„
traditionally reserved for other people, and have no, been used commonly as a means of
positive self-identification, except among the darkest segments of society, Color
consciousness, however, does no, translate into collective identity font particularly
around the idea of* race.
When asked to identify themselves, to identify their ancestry, or even their race,
11,8 V1IS| mi
'
i0rily HrDominicans and
-gardless of color, respond "Dominican”
° r “HraZilian-" DominiCanS and Brazilia'« of .11 colors no, only primarily identify
thcmscivcs by I heir mil identity (Dominican or Brazilian), but their secondary and
aiy identities are micly related to race or color. Dominicans ana Brazilians will
regularly choose regional, class, and religious identity as secondary forms of
lon* before
'heir color/race. Additionally, immigrants as
well as second and llmd generation Dominicans and Brazilians (generally Jewish, Asian,
I xr*
"d
‘"d
«d „h„ lit, in
°nl> ““P" «**» “»« A
in
^
Zil found that When asked "what is your origin [background]?” (Qual e sua origem?).
75-95 percent responded Brazilian. What is ntore interesting is that morels
identified as Brazilian than^ and morels identified as Brazilian thanks
(Schwarzmann,
> of December,
,998,. This indicates wha, Gilberto Freyre and ntanv
Brazilians believe themselves to be Brazilian, and no; Afro-Brazilian or Black. This does
not. however, mean that they live and work in environments free of prejudice.
Statistics in Brazil clearly show that Afro-Brazilians have lower life expectancies,
fewer educational opportunities, and are more likely to have lower paying jobs, than
Euro-Brazilians (Wood and Lovell, 1 998,. Ye, Afro-Brazilians, who are generally poor,
believe that their socio-economic conditions are caused primarily by their class. Statistics
about poverty in the Dominican Republic inevitably leave out the category of "color" or
-race.” Bu, unlike in Brazil, when nearly half the population is Euro-Brazilian and where
Afro Brazilians live in poverty and infavelas alongside Brazilians of various shades
(although Afro-Brazilians tend to be disproportionately represented), the slums in the
urban centers of the Dominican Republic have few to no Euro-Dominicans. In some rural
areas, however, there are poor Euro-Dominicans. Bu, here it is critical to note the
difterence between a country, like Brazil, w here 48.9 percent of the population is
consideredW and one, like the Dominican Republic, in which some 5 to 16
percent of the population is considered
-bianco." The smaller percentage of“blancos” in
the Dominican Republic, and yet the maintenance of a primarily light-skinned elite class
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of politicians and television personalities could be capable of contributing t0 a racia ,
consciousness. However. Dontinicans tend to believe tha, since anywhere between 70
and 90 percent of ,bent are of clearly ntixed racia, heritage tha, there is a son of racia,
equality.
Bu, perhaps the Brazilian example shows why there is no, a ‘racial consciousness
in the Dominican Republic. In Brazil, the regions which have the lowest percentages of
Afro-Brazilians are also the ones where Afro-Brazilians are the most marginalized and
conscientized. For example, Afro-Braziltans in Sdo Paulo. Pono Alegre and Brasilia,
where the percentage of Afro-Brazilians is quite low. disproportionately repon incidents
of racism, relative to other regions (Guimaraes, 1 997), and are more prone to assume
"racial consciousness." Afro-Brazilians have been elected governor in the south, which i:
the w hitest area of Brazil, and Sao Paulo now has an Afro-Brazilian mayor. In the
meanwhile, the elite class of Bahia, where brancos constitute 20.2 percent of the
population, is almost entirely Euro-Brazilian. I, is very possible tha, the condition of
being a minority increases the likelihood of racial consciousness. However, the
p pulations of Sao Paulo. Porto Alegre and Brasilia also are much more educated than
those in Bahia, and there seems to be a clear connection between education and
awareness of racial prejudice (Guimaraes, 1997). Nevertheless, the Dominican Republic
and Brazil make interesting comparisons to examine the relation between demographic
presence and racial "consciousness.” The evidence seems to supper: the idea that
consciousness of racial identity and discrimination is sharpest in areas where populations
are better educated and where the "disadvantaged” group occupies a position of
demographic minority.
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One of the most significant problems facing the expansion of the citizenship of
Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians is that of identity. In examining black movements
in Brazil, the US and South Africa, Anthony Marx notes the political results depend on
the construction of group identity and the building of solidarity. "In Karl Marx's terms, a
group must be conscious of existing 'in itself before it can engage in collective action 'for
Itscil. I he 'object' ol a self-conscious group must be evident before it can act in response
to its situation" (Marx, 1 995: 1 59). Political movements and strategics require self-
conscious groups which can articulate policy proposals based on their position. When
groups are struggling to expand their own rights they can generally unify around their
collective identity which is based on suffering specific to that group, and their belief that
that suffering can be alleviated.
I he problem ol creating a collective identity is particularly acute among Afro-
Dominicans and Alro-Brazilians since they invariably identify as Dominican and
Brazilian, and since it is quite common for them to ignore or deny any African heritage,
and to aspire to Whiteness. Additionally. Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians have
traditionally sought individual means, lightening hair color, straightening hair, marrying a
lighter oi more wealthy person, attaining high levels of schooling, working in certain
markets, etc, as means ol negotiating their racial identities. Such negotiation of
individual racial identity seems a rational strategy for mulattos to pursue, given the color
preferences and racial ambiguities (in certain circumstances) of their respective countries.
1 lie process, pejoratively referred to as “whitening,” is one in which individuals better
their position by accepting society’s stereotypes. Their individual success tends to
reinforce the stereotypes, since il educated morenos arc no longer morenos but arc
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~ Chr0S
'^ e 'C ’ ",iS meanS that lhose "»o are less educated are considered by
society to be more “brown." By connecting success in a capitalist ke,place, as well as
education, family background, ability to consume, etc. to the lightening of skin color,
llK.sc of darker skin color are invariably seen as failures and marginals, which reinforces
notions of social Darwinism. This is particularly so of the Haitians and the darkest
skinned Dominicans, as well as the people who live infavelas in Brazil.
I he idea that negros constitute a race onto themselves, separate from the
Dorn,mean or Brazilian race, or that mgros and all people who are not hlanco/brcmco
constitute the same race is quite controversial, and it has been accepted only by activists
and their selected following, some academics, and some educated Euro-Dominicans and
Euro-Brazilians. Afro-Dominican and Afro-Brazilian activists sec it as imperative that
Alro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians see themselves as constituting a culturally rich
community, which is nonetheless discriminated against. The idea of constructing a
conscious community is considered to he a primary goal, and any efforts at political
lobbying and applying pressure on a democratic government requires the perception that
an “Afro-Dominican” or “Afro-Brazilian” vote exists. Since voting is compulsory in both
countiies, a politically conscious and unified community has the potential to make
significant demands upon the political system. I lowever, such potential is blocked by the
rigid schemes of activists whose use of essential “Black” identity and issues limits
popular support for their programs.
In the Dominican Republic, challenging racism is still at a very nascent state, and
the bulk ol work has been by very small groups and individuals who have attempted to
raise awareness about racism. The section on the Dominican Republic will, therefore.
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"h'ch h ‘1S bee" ralSing CO"SCiousness for twenty-years, and which, a, times, has been
successful a, pressuring the government on behalf of
-black* issues. The section on
Brazi, wii, therefore ana.yze efforts to conscience individual, to font, a se,f-conscious
community and to deliver open politic space and expand the rights of Afro-Brazilian
citizens.
Dominican Republic
There is an adage that “in the Dominican Republic, only the Haitian is negro"
(S°’ameMe “ haU,an° “ 'KSr0f - Frank M™o Hernandez suggests that there is another
group of people who are "negro." “Here, the only negro is the one standing in front of
another negro" (aq,n. fe mica negro es el que esta enfrente de otro negro)\ In other
words, Afro-Dominicans only notice the color of other Afro-Dominicans, and do no,
recogmze their own color. Dominican society clearly associates Haitian identity w ith
negrdud." as well as a host of very negative discourses. But, since color is conceived
along a continuum, dark-skinned Dominicans identity people who they consider to have
more "negro" features than they do as “negro.
"
w hich therefore makes them “not negro."
Th.s is based on the idea that there is a continuum of color, rather than strict racial
categories, into which the population can be classified. Although the majority of the
population can hardly claim to be bianco, they can very easily claim to be no, negro. One
investigator reported an experience that the author shared on separate occasions. When
In bis genealogy of Pena Gomez. Campillo Perez writes “in the Dominican Republic 'negro' is reservedregularly for the native of Haiti" (Campillo Perez, 1996: 24).
8
(Interview, Hernandez, 23, June 1997).
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organ,2a„on. concentrates its energies on speaking ou, about Dominican style racism
while also attempting to promote se.f-esteem among Afro-Dominicans. When Miss
interviewed for this study, her organization had recently changed the name
of .he organization from CW,* Idemidad de Mujeres^^^ y
Biack Women). When asked about why the name of the organization had been changed
she explained that “many people do no, identify themselves as negro,” and that “Afro”
might be able to attract more people (Mendoza. 25* of June. ,997). For example, non-
negras who have African ancestry might be more receptive to their message.
One activist criticized Miss Mendoza's decision since the term “negro,” which is
very political and assertive, was replaced by the softer “Afro” (Interview. 1 997).
However, given the reluctance of Dominicans to identify as negro, her decision seems to
be no, only pragmatic, bu, also inclusive, since it may appeal to ina,as and Her
am grateful to Richard Turks for this anecdote which quite succinctly complements my own participant
r--"-*—-
comments made by a Brazilian anthropologist who comp|ajned^^^
identified by color and not ancest^ (da Silva, 30, Oct, 1998).
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were quick to find
'light-skinned wives and to deny their background.’ When asked
piesidential candidate, former mayor of Santo Domingo, and secretary
““ “•““*”»« *».„ ,« » id„,„ „
African.
.
. He ,s a coward for not accepting his idemity-a leader without
courage.” She also noted that his wife. Peggy Cabral, is “almost white” (Mendoza. 25'"
of June. 1997). Her anger was no. jus. directed against Pena Gomez because he did no,
positively identify himself as ‘ bu, because when he was U, of all sorts of
racist and anti-Hatian attacks from his opponents in the PRSC and PLD he remained
silent. He had the opportunity to take a stand for dark-skinned Dominicans and for
Dominicans of Hainan ancestor, yet he passively avoided the attacks. In fact, as one
scholar reported. "Pena Gomez denies his Haitian ancestry” and "he paid for the
genealogy”’ commissioned before the 1996 elections which proves that he and his parents
were bom in the Dominican Republic (Interview, 1997).
While the Casa de Idemidadde Mujeres Afro is one of the very few Non-
Govemrnental Organizations that expressly deals with racism, other organizations are
sympathetic to the idea of the creation of a positive Afro-Dominican identity. Prominent
observation.
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Haitian ancestn and they work primarily in two bateys (plantations). While the women
of Identidad primarily give lectures and facilitate discussions on racism in schools,
businesses and other environments, MUDHE complements their consciousness raising
efforts with social services in two bateys, where they pay for occasional visits by nurses,
doctors, and medical supplies. In one of the bateys, MUDHE maintains a pre-school,
since the CEA (the state sugar agency) only pays (very little) for primary school, as well
as a general store which offers reasonable prices.
Sonia Pierre, the director ofMUDHE, explained that growing up on the batey she
noticed that many laborers were not allowed to leave, plantation owners chose young
women/girls for sexual partners, and they were forced to have abortions if they were to
become pregnant (Pierre, 19 ,h of June, 1997). Conditions have improved, but Haitian
workers are often prevented from leaving bateys during the zafra (cane-cutting season),
and they are arbitrardy transferred from one batey to another (Wucker. 1999: 95).
Conditions were so bad that various international anti-slavery organizations criticized the
conditions of workers in the bateys, and academic discussions raged over whether batey
labor could or could not be considered slavery (see Martinez, 1996). Sam Martinez’s
astute observation that although the workers in the bateys are not slaves they certainly are
not free is particularly useful, because although Haitian workers may not be slaves, they
do not have recourse to rights.
9
See (Campillo Perez, 1996)
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- through their campa™
for the right to have a nante and na,iona.it,- which entphas.es donation for the
many babieS b°m °" the^ Wh° documentation nor proof ,ha, they
"" b0m ",e D°miniCan RepUW
- of Dominican as we„ as Haitian
workers, since ,ahor in the toe,s is no, exclusively foreign. Documentation is espeeiai,
important gtven the constant threat of deportation, which is directed against people with
dark skin who are believed likpiv u u • •ue dkely to be Haitian (see chapter 4).
Even st, II, there seem to be advances for those who are seeking to improve the
abtlity of Afro-Dominicans to participate in their government. Although 66.43 percent of
the Dominicans believe that “Haitians bring problems to the count,,” and 58.30 percent
said that Negros will cause problems [la hace] either in the entrance or the exit," 63.62
percent said that there was no problem with a “negro in an important position” and 52.27
percent of the population agreed that “the count,, is racist” (Brea e. al, 1995: 227). To
acknowledge
.ha, racism exists in the Dominican Republic is quite an important step in
trying to improve the citizenship and socio-economic conditions of Afro-Dominicans 10
.
However, recognizing that racism exists in the abstract does no, mean being able to
Identify it in the specific, a complaint made by Brazilian anthropologist Jorge da Silva (da
Silva, 30, October, 1998). Additionally, being against racism in the Dominican Republic
may mean being against racial discrimination against Haitians, not Dominicans who are
not considered negro anyway.
Domii cans A “Zr t h ^
eXamine ,he political co"di,i<>" of contempt™, Afro-
Dom n cal
™
aT? ' %''" 7 by Ashi"di M“°". demonstrated that young
co™
Pre,"eSt a"d m°St in,elii*ent dolls are the »"« with the lightest skin
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But speak, ng of racism has, slowly, become easier over the past decade or so.
Miss Mendoza explains
‘-Dominicans can express that there is racism” in seminars which
deal with racism in the Dominican Republic (22, June 1998). They
to express the same sentiment outside of the
are however “afraid"
seminars where they are silenced by a society
and a culture which denies the existence of racism, while simultaneously supporting
discourses and stereotypes which negatively depict Afro-Dominicans. When Miss
Mendoza began her work of conscientization, most Afro-Dominicans neither identified as
•'Afro-Dominican” nor “negro " She believes that this was due to Tnijillista-Balaguerista
propaganda that insisted that Haitians, not Dominicans, are negro (el negro es el
Haitiano), and that simultaneously demonized Haitianidad (Haitianness). A similar
understanding of a national myth serving as an hegemonic identity to silence protest is
assumed by Movimento Negro activists in Brazil.
However, in the safe space of seminars which concentrate on African identity.
Negritud and racism, Afro-Dominicans feel more comfortable to sp:,:l: to a counter-
narrative, and to challenge the racial myths that underlie Dominicanidad. In these
seminars, Afro-Dominicans not only are able to acknowledge their experiences with
racism, they are able to compare their own experiences with those of others, and. in on a
\er> limited scale, the potential for community and collective identity is built.
Every day, Miss Mendoza explains, “there is more receptivity" to the work of
Identidad. and "there are more people identifying themselves” as Afro-Dominican or
negro. However, the majority prefer to express their identity in the safe space of
Identidad s seminars, and are not willing to transform their experiences and personal
identity into a public and political “racial consciousness.” After Miss Mendoza’s
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natl0nai,y aired te 'eViSi0n Pr°gram discussed racism in ,he
ommican Republic, she
-has been approached by many peop ,e of a., socio-economic
positions who share their experiences and solidarity” with her 11
. The program was aired
spaces, as well as more informal spaces.
The
,decision program was able to introduce the theme of racism in the
Dominican Repub, ic as par, of pubiic and popular discourse. Through television the
-hiec, was abie to reach a large nationa. audience. Addition*, through the medium of
•elevision. Afro-Dominicans eouid watch the program and empathize with Miss
Mendoza-S organization, without having to pubiiciy affirm their identity as Afro-
Dominican or that they had simiiarly been victims of racia, prejudice. This ias, point is
particular,y important since admitting to being a victim of racia, prejudice tends to no,
chc. sympathy/empathy from iisteners, as i, might in the United States, bu, instead is a
confession that the story teller is “negro.”
Prior to Miss Mendoza's television appearance, challenges to Dominican racism
were limited mostly to NGOs with limited resources, and still more limited success, and
to Dominican scholars. For qui,e some time, Dominican scholars have denounced anti-
Haitianism, particularly as pan of the nationalist ideology that they identify with Trujillo
and Balaguer’s nationalist projects. the las, decade and a half, academic work on
racism has been building, although i, has mostly focused on the treatment of Haitians in
ommican Republic. Harr)' Hoetmk, one of the pioneers of studies of race in the
Dominican Republic, notes “we see especially during the las, fifteen years, a re-
(Interview, 22, June, 1998).
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r of studies of slavery have increased, particularly those that study the “slave
resistance” of the cimarrones (runaway slaves) (Deive, 1980, 1989; Dipp: 1992 ). The
{// icons cinci Our Island h\- aili i a by Celsa Albert (1989) CArlnc &„a ?^ ), La os Andujar s study of Afro-
Dominican re„gion (1 999)
, and Carios Hemandra Soto
,^
fUnml rUeS ( 'W)
~ These works, neverthe.ess, are
by a small and very educated elite, most ofwhom were already conscious of
racism.
' ^ most influential works in mainstream Dominican scholarship that have
attacked racism and anti-Haitianisn, have come from Roberto Cassd and Frank,* Franco
Pichardo. Cass* for examp, e. has used his position as a preeminent pubhc intel.ectua, to
criticize the deportation of Haitians in newspapers, and his histcy books have been vety
critical of the Truji„is,a-Ba,agueris,a concept of Dominicanidad which he considers
racist and anti-Haitian (e.g.1991: 308). Franco has written hooks e-*,ed Negr0^
Mulattos and the Dominican Nation (
1
989 ) and On Racism and anti-Haitianism (and
other essays) ( 1
9
9 7). In these anthologies. Franco analyzes the role ofwgrar and
mulattos in Dominican histoty, as well as elitist and racist ideologies within the
Dominican Republic. In both his Myth and Culture in The Era of Trujillo and his regular
contributions to Dominican newspapers. Andres L. Mateo regularly attacks the
I iispanicist and racist vision of Dominicanidad, and often criticizes Balaguer’s use of
them (Mateo, 1093, ,996). A more partisan collection of essays. Against a Racist
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Ideology* in Santo Domingo
:
Cespedes (1998).
Two Campaignsfor Pena
,
was written by Diogenes
1 his literature is not without its opponents. Federico Henrique Gratereuax has
written numerous essays that assert clear demarcations between Dominicans and I lai.ian,
I le explains “[w]e are I lispano-mulato, Haiti is Afro-French” (Gratereaux, 30'". June,
1997). I le denies that Dominicans are
“Spanish-Hispanics” and he
.cognizes the
Dominicans have been mulattos since the middle of the 17'" century. However, like
Manuel Pena Batllc before him. Gratereaux argues that Dominican identity does not come
front race, but culture, which though mixed, is primarily Hispanic. Another writer who
recognizes racial mixture yet privileges the Spanish part of Dominican cultural identity is
Carlos Dobal who writes "we are a racially mixed people; we have the predominance of
Africa and America in much of our physical presence; and of Spain in the basic structure
ol our temperament and our very being. Ifwe insist serenely upon our most cherished
values and those things most precious, we will more likely approach our Spanish
heritage” (in Cambeira, 1997: 46).
In a more concentrated attack on Cassa and his brand of revisionism, Manuel
Nunez writes that Cassa’s anti-Trujillism forces Cassa to become a Haitianophile, and
that his interpretation of history shows this ideological bend (Nunez, 1990: 189). He later
writes that Cassa makes the mistake of associating Hispanophilism with racism and anti-
Maitianism (Nunez, 1990: 306). In the end, he concludes, like Gratereaux, that since
Dominican culture is filtered through its linguistic expression, Dominicans are culturally
Hispanic, even il they are not racially European. And this culture, he believes, is under
attack by an increasing I laitian population. I le writes the “Dominican population has
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doubled between I960 and 1989 while,!,
^ - 1QO
theam°Unt0fHaiti
-
'Migration has sex,up, ed"(Nunez, ,990: 37). a 1997 presemation on
'
hyeu
C “Uural Su bs,stence,” he made clear his
thesis in La isla al reves (1985)
es.dent Fernandez s government has supported cultural commissions and a
^ C°nSiderS D°mini
-"
— * -—tliy—
. While this is often
done from a position of romanticizing the Other and“ the aPPealing to the eroticism of
European and American tourists it
’ d0SS mean m0re visibility for Afro-Dominicans and
more areas from which pride can be drawn- Increasing visibi% for Afro.Dominjcans
•Hough, must no, be limited to the realm of popular culture-such as a„d^ ,hCy“
- rePresented. bu, to positions which do no,
contribute to stereo,yPes. Such stereotypes inform wha, Gratereuax calls the ”c,v„ war in
the hear, where the mixed racial heritage of the Dominican leads to a personality
dance we want to be negros
; and when we study or investigate we
want to be blancos ” (1995: 10)
The State, for its part, seems to be more open to including darker skinned
Dominicans in their tourist brochures, and cultural commissions have given greater
attention to the contributions of Afro-Dominicans to Dominican national symbols. Bu,
efforts towards promoting more positive identity for Afro-Dominicans relies on certain
stereotypes, such as their contributions are purely in the area of popular culture, and al, of
|3
(Interview, 24, September, 1999).
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the$e eff°rtS mU$t be Pr°CeSSed thro
“Sh a culture which has for so long denied and
discrintinated against Afro-Dotninicans and Haitians. A clear example of how such
progressive efforts become interpreted can be found in an interview with Selenes
Mendez, Miss Dominican Republic 1998.
When asked "What question would you like to answer that you have never been
asked? What is the answer?" Miss Mendez responded '"How do you feel spiritually and
emotionally about being a woman?' I feel like a universal woman. I am made up of three
races with their beautiful characteristics. They go beyond the boundaries ofmy own
country—the kindness and dignity of the Indian, the strength and courage of the African,
and the culture of the European." It should first be noticed that she believes she is saying
something complementary. Only four years earlier, Balaguer employed racist stereotypes
to present Pena Gomez's emotional character as one that would lead to the razing of the
country. The idea that Miss Dominican Republic offers a somewhat more palatable and
progressive vtew than the nonogenarian many-term president, and former chief ideologue
of I rujillo, is comforting, yet not entirely praiseworthy.
Rven while trying to be politically correct, she defines role< traits for the three
races that have inhabited the island 15
. If the European contributed culture to the
Dominican Republic, what does that mean for the African? Was the African devoid of a
culture, or did the African have a culture which was considered inferior? If the African's
contributions are strength and courage, then it makes sense that the African worked in the
plantations. Her statement seems to suggest that Africans are most capable of doing
become adopted into mainstream music (see Austerlitz, 1997
; Pacini-Hemandez, 1995 ).
These comments equally apply for Brazil which makes similar assumptions about European, African and
native influences. It should be noted that there are Asians and people from the Middle East in the
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Physical work, as opposed to the Indians and Europeans. This reflec,s well the roles that
are distinguished in Dominican society. Afro-Dominicans are believed to be better
workers, whereas culture is seen as Euro-Dominican. In a society where economic
inequalities are sharp and where civil and political rights are not institutionalized for the
majority of the population, the civilized Euro-Dominicans will be assumed a priori to be
citizens, and the Afro-Dominicans are more likely to be recognized as workers, beggars
or thieves.
Brazil
The primary problem for members of Brazil’s Movimento Negro Unificado, like
that of those who aim to improve Afro-Dominican self-esteem, increase Afro-Dominican
participation in politics, and expand Afro-Dominican citizenship, is that of identity. The
bulk of Afro-Brazihans are unaware of the existence of the MNU, let alone active
participants in its political struggles. Yet, unlike the Dominican Republic, the MNU has
been able to garner enough support, primarily among small NGOs, often with foreign
financing, and academics, in order to serve as, at times, an efficient pressure group.
Therefore, in this section, not only will the questions of consciousm^ and community-
building be addressed, but so will the various political efforts of the MNU.
Chapter j examined the genesis of the MNU as well as the much lauded 1988
protest to the centennial celebration of the Golden Law. Since the mobilization in 1988
the MNU has had little success with national efforts at mass conscientization. Instead,
the \ arious groups and individuals associated with the MNU have continued their local
Dominican Republic and Brazil, but nationality only refers to three races (African, European and Indigene).
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activism, their rese,c, or their Aching. DespUe
.^^ of ^
potentially sympathetic people in Brazil, the MNU has no, been able to consolidate mass
been c,ted by numerous authors, mostly from the US. is the MNU's use of an essential,,
t> which does not appeal to the Afro-Brazilian masses (Hanehard. 1994; Hasenbalg
1998. Burdick. 1998), and may be inappropriate in Brazil altogether (Spanakos.
forthcoming a).
Tltere has been much ado about the “lack of racial consciousness” among Afro-
Brazilians (see Hanehard,
,994; Winant, 1994). Afro-Brazilian activists are quick to
consider the failure of many Afro-Brazilians to identify as such to be a classical case of
false consciousness. 16 This “false consciousness,” they argue, is seen as a result of the
ideological hegemony ot the idea of racial democracy. Florestan Fernandes, one of the
firs, to challenge the idea of racial democracy as a “myth,” argues that racial democracy
was used to "hide reality and to simplify things,” while also instilling a sense of “false
consciousness” among Afro-Brazilians (Fernandes, 1989: 14 ).
The idea of racial democracy has been unanimously criticized by Afro-Brazilian
activists, and Gilberto Freyre. the anthropologist most associated with the concept, has
become the object ofmuch scorn. Freyre’s historical analysis of Brazil found .ha,
colonial and independent Brazil was a place in which no racial identities were clear, and
racial tensions were almost completely absent (Freyre, 1 934 ). Bu, i, is less Freyre's
"False consciousness" is associated with certain strains of Marxism. It explains that workers do not
One Sample oflihsTsVCT 'T*
"leir COnsciollsness as Proletarians is no, sufficienlly develop,;
War Mnsiead^ of rl^Ivino hlh H 1 TT'S‘ pa" ies in Eur0Pe suPPorted t^ir nalion-slales in Wor
cond itions
lymg be md the,r real common Merest, improvement of workins and living
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portrait ofBrazilian society than the simplified version of“racial democracy” which
CCame "" “d ParCd °f nati°" aliSt»da employed by the authoritarian
governments of Brazil during modemizati„„ that the MNU attacks. During
,he Es,ado
NOVO{mi
-'5) a"d mili
- » ^-85), facia, democracy was turned
im0 na,,0na,,S, P0"' iCal Pr°Pa8anda
- WWch «*
-he
“Brazilian,” the pr„duc ,
o. prolonged cultural encounters, was something of a meta-race, one that surpassed its
predecessors. Thts interpretation eliminated the presence of the Portuguese, Indigenous
and African peoples in Brazil, and limited them only to being cultural influences in Brazil
(Motta Mauds; 1 997: 284)
. Wore, there were n0 longer cleavages^^^
raca, groups because al, Brazilians were successfully integrated into one cultural unit.
This notion of racial democracy, when employed by the nation-state. has been
used within developmental discourses which deny the salience of race as an indicator,
focusing instead on broad based social, economic, political and technological
development. But scholars and activists challenged the notion that Cass was more
important than race. Statistical data from the 1 970s, 1 980s and 1 990s (Hasenbalg and
Silva, 1 979, 1 992), shows that Afro-Brazi.ians, both pardos and pre'os, fare much worse
<han blancos in all salient categories. A national survey of average wages for brancos
and negros published in the newspaper O Globe indicates that on average, Euro-
Brazilians earn more than double what Afro-Brazilians earn (Oliveira, 1 998: 2
1 ). an
examination of the 1980 census, Lovell and Wood find that the life expectancy for Euro-
Brazilians is sewn years higher than that of Afro-Brazilians (Lovell and Wood, 1998:
9b). In other studies, while 1 0% of the broncos population completes university level
education, only 2.5% ofpardos and 1 .9% of negros do (Telles, I8 ,h of December, 1998).
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In a survey of students in undergraduate. master’s or doctoral programs in Rio de Janeiro
between the ages of 20 and 24. 85% were branco, 13.6%we«, and 0 .67% were
negr°, and 0.68% were amarelo (Silva, 1998:165). The racial breakdown of Rio shows
a very different set of numbers: 55.96% are branco
, 34.55% are panic, 9.36% are negro
,
and 0.12/o are amarelo or "undeclared” (Silva, 1998: 164).
Acm ists claim that the conditions of Afro-Brazilians are so clearly different from
Euro-Brazilians, even when class is held constant, that Afro-Brazilians can only be
denying the truth if they deny the existence of racism. The “myth of racial democracy,"
they argue, through its romantic and integrationist ideology gives Afro-Brazilians a
means to block out the reality which discriminates against them. MNU activists argue
that Brazil is “[t]he world’s most racist country! [It has] the most effective type of
racism’ 17 (lvanir dos Santos, 1 6'" of October, 1998). They argue that unlike South Africa
under Apartheid and. and the US South under Jim Crow Laws, such formal legal
distinctions never existed in Brazil because they were unnecessary'.
Scholars also criticized the idea that Brazilian society is characterized by a color
continuum. Carlos Hasenbalg writes ‘'the social perception of race according to a
continuum of shades of color, had led to a fragmentation of racial identities” (Hasenbalu:
1996: 165). This, in turn, limited opportunities for political activity solidarity among
Afro-Brazilians, thereby weakening their political agency and ability' to mobilize. It also
makes it difficult for MNU activists to mobilize lighter Afro-Brazilians who may not feel
as though they are in the same position as darker Afro-Brazilians. It is true that brancos
These sort of statements irritate more moderate people who are sympathetic to some of the goals of the
MNU, but are unwilling to support such hyperbolic situations. Two people very involved with Afro-
Brazilian activity both expressed their disagreement with the “most racist...” statement.
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are statistically in a more advantageous position in society than both par,os and pretos,
but pardos and pretos do no, often believe that they are discriminated against, and pardos
generally do no, believe that they are victims of the same type of prejudice as pretos.
The MNU's effort to construct a solid and positive identity is clearly done as a
means of attempting to construct solidarity, to open political space, and to increase the
political capital of a potential lobbying group. This explains the constant preoccupation of
members of the MNU with identification and the attempt to market a
-Black" identity.
In a recent seminar presented by the MNU and the Centro de Estudos Afro-Asidtieos
(Center for Afro-Asian Studies), Marcelo Paixao outlined four area*-
-.'here the MNU had
to improve in order to address “How to deal with social exclusion and democracy?" He
notes that the primary problem is identity. After that, education-the inclusion of more
pro-Africa information on curricula and better preparation about the issue of racism and
about Afro-Brazilian culture of teachers, increased economic potential—better wages as
well as more space for advancement, and visibility in the media of communication are
critical to the success of the MNU program (Paixao, 2 of December, 1998).
The lack of control of self-representation was among the principal messages that
various leaders among the MNU conveyed in interviews and at conferences' 8
. In an
effort to try to combat this, the MNU has created counter discourses, a form of "negro"
identity which is supposed to replace the image presented by mainstream media. To
counter dominant, marginalizing discourses which degrade the Afro-Brazilian, activists
attempted to create a positive discourse of negritude. The creation of such a counter-
1
8
Interview with Ivanir dos Santos, Jorge da Silva, and Conference on "Neoliberalism and the Question of
Race
,
coordinated by Beth Vieira, 2 nd of December, 1998, sponsored by the Movimento Negro Unificado
and the Centro de Estudos Afro-Asiaticos, Rio de Janeiro.
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discourse involved the creation of a set of heroes, ofwhich Zunrhi was given a prominent
Place, a revision^ approach to official history, the advocacy of candomble as an official
religion, and a continuation of activity from
integrate symbols of the “African diaspora.’'
the late 1970s and 1980s which attempted to
such as rap, reggae, braiding of hair, and
symbols of Black Power 19
.
These images have been promoted in the many newspapers and magazines that
now cater to an Afro-Brazilian middle-class, which although small is increasingly racially
"conscious.” Similarly, Afro-Brazilian artists often celebrate the cultural artifacts
consistent with the MNU’s counter-narrative and propaganda. Popular musicians are
increasingly adopting Afro-Brazilian identity, including groups like Cidade Negra (Black
City), Raca Brasil (Brazil Race), and Nacao Zumbi (Nation of Zumbi). Brazilian popular
musicians, such as the Racionais MCs. Rappa, and Carlinhos Brown, are also placing
more emphasis on "Negro" themes, including racism, than ever before.
The more unified and consistent the union of Afro-Brazilians, the more effectively
they could resist racist politics, could challenge police violence, and attempt to
promulgate laws that would benefit their community. Their discourse has been
essentiahst and radical. This facilitated the political coherency of the Movimento Negro
,
and also was able to valorize elements of Brazilian culture which were seen as having
roots in Afro-Brazilian culture, or where the contributions of Afro-Brazilians were
fundamental. Coherency also tacilitated localized victories on the federal level. The
Movimento Negro generated enough political pressure to force the inclusion of an article
Zumbi was a runaway slave who in the seventeenth centuiy formed a quilombo, or runaway-slave
community. MNU leaders celebrate the day of his death on the 20 th of November as the day of “National
Black Consciousness.'
-
Candomble is a synchretic religion with combines Afro-spiritist traditions with
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in
-he Brazilian Constitution (.988) which criminalized racism and pr„mulgation of
the Cao Law (1989). which provided for punishments to be assessed for those found
gU " lty °rraCiSm (FUnte° CUl,Ural Pa‘— *«= 39). „ also opened up significant
pohucal space for discourse on racism, and for self-affirmed
“negro” politicians. and ft
community. Ivanir dos Santos’s Center for Marginalized Peoples (CEAP), which is
ractsm can be considered a success. Another success is the social program of Olodum
which began as a Afro-Bahian musical troupe in the northeast and was very influential in
re-Africanizing carnaval in the Northeast, and lateral! of Brazil (see Yudice. 1999;
Oliveira. 10* of December, 1999). Another area of success has been applying pressure
on the Brazilian government to include race in the 1979 census.
More recently. President Cardoso admitted that Brazil was a racist country,
suggested that Brazil may need some sort of measure resembling affirmative actions, and
convened an academic conference on affirmative action. MNU activist Vera Lucia
eves that Cardoso s sympathy was due to MNU pressure which “forced" him to
recognize that Brazil was racist (Lucia. 2"“ of December. 1998).
However, despite these successes for the MNU and the campaign to improve the
conditions for Afro-Brazilians. the most significant success of the MNU. all of the local
NGOs alhed with it. as well as a reasonably committed artistic com,.,unity, is the use of
the tern, negro in common parlance. John Burdick reports “[u]ntil the 1 980s, negro was
generally avoided as a self-referential term.... Due to the influence of the Moximmo
Iberian Catholic Saint worship.
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but also to the growing presence in Brazilian markets of U.S. black popular
especially h.p-hop, negro increasingly became a term of self-affirmation and
(Burdick,
,998: 19, italics in original). Similarly, Livio Sansone notices that the
use of the term for self-identification has tncreased in Salvador, although he also
nonces that these people are better educated and more likely to be unemployed than those
"who define themselves with less ethnically assertive tenns of color, like pre.os, moreno.
Pard° and (SanSOne
' '" 7: 471 The^ must be given some responsibility
for the increasing use of the term negro. ,n his study of several poor Afro-Brazilian
neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro, John Burdick found that several people
“r“'r=:s ~
lerm, but had finally opted definitively to call themsdves^
‘ ‘*er-con,t„uum
recent past, during the last decade, due to the influence of the media the
ita 1 icshTori
j
gi rml
y*
' e"dS^ ' amily
’
°r re ' i8i°n (Burdick
' 1998:1
8
-
But the MNlTs success comes at a relatively high cost. As political scientist
°n* Ma,X UnteS ^he stre,lgths ot ibe MNU also suggest its limits. The movement
was and has remained relatively intellectual, elitist, and middle-class, with fewer than two
thousand active members. At its height in 1988. none of the MNU’s candidates for
public office were elected, suggesting a general view that it was too elitist and too
advanced to gain broad popularity” (Marx. 1 998: 258). Its coherence, its activists’
dogmatism and its essentialist vision of Afro-Brazilian identity alienate many Afro and
Euro-Brazilians who might otherwise be sympathetic to many ofthen causes. One
principal problem is that the MNU still is a very small and elitist group that has very little
grass-roots support. An example of this elitism and lack of connection with the masses.
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- when one academic,activist insisted t0 the author that so few
re,at ‘Ve PerCema8e ° f °r~S—— affiliated NGOs and other MNU activists
to non-activists was verv hioh Th;- • am
^ - J hls indicates the low level nfmrt,v *•°* participation among the
of Afro Brazilians. What is perhaps worse is that the march was seen as an
liberalism and President Cardoso. Considering the presence of many directors ofNGOs
which provide service to
“Afro-Brazilian" communities, one would think that such
organizations would set up tables promoting their services to the few people in
attendance, instead of simply grandstanding against neo-liberalism.
Another problem with the MNU is its essentia, ist identity. This has produced a
veo> stereotypical portrait of Afro-Brazilians. Michael Hanchard has been q ui,e critical
of the MNU s use of what he refers to as 'culturalisms.’ Several informants told
anthropologist John Burdick that the Afro-Brazilian drumming during the Inculturated
Mass20 bothered them, and they did no, feel any less negro because they did no, like the
drumming there (Burdick, 1998). However, the dogmatism ofMNU activists insists that
Afro-Brazilians like drumming because i, is African, that Afro-Brazilians are good
dancers, etc. The use of these stereotypes by a group attempting to combat racism and
increase the political agency of Afro-Brazilians is puzzling. Especi*..y since. 30 percent
deTd by Ff David“> Samos, which
elemenlal spirits, and praying to the deities ofAMca as well TzumbT’
'“h 5'™ drUmmi"g- 0fre™gS ,0
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Of Brazilians agreed totally, and another 1 3 percent agreed in part, with the statement.
"the only things a negro does well are music and sports" (Datafolha 1 995: 1 29). Even
more troubling is that while 28 percent of Broncos agreed completely, 31 and 32 percent
ofpardos and pretos agreed completely.
Another problem is that “Movimento Negro activists adopt stances that alienate
many people in their targeted constituency who otherwise are sympathetic to their goals"
(Burdick, 1998: 5). For example, the essentialist identity that is fundamental to the logic
of the MNU is considered radical, alien and unacceptable to many Afro-Brazilians.
Carlos Hasenbalg explains that one of the principal problems with the MNU is that it
employs a system of categorization that mimics that of the United States. He writes:
in this dichotomous system there are blacks and there are whites; there is
nothing in the middle... Racial prejudice in Brazil is not
... [H^ar, neat,
nor bipolar]... and the Movimento Negro
,
in their rhetoric, insist on this
polarity white-black, when the majority of people between white and
black think ot themselves neither as whites nor blacks (Hasenbale 1998-
28).
Ignoring the tact that "Brazil is multiracial, not biracial” (Skidmore, 1992: 1), MNU
activists adopt the idea ot hypodescent, which is alien to most Brazilians, especially Afro-
Brazilians who experience life quite differently. Although statistics clearly show that both
pardos and pretos tare worse than broncos, pardos fare consistently better than pretos. As
John Burdick notes the greatest difference is often "not between white and nonwhite
women, but between pardas and pretas” (Burdick, 1998: 45, italics added). However, for
the sake ot unity and coherency the MNU insists that all non-brancos are negro21
,
and
Similar to the US understanding of race.
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.his position alienates andpc,,^ who exper|ence^^ ^^^
as negro, and this is no, necessarily due to shame or false consciousness.
Many mulattos consciously reject the black-white scheme of the MNU, since i,
does no, accurately represent their social position. Additionally, as mentioned earlier,
there is a quite rational reason tor mulattos to accept the idea of color being perceived on
a continuum since i, gives them relative advantages in many areas. For the same reason,
they are often unlikely to believe that the discrimination and segregation that they face is
identical topmos. This is no, to say that they are unaware of their color, or unaware of
racism. In fact, panhs are statistically more likely to be aware of racism and are less
likely to identify as Brazilian than arepre'os (Datafolha,
,995; Schwarzmannn,
,8*
* of
December, 1 998). I lovvever, they also recognize that in many situations they are in a
more privileged position than are negros.
There is also the problem with Afro-Brazilians who are aw are of their skin color,
their ancestry and yet they identify as “Brazilian”(Carvalho, 26 ,h of August, 1 998). 22
MNU activists have a very hard time convincing these people that they should be
‘•conscious" and politically committed to their negro identity, when they do not have
similar consciousness to other facets of their identity, such as religion, class, sex. etc.
Jose Pereira de Oliveira Junior, the director of the Cultural Group of Afro-Reggae
(GCAR), has been reluctant to associate with the MNU. Additionally, he commits the sin
of identify ing as “meslico since he says that is what he is. In several interviews he
whn<^l
S
!,w
ar81nallZ
',
n8
,!
0
J
brT °r dark skinned nordestinos, particularly those who are not from Bahia.* '
"7 'i7re
,
llnked 10 ,he S<*a°' The
-racial- identity of Ihese people is more clearly aniculated
as being Indio, C aboclo, or Blanco and not negro.
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as
explained that he had aneestrv twSt
•
that WaS
»*">
'«*>, and then asked why he
should say he is negro.
OCAR began as a newspaper that focused especially on culm-, particularly
involved in Commu„ ity education protects and in AIDs prevention progrants. Following
the massacre in Vigario Geral in 1 qq-> m \ r>“ 1"J
- GCAR Set
“P a center and offered classes
•o
-he youth of the neighborhood. GCAR se, up a perforate troupe, consisting alntos,
0, "“d“***- *> PH-
””
“
Oli'.it. e.plaiiKd, i, „ t,M
self-esteem, especially through the use of Afro-Brazilian culture.
The cultural focus ofGCAR has avoided some of the excessive dogmatism of the
MNU and it has been very effective in bringing youth, some ofwhom are formerly drug
dealers, into community participation and activism. GCAR has been able to insert itself
into thefavela of Vigario Geral, contributing to a community, and improving the
condition for many residents in the process. One anecdote emphasizes this point. ,n one
interview, Ol.ve.ra recounted how earlier that day he was called down to Vigario Geral
because there was a run-in between police officers and some members ofGCAR33
. The
police invited Oliveira’s participation and encouraged his mediation. This is a
particularly positive sign given that only five years earlier off-duty police officers
murdered 21 sleeping residents because of the/m*/a ’s reluctance to give information
about a drug dealer who killed a police officer.
Interview with the author 10 th of December. 1998.
The results for Afro-Brazilian activism and Republican citizenship remain mixed
Self-esteem among Afro-Brazilians remains a serious prob.em. When shown
-white- and
"black" figures, primary school students overwhelmingly identified the
-black" figure as
stup.d (83%), -ugly" (85) and only 6% recognized the "black" figure as “wealthy”,
compared w„h 1 7%, 14% and 94% respectively for the "white figure” (Hanchard. 1994:
61 ). Similarly,
, n a study of racial prejudice in Brazil. 89% of Brazilians admitted that
racial prejudice exists in Brazil, bu, only 32% of Afro-Brazilians claimed to have been
.he victim of prejudice (Datafolha, 1 995). This awareness that racism exists is certainly a
positive sign, considering the extent to which the idea of 'racial democracy' is accepted.
1 lowever, the idea of racism is something that is rarely transformed into a personally
experienced event. Jorge da Silva reports that informants noticed racism only as “isolated
incidents, never practiced by them (in the case of broncos) and rarely personally
suffered... (in the case of negros)" (da Silva, 1998: 31).
Another problem is that even while the idea of racism exists in Brazil is being
affirmed, old stereotypes and discourses persist. The statistics cited earlier about sports
and music is exemplary of this. More poignantly Brazilian, and particularly Afro-
Brazihan, acceptance of “whitening” is also validated by the same study. When asked
whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement "A good Negro is a negro with a
branco soul" [Negro bom e negro de alma branca], 35% agreed completely, while 12%
agreed partially
. Interestingly enough, when broken down by racial category, the numbers
W'ere almost identical (35% and 1 1% for brancos, 36% and 1 1% for nmlalos. and 36%
and 12% for pretos, Datafolha, 1995: 129).
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Despite the increased number of self-affirmed “Black” politicians, the passage of
key legislation, and the growth ofNGOs that targe, some of the needs of Afro-Braziiians,
"it would be rash to argue that Afro-Brazilian protest has had any significant impact
either on the prevailing assimilatiomst ideology or social behavior" (Skidmore. 1992). Or
as former director of the Center for Afro-Asian Studies Carlos Hasenbalg explains, "the
Movinwnto Negro has far more influence on the government than on the masses"
(Hasenbalg, 12* August, 1998). Much of this is due to their adoption of a discourse
w hich is inaccessible to the mass of Afro-Brazilians who are aware of their skin color but
do not identify as “negro .”
Comparative Analysis
In comparing the experiences of activists and academics who are challenging
silence on the issue ot race in the Dominican Republic and Brazil, th.re are several issues
that stand out as groups and individuals attempt to broaden and deepen the rights of Afro-
Dommican and Afro-Brazilian citizens. The Movimento Negro Unificado is hardly a
sustained "movement" and even less a “unified” one at that. However, there is a
remarkable amount ot consensus among members over certain fundamental ideas, such as
hypodescent and the idea that Brazil is the most racist country in the world. The
Movimento Negro's presence, even if small and elitist, in all of Brazil’s major cities and
states allows tor national campaigns. The Movimento Negro also serves as the central
point of nexus for people concerned with racial issues, with activists and mobilizers,
NGO service providers, academics and artists. There is a central institution to filter anti-
raC ' St POl “'Cal aCtiVky
' WHiCh Can giW ^ actions of tod organizations
and which can pressure national govemntents, in addition to JUst local ones.
The Dominican Republtc has no such organized anti-racism campaign.
Combining the offices of ,den'idadwd MUDH£ there are^^^^^^
perhaps another ten volunteers and academics that are somewhat regularly associated
with the organizations. While the Dominican state without Balaguer a, its helm seems
more likely to be sympathetic to preventing racism, the likelihood of any anti-racism
legislation, or any policies aimed towards improving the conditions of Afro-Dominicans
S very low. As of yet, the government still has not recognized racial discrimination as
existing, and so there is no debate to promote policies to prevent it.
The area of identification remains perhaps the most difficult one in the promotion
OfAfro-Dominican and Afro-Brazilian citizenship. The situation in Brazil is only slightly
clearer, since Brazil does not have a significant population of foreign dark-skinned
nationals. Therefore, the victims of racism are always members of the same national
community of citizens. In other words, while in the Dominican Republic, Dominicans
seem willing to accept the poor treatment, and abuse, of Haitians and people who may be
perceived to be Haitian, all of the Afro-Brazilians who are mistreated are clearly Brazilian
citizens. This should contribute to a slightly more sympathetic audience for MNU claims,
as opposed to in the Dominican Republic. However, the MNU has consistently employed
veiy extreme and essentialist discourse. Afro-Brazilians (pardos and pretos) who do not
recognize their race, those who do not employ the term “negro" those who date/marry
lighter-skinned peoples, and those who straighten their hair are often considered traitors.
Additionally, the MNU discourse insists that non-brancos are negro- an assertion which
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maJOnty Wh° be"eVe °therWiSe
' Fina”^ MNU <***> for the Catholic Church and
hatred for Evangelicals cuts it off front ntany potential sympathetic Afro-Brazilians
(Burdick: 1998).
,n ,he D°miniCan RepUbliC
-
Mi
- M^doz... choice of the word
-Afro'- rather
than 'W is symbolic of an attempt to be inc.usive. Since Afro-Dominicans
constitute anywhere between 75-95 percent of the population, bu, negros are on,y 5 to ,5
percent of the population, Afro could include many more people. Additionally, the
choice of Afro highlights the role of culture and a heritage, which is shared by all
Dominicans, and which therefore could be used to forge useful ailiances with Euro-
Dominican elites. Bu, the issue of combating racism is complicated because many
Dominicans may be against racism, and ye, may exhibit very anti-Haitian views. This
complicates strategies towards building self-esteem and racial consciousness among
Afro Dominicans. The strategies employed by Idemidad and MlJItm' seem t0 be fair|y
successful, however the most difficult logistical problem is the scale of their campaigns.
As mentioned earlier, without national institutions through which they can link and
without large and reliable sources of funding, their efforts are limited to local activism.
The strategies employed by the MNU can be more thoroughly evaluated since i,
has existed for more than two decades. The MNU’s attempt to create Afro-Brazilian
heroes has had only limited success, in that awareness ofZumbi is not as high as activists
would like to think, given twenty years of organizing. Also, focusing on Zumbi has
fetish,zed the runaway slave and has led to a romanticization of Zumbi and of Palmares.
Surely, an organization of so many people, including scholars, could find and promote
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o.Her figures in Brazilian Hi*** for examp,
e, Afro-Brazilian activists and politica
,
figures such as Abdias do Nasciment„, Benedita da Si.va and Ivanir dos Sant0, A ,soMNU strategy has involved positive stereotypes of Aiio-BtazQian tdent,,, but
stereotypes nonethe.ess. Michael Hanehard ( , 994) has issued harsh crittctsnts over this
ssue, bu, perhaps nrore telling is the Afro-Braztlian Catholic mass of Fre, David
Raimundo dos Santos which brines "African " n •to culture into the Catholic Church (see
Burdick, 1998).
Afro-Dommican activists have not given much pursuit to the tdea of constructing
a mythology of their own heroes, or specifically Afro-Dominican historical accounts. The
closest character to Zuntbi in Dominican history is probably the runaway slave Lemba
whose statue is alongside Bartolomd de las Casas and Enriqu,„o in front of the Museum
of the Dominican Man. Despite the prominent placement of this statue. Lemba is less
well-known than Zuntbi. However, the idea of propagating heroes may be successful,
given the vast amount of coverage given to the assassination of the three Miraba! sister’s
w htch ,s used as a means of encouraging the participation of women in politics (Cassa. 25
June, 1998). Dominican histoty is certainly full of prominent Afro-Dominican figures.
even though no, all of them, such as the mulatto dictator Trujillo, contributed morally to
the Dominican nation and Afro-Dominican identity.
Where the MNU has been extraordinarily successful, especially considering its
lack of a significant mass of support, is in pressuring both dictatorial and democratic
governments at the elite levels of society. Although the Cao Law was mostly a revision
of the 1 95 1 Afonso Arinos Law and it has only rarely been used, the inclusion of a policy
against racism in the Constitution and the passage of an anti-racism law the following
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year is significant. Again. President Cardoso’s declaration that Brazil is a racist c
is a very significant step, as was his
of adopting a sort of affirmative
ountry
ln putting affirmative action, for however
claims that MNU protest forced Cardoso
opening of an academic convention on the possibility
e acton program. MNU pressure was no doubt involved
SO briefly, on the political agenda, but activist
to recognize racism in Brazil seem completely
exaggerated (Lucia. 1998), given that the sociologist was a member of the Sao Paulo
revistonis, school which attached the notion of racial democracy, and one of the reasons
the military government removed him from his
because of his investigations in the area of
On a more local level, GCAR has been immensely successful in raising self-
esteem as well as opportunities for members of one of Rio de Janeiro’sfavelas. It was
able to insert itself into a community, draw its leadership primarily from the community
post at the University of Sao Paulo was
race.
and to raise educational levels while raising sell-esteem in a very depressed area. As seen
in the incident cited earlier, GCAR can serve also as a means of mediation between the
State and the residents of Vigario Geral. However. GCAR has only
' sen in Vigario Geral
since 1 993 it is difficult to evaluate the long term effects of its program on the
community, or even on leadership within that community. CEAP’s anti-racism program
has been reasonably successful, although it has no. created the sort of community and
limited Republican ci.tzenship that GCAR has. These programs are small and targeted
whtch means that they tend to have a concentrated influence on a fairly small population.
This contributes to deepening citizenship for very narrow communities and as of yet.
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and Atro-Brazilian
these efforts remain primarily localized and their success is directly linked to the qualities
of the individual leaders and their ability to get fundin.. 24
Another significant difference between Afro-Dominican
activtty is historical. The historical roots of challenging racism in the Dominican
Republic are reasonably shallow, while an actual organization, the MNU, has existed in
the Brazil for more than two decades. Additionally, the MNU was ab,e to build on a
significant amount of Afro-Brazilian activity between the 1920s and 1940s, principally in
Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, a historical legacy of activity that really has no analogue in
can history. In addition to the number of years of existence, the MNU came into
existence at a period when civil society activism was challenging military4 governments,
and therefore earned a more receptive public audience.
In a review of the conditions for consciousness of racism, political identity ,
community formation and Republican citizenship for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-
Brazilians, i, seems as though all of these conditions are slightly more developed in Brazil
than in the Dominican Republic. This does not mean that the condition of Afro-
Dominicans will follow the path of that of Afro-Brazilians. However. Afro-Dominican
and Afro-Brazilian activists could certainly benefit from comparing notes on successful
and unsuccessful strategies.
In terms of consciousness of racism, a considerable number (52 percent) in the
Dominican Republic acknow ledged that there was racism in their countiy, while almost
all Brazilians (89 percent) recognized that there was racism in Brazil (Brea et al. 1995:
227; Datalolha. 1 995: 96). Both numbers are certainly impressive, given the many y ears
" 4
See chapter 6 on both accounts.
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al ofracsm. However, one continually hears both Dominicans and Brazilians
1" °f inf0™antS ^ ab0W—“
-r countries were racist, tha, does
hat racism is understood in terms of concrete acts. The reason for this is the
persistence of color carries a,ong a continuum and an absence of any large-scale
COlleCt
‘Ve^ rada
' identifiCati°"' *" «• ** Afro-Dominican and Afro-Brazi ,ia„
activists have had limited success, since the problem of political identification remains
•he most fundamental problem to collective identification, community budding and
political participation of a self-conscious
-group.”
While Identidad-s scheme of identification is far more inclusive and will ,end
'.self to more of a mass-base, the MNU’s strict dichotomies create verv dogmatic ye,
vety few, sympathizers and activists. Neither group has been altogether successful in
creating Afro-Dominican or Afro-Brazilian communities tha, are self-conscious. this
successful in contributing to an actual community, which already existed, and attempting
to raise self-esteem there.
Judgements of Republican citizenship could range from harsh to very generous.
Considering the amount of political agency and participation of Afro-Dominicans and
Afro-Brazil,ans, i, would be very easy to argue that positive freedoms are veiy limited.
No doubt discourses tha, demean Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, as well as other
discourses that deny the existence of racism, limit the possibility for active, participatory
and associative citizenship. Additionally, the fact that Afro-Dominicans and Afro-
Brazilians also occupy low ends of very rigid socio-economic hierarchies impede the
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citizenship.
However, given the generally anomic position of almost all citizens in the
Dominican Republic and Brazil, there is reason to be more optimistic about the relative
anomie of Afro-Dominieans and Afro-Brazilians. Most Dominicans and most Brazilians
do no, enjoy Republican citizenship. Few Dominicans and Brazilians are involved i„ any
associative activity in civil society, and still fewer aim to expand the public sphere. Party
identification is vety low among Afro-Dominicans, and i, is especially low among the
lower classes and among women (Duarte e, al. 1 994 ). Politics remains an arena which
few women enter, while civil society is over-representative of women. This is true also
for Brazil. Dominican and Brazilian societies are based on subtle ye, recognizable
hierarchies in
-which people know their place.” I, is a common expression among
Brazilian scholars of race tha,
-Brazil does no, have a racial problem, because the negro
knows his place.” The same could be said of other groups who occupy lower rungs of the
social hierarchy, such as migrants, labors, the poor, homeless, and. in many instances.
women. Republican citizenship for these people has, like tha, of Afro-Dominicans and
Afro-Brazilians. also been abridged by hierarchical societies and degrading stereotypes.
But public space has expanded in both countries over the last two decades and this
has increased the area in which Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians could organize.
Also, activists have access to a much more open media and to more competitive and free
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elecnons. Afro-Brazilians have formed groups within various B razllian parties (,g . pDT
PT. PFL), and both Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians have increased access to US
and Western European resources. assistance and support.
Conclusion
There are cenain elements of racial tdentification in the Dominican Republic and
Brazil that seem to be little affected by Afro mobilization in the las, twenty years. For
example, the idea that Negro is a term reserved for Haitians in the Dominican Republic,
or that "[t]0 be black in Brazil means to have no white ancestors"(Eakin. 1998: 1 15). I„
his study of the slave
-Saint Anastasia ” John Burdick found that most Afro-Brazilian
women who were devoted to Anastasia “often though, about her in nonracial terms”
(Burdick, 1 998: 1 54). They identified with her more as a symbol of suffering, than by her
race. Yet, as noted, both countries, particularly in the past two decades, have seen an
increasing use of the term negro. While it is still useu by a minority, it does suggest that
racial dynamics may be shifting towards one which is more assertive and public, more “a
m°da, as Carlos Hasenbalg puts it critically, of the United States.
Despite the persistence of the mass belief that racism does not exist or is fairly
mild in both countries, there are clubs in the Dominican Republic where Afro-
Dominicans cannot enter. Also, in both countries, children are regularly recognized by
their skin and hair color and are often treated better or worse as a result, even by members
of their own family2 -
. Employers in professions where workers will have to be seen still
This is true even of Euro-Dominicans and Euro-Brazilians with dark hair who report that they do not
receive the same attention as blonde and blue-eyed members of tneir family (Interviews, 1997
,
1998
, 1999 ).
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implicitly, if not explicitly, expect employees of
-‘good appearance" (buenaapm
hoc, aparencia ), which means the more European the better.
As Marshall Eak.n writes "racial prejudice seems to intensify as one moves up
the social scaIe"(Eakin,
,998: ,17). This is largely due to the fact that certain spaces
whether these be public, commercial or private, remain fairly closed to many Afro-
Domimcans and Afro-Brazil,ans. Access for lighter skinned Afro-Dominicans and Afro-
Brazilians with more European and Indigenous features is better, but still not entirely
open. As a result, consciousness of racial identify and racism seems strongest among the
most educated who are most capable of seeing that burners presented against them are no,
related to wealth or education.
As Livio Sansone has pointed out, a "new openness to cultural diversity has
developed [in Brazil] as a result of the increased acceptance of black cultural expressions
by government institutions and official culture, in addition, the leisure Indus,fy is more
interested in black culture than ever before” (Sansone. 1997: 467). This is also true of the
Dominican Republic with the growth ofmerengue-house music and the increased
consumption of rap music. Yet there are two things that should be noted regarding the
awareness of Afro culture. First, this often contributes to the propagation, rather than the
contestation, of stereotypes. Second, cultural awareness of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-
Brazilians contributes to socio-cultura! identify, and does not immediately translate into a
political identity. This is particularly salient because participation in politics, challenging
racism discourses, and trying to expand Republican citizenship is still very much limited
in both countries, although it seems slightly more developed in Brazil. However, as will
be argued in the next chapter, participation and Republican citizenship, for all groups, in
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~— *0 be seriously obstructed by authoritarian and„^ ^^
centered economic model and the growth of neo-liberal hegemony
Finally, there is a new generation of Afro-Brazil ian activists within and outside of
e wbo are actively Pusbing Afro-Bra.ilian political issues. Among tbe more
promment of these groups is a group of Sao Paulo based
have held conferences about affirmativt
Afro-Brazilian lawyers who
- e aC,‘°n which have attracted some of the world’s
m0S‘ Pr0mment SCh°'arS ”d
distributive justice and minority
rights (Telles, l/’ September,
,999). They also have been active in prosecuting racism
adVen,Sing
' THe i$SUe °f «*>" underscores the difference among
members over who should benefit from affirmative action, and whether a„
are rea"y U remai "S t0 ^ h0W ** " adjust affirmative action programs
' f a ‘ a"’ t0 C°nf0mi t0 BraZ’Ts Pa, 'em °f co,or classification. In the meanwhile, they are
actively advocating Afro-BraZi,ia„ rights and are addressing many issues that are relevan
to Afro-Brazilian citizenship.
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PART IV
sssas.'is
IN COMPARATIVE perspective
Hav,ng argued in part 3 that neither the Lihera, nor Repubiican notion of
citizenship seem vety we„ institutionalized for Afro-Dominictms and
^-Brazilians the^ 'UmS t0 Wh3t“ °f
*ese group, and what are the
consequences of such a conceptualization of citizenship for democratization. Chapter 6.
The Privatization of Citizenship in the Dominican Republic and Brazil," follows the
conceptual alternative ,o the Liberal and Republican models that was se, ou, in pan 1
-lying upon the construe,ion of nonns and values in Dominican anu Brazilian society
which have historically developed surrounding citizenship, race and the polilica, system.
examined in pan 2, and the ponraits of contemporary issues in race, citizenship and
democracy in the Dominican Republic and Brazil which appeared in pan 3.
The following chapter argues that there are three fundamental components within
the privatization of citizenship. The firs, is (hat power remain external to public
institutions, that the procedures of policy-making be denatured by extra-ins, itutional
atrangements, and that the public agency of the citizen is undefined by panicularistic
identities, such as membership within a clientele. The second point is that citizenship is
consistently understood in terms of a status which is distinctive and private rather than
universal and public. Being a citizen is vety intimately linked to class politics and ethnic
and racial stereotypes which privilege the wealthy and the light-skinned a, the expense of
the poor and the dark-skinned. The third is that, following neo-liberal economic dogma.
If
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> - State to mtegrate citizens politically, socially and economically.
CHAPTER 6
1 HL PRIVATIZATION OF CITI7FNSHIP
IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND BRAZIL
The most fundamental work on citizenship remains T.H. Marshals lectures on
"Citizenship and Soda, Cass" in which he states that
-citizenship is a status bestowed
those who are full members of a community. All who possess the sl.tus are equal with
on
respect to the rights and duties with which status is endowed” (Marshall, ,950: 28-9).
Marshall intended citizenship to be a means of expanding the privileges of the wealthy to
•he working Cass, thereby enfranchising the latter and ms,nationalizing a more
tial form of equality. Yet the construction of a citizenship which is a status
available to all and which provides equal rights and duties is continually frustrated,
especially in electoral regimes where clientelistic practices and hierarchical notions of
status prevail The lack of-full membership” for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians
is particularly exemplary of how the construction of citizenship is thwarted by such
particularistic behavior and such socio-economic disparities.
In chapters 2 and j, evidence was given to suggest that social and political
structures that prioritize privilege over equality have negatively effected the
institutionalization of democracy and democratic notions of citizenship, especially for
Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. In these chapters, the notions of racial identity
and citizenship were traced through different historical periods, noting shifts and
continuities. While the legal definition of the citizen expanded during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, the percentage of the population that could claim to have its exercise
ot citizenship consistently recognized remained small. The elites in Dominican and
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Brazilian
-'democracies'- resisted opening public space to the masses, and often sided with
authoritarian governments which limited mass entry into the political sphere. The
resistance to include popular sectors expressly limited the political agency of the Afro-
Dominican and Afro-Brazilian citizen, who often found democracy to be little better at
ensuring political and civil rights, as well as political agency and access, than other forms
of government.
Chapters 4 and 5 examined the extent to which Liberal and Republican citizenship
have been institutionalized, exist and/or are possible for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-
Brazilians. The Dominican and Brazilian governments, despite their many successes,
have been disappointing in terms of institutionalizing and protecting the rights of all of
their citizens, and government remains inaccessible to many as efforts at participation and
community building face serious challenges. This has practical and direct implications
tor the quality of citizenship of Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. In contemporary
Dominican politics, the State has implicitly, it not explicitly, supported the violation of
the civil and political rights of Afro-Dominicans. In a similar vein, the Brazilian national
government has had little success in ending police immunity and in preventing wide-scale
violations of civil rights of Afro-Brazilians, particularly in urban areas. Two of the most
significant challenges towards constructing a robust and deep form of democratic
citizenship lie within the limitations imposed by traditional societal beliefs and political
culture as well as by new dynamics of neo-liberal economic policies of structural
adjustment.
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The Priv atization of Citizenship
Despite approximately two decades of'
“democratizati
political cultures in the two
ion, the political arena and
countries still demonstrate significant strains of
authoritarianism. This does no, mean tha, Dominican and Brazilian political culture is
exclusively authoritarian, nor that Dominicans and Brazilians have no means of
understanding democracy, much less implementing it. I, also should no, be assumed that
what is understood as political culture is homogenous and static (Alvarez, Dagnino and
Escobar. 1999). However, there is a persistence of highly unequal relations, based on the
historic social and political exclusion of,he poor, uneducated, women, and non-
Europeans which was normalized within political culture. This political culture has
mixed with the restructuring of state and society relations tha, result from neo-liberal
plans and structural adjustment packages that often are emergency stabilization measures
designed to cu, (hyper) inflation. The privatization of state ow ned industries and the
decrease in state spending in social areas has forced citizens to seek assistance and charity
in the area of civil society (Yudice, 1 999: 49). This is especially significant considering
that the State has been the most central political and economic insfi>-:on jn Latin
America since at least World War II, if not the Great Depression (Cavarozzi. 1993:
Vellinga, 1998).
One should not lose sight of the many democratic advances in the last two
decades in both countries. The military' seems to be under civilian control more so than at
any other time in modem history 1
. Legislative bodies are becoming more active and
willing to challenge presidential prerogatives. The media, with probably fewer
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restrictions thnn ever lnvp> k-> i .
n able uncover many scandals, and elections are fairer
m0re mStitUti0nali2ed and
- democracy has no, trick,ed down inio every
'
^ pobucs, nor have democralic politics normalized
,o rhe extern tha, they are expected
and constdered the only legitimate form of politics3 n„, , u-P ^ • Due to a hterarchical understanding
of ,he ordering of society and a decrease in State involvement in tenats of social
integration, there is an undemocratic form of politics tha, underlies a„ of the praiseworthy
changes mentioned above. Examining how citizenship is conceived, maintained and
institutionalized within contemporary Latin American democracies allows the
investigator to see the gap between forma, electoral politics and informal, evetyday
marginalization.
I argue that citizenship in the Dominican Republic and Brazil, like other
contemporary Latin American democracies4
,
is neither based on Liberal guarantees of
individual civil and political rights 5 nor a Republican notion of robust participator
politics and community,6 but is rather a largely "private," rather than "public;' matter.
This chapter will examine the
“privatization" of citizenship by analyzing: first, the
privatization of power; second, the association of citizenship with socio-economic status;
and third, the privatization of services. Since the role of the citizen is a public one. 1
consider the persistence of political patterns tha, make public space less accessible to
ordinaiy citizens, such as clientelism. deleterious to the construction of democratic
2 5,°
me n°ta
L
ble excePtions include Peru. Colombia and Mexico
;
“nica" Repub,ic
'
,his is no sma " fea ‘-
See Spanakos (forthcoming b)
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--—es and not Public righ, As
a result, the wealthy are disproportionately trea,ed as citizens, and the poor and
often seek to compensate for their peripheral socio- (
conspicuous consumption. Finally, social
marginal
-economic position through
market reforms have cut down the
NGOs that provide direct
services and advocacy become privatized as
size of the state, ushering in a more prominent role for
services. While these organizations can often offer specialized
support services for marginal communities, they cannot offer a viable independent form
of cmzenship. They can only serv e to complement and make more robust the citizenship
offered by the State. Additionally, neo-liberalism shifts the entire perception of what
titutes a public good, which makes attempts towards state-based distribution
policies more difficult to implement.
Power as Private
Citizenship requires power to be a public good that is contestable and negotiable.
Citizenship is limited when power and decision-making are private and thus no, placed
within a domain that the public, particularly ordinaty citizens, can access. This has long
been the case in Lat,n America where public institutions and Liberalism have been
historically undermined by private individuals, dictators, caudillos/caudilhos, networks,
or clienteles (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1 998: 9). This tendency is worsened by the
diminishing public and political space resulting from the adoption of neo-liberal
Habennas,
230
neural adjustment programs that have further institutionalized the privatization of
Power. The privatization of economies, particular., ones where the State has ,ong played
of distributor of welfare, services and unemployment, shifts the notion of public
and private space which radically affects how state-society relations are conceived. Neo-
liberalism constructs the individual as the basic economtcunit** and in so doing i, strips
away bonds of solidarity across groups which weakens their bargatntng power relative to
the State. This is particularly relevant as the ontotheological acceptance of the
Washington Consensus’ vision of government efficiency cuts government programs
hich would typically sene as much needed aid. relief or patronage for the more
marginal sections of society.
As has often been noticed, the growth of the developmental state and the
bureaucracy in Latin America did not lead to the creation of neutral publie institutions
(Vellmga, 1998: 5; Smith. 1998). Instead, patrimonialism was employed to reinforce old
chentehstic networks, as well as to construct new ones. This allowed power to continue
to be a particular and private possession, as opposed to something universal and public.
As Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar write, the privatization of public political spaces
"normalizes favoritism, personalism, elientelism. and paternalism as regular political
practices." (Alvarez. Dagnino and Escobar, 1998: 9). These behavioral tendencies,
particularly elientelism, tend to reinforce existing socio-economic and political
7
See (O’Donnell, 1998).
* As opposed to the group as the economic unit which was critical to Latin American corporate and Import
substitution and Industrialization models (see Wiarda, 1981).
Coined by John Williamson, the “Washington Consensus” represents a consensus among money lenders
and financial experts in terms of improving economic performance and ending economic crisis (see his
Appendix” in Williamson, 1994).
inequalities, and to subvert legal notions of equality 10
. This i
areas where inequalities of power and
s particularly dangerous in
resources are so deep and trenchant (Vilas. 1997;
60).
Active and independent media in both countries have opened many political
spaces and exposed many scandals since the 1980s", most obviously the corruption
surrounding the Collor presidency in Brazil. It is not unimportant that the scandal
surrounding Collor led to his impeachment. Similarly, following the very problematic
and fraudulent presidential elections of 1994. Balaguer ended up serving a two, rather
than four, year term. This represents an improvement on eras in which politicians were
entirely unaccountable. However, many critical political decisions remain enshrouded in
non-mstitutional spaces, made in back rooms, far from the gaze of the citizenry. In fact,
although public contestation has increased during this most recent period of
democratization, many politically significant groups are aware that there are more
efficient arenas than those of the official political institutions. This is because power has
resisted institutionalization and democratization, and instead has crystallized in the
private form of clientelism. Or as Lechner writes ‘“really existing politics’ occurs on the
margins of democratic institutions, which often are limited to ratifying extra-institutional
accords” (Lechner, 1998: 32).
Clientelism is certainly not a political practice that is limited to Latin America.
However, while the practice of clientelism enforces the idea that certain individuals are
patrons and others clients, the difference in pow'er between the two groups depends on
10
See chapter 4.
This does not mean that the Latin American media is capable of holding the government and others
accountable, but it does at least report scandals.
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economic cautions, societal values and political cultuce. While p„, lticians may trade
favors in other countries, what has been institutionalized in Latin America is the
wealth, and the vast majority who do not.
n a region
.ike Latin America, which has the world's most perverse distribution
ol income within its countries, the unequal relations between patron and client weaken
the possibility of democratic citizenship. And ye, it should be stated that democratic
government has rarely been able to improve the socio-economic cc:t Ltions of poor and
marginalized individuals, while local patrons have historically provided for their clients
through jobs and the distribution of food and resources. These sons of relations hardly
contribute to the normalization of democratic behavior or even economic mobility,
however, they explain quite a hi, about the politics of survival, political inactivity and the
quiescence ot Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians.
In a survey conducted in 1994 in the Dominican Republic, 88.5% of those
interviewed agreed with the statement "when someone arrives at an important post s/he
should help those who supported him/her" (Duarte et ah 1996 :63). Support for this
claim was even higher in cities other than Santo Domingo and in rural areas (89.9% and
93.6% respectively, Duarte et al, 1 996: 1 87). The expectations for pay-offs are quite
normalized since fundamental to Balaguer's power has been his ability to personally
distribute patronage. Jonathan Hartlyn notes the very high budget for the office of the
presidency, through which most of the government’s construction projects are funded
(Hartlyn, 1998: 194-5). Although current President Leonel Fernandez seems to be less
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amount of budgetary discretion (Hartlyn, 1998: 272-3).
Elections in rural Brazil are often characterized by. and satirized because of. the
amount of free food available to populations who ordmarily are quite poorly fed, Monev
food and alcohol have traditionally been given to voters at election time in order to gamer
«he support of the most poor. Political supporters-,
„ a„ of Brazil-believe that a direct
Imk Sh0U 'd eX ' St betWeen
'he am°Um °fw0rk that the >'
"volunteer" for a candidate, and
•he position they receive after the election (Interviews,
,998). Although these traditions
seem ,0 have waned to some extent, the lack of discipline of Brazilian political parties
and the lack of majority parties forces political coalitions, such as the one President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso's PSDB has made with the PEL and other mostly
conservative parties. Coali,ion-building in Brazil, as one might expect, is less influenced
by ideology or party program than by the amount and the type of patronage offered to
members of the coalition. Again, when parties are weak and incapable of providing
members and constituents with necessaty relief and protection, patronage emerges as a
very rational survival strategy.
Access to the political sphere is very much effected by patron client relations, not
legal status or birth-place, the traditional prerequisites for citizenship. This seems
antithetical to both the Liberal and Republican notions of citizenship outlined in chapter
I • Liberalism requires that individuals be universally and unequivocally recognized as
legally equal, but the recognition of an individual's legal equality is undermined by the
primacy of private over legal status. Republican citizenship is also limited by tile
existence of an abridged public space that is not the only, nor even the most important.
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.he citizen the Republican notions of participation, responsibility and membership.
Citizenship becomes private because the public and political are perceived to be the
distant realms of a foreign and isolated group, to which the citizen is an
-alien.” Power is
Private, as are the negotiations and exercises of it. This excludes the immense majority
from observation and vigilance, to say nothing of participation.
Th,s is especially true for Afro-Dommicans and Afro-Brazilians who are alienated
from the public sphere due to their weak political agency and the inability/unwillingness
of the State to ensure and guarantee their civil and political rights. For a variety of
reasons
12
, Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians rarely identify their lack of citizenship
with their
-race,” and rarer still do they politically organize in an attempt ,o improve their
status. Not only does this limit the possibility of any participatory oriented citizenship,
bu, i, also impedes the ability of groups to monitor and prevent violations of civil and
political rights within Afro-Dominican and Afro-Brazilian communities. Afro-
Dommicans and Afro-Brazilians are agents in an order where they know that power is
profoundly concentrated in distant places, where individuals are far lighter than them, and
that they are subject to the arbitrariness of police officers who invade the neighborhoods
in which they live.
The privatization of power means that not only is it embedded in private networks
accessible only through patronage and exchange of favors, goods, and support, but also
that decision-making is external to the public realm. Thus, not only are political
institutions (often) alienated from power and politics, but so are citizens. In the survey
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cited earlier
-
49
-2%fcd
never or a,most never have
of influencing those in power (Duarte et al, 1996: 64). Whether this is the ease
“ nW Wha‘ i$ imPOr,am i$ D°n" beli
- * majority of their compatriots
ave hm.ted or no means of affecting politics, indicating that there is a sense tha, the
majority of citizens are incapable of asserting their legal rights and
responsibilities 13
.
civic
In the same survey, 56 ? net-rem nfn
. • percent ot Dominicans said that political parties only
served in order to participate in elections, and 42 5 percent said that •vpoliticians only
defend their own interests (Duarte e, al, 1996: 70). A survey in Brazil in ,990 found tha,
52% ° f BraZi "anS beHeVed ,hat "POliti- 1
°»'y divide people,” 61% agreed that
-Parties only defend interests of politicians,” and 60% believed that
-political parties only
make political participation more difficult” (Dagnino. 1998: 56). This is a serious
indictment not only of political parties, generally considered the most effective means of
democratically integrating common people (Peeler, 1998: 1 65; Mainwaring and Scully,
of the political class as a whole. That the impeachment of Collor did not lead
to a cleaner form of politics, but simply to more efficient forms of corruption, suggests
See chapter 5.
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•ha. such skepticism is well-earned. it a,so brings hack the idea of patronage serving the
poor, where parties can, or do. not.
Economic reform programs and privatization schemes have been deemed
necessaty by many of Brazil's governments during democratization, as well as by
Fernandez's government in the Domintcan Republic- Cuts in budgets and privatizing of
state-owned companies have received continual protest, from both the Left and Right.
since these policies cu, the traditional cash-cow of the state. As the amount of money
available for patronage decreases, the need and competition for patronage becomes
steeper. This is not only true of patrons but especially also of clients who suffer
increasing rates of unemployment, downsizing and devaluation.
Citizenship is won through public struggles and politics. This does not mean that
matters which society may consider ‘-private” or “social.” as opposed to “public” and
"political,” such as racial discrimination, are not rights for which citizens can petition.
The reverse is true. Citizens may choose to articulate issues that are considered private,
but they will only be able to guarantee these issues, through political means, when they
are publicly debated. Laws against racial discrimination are negotiated and written in the
public sphere. But this is only when the public sphere is porous enough tc allow
advocates for such issues the opportunity to articulate their view points, to access state
funds, to petition legislators, and to effect policy. When political spaces are less
accessible and/or cut off to large sections of the population, the construction and
institutionalization of democratic citizenship faces very difficult odds.
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Citizenship as status
Citizenship is also
“privatized” when the distinction of being
. citizen, of
mentbership in a community of rights-bearing individuals, is based on private resources,
no, on birth or naturalization. Roberto da Matta has written that in Brazil there are no
citizens, only sub-citizens and super-citizens (1991); this is certainly true of the
Dominican Republic as well. There is little notion of rights being app,
.cable to a
universal categoty. since the idea of rights, and citizenship in general, is linked to the idea
of status. Unlike the contractarian notion of ‘'bearers of equal status” upon which
modem, Western democracies are based, the status implied by “citizenship” in the two
countries has always been a means of exclusion, rather than inclusion. The citizen is
recognized by his or her distinctive, rather than common, features. This understanding of
the “status” of citizen is considered with the increased possibilities for consumption
offered by liberalization of markets and import restrictions, increased differences between
classes resultant from neo-liberal austerity programs, and the fatalist belief that
citizenship cannot be achieved through political activity and education. The political
becomes cut off, and
~[t]he role of the consumer... replaces the notion of the citizen”
(Lechner, 1998: 33).
The association of wealth with citizenship, and therefore with rights and
privileges, is a dangerous one in a region where relative and absolute poverty affect so
large a percent of the population. Again, it is not just a matter of GDP per capita, but
how GDP is distributed across society. Additionally, it is worsened with the
Balaguer remained very consistently against neo-liberalism, and generally maintained a
nationalist position, which was used to grease the political machine he depended on
See chapter 4.
very economic
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dehumanization ofmeters ofmargina, groups, particularly the i„digent
. Those vvho
bear marks of social s.a.us are considered super-citizens, whi.e ,he majority of poor.
semi-literate, racially and ethnically marginalized are classified as sub-citizens. The
privileged are often capable of stretching, or simply ignoring, the Law, w hile the marginal
are harshly subjected to its excesses.
This has significant policy implications, particularly in terms of citizen support for
democracy. Considering events in several other countries in Latin America, such as the
aUIOS°'Pe (Se 'f'C0UP) m Peru in Fui™°ri and Chavez’s failed coup in 1992 and his
electoral success in 1998, it seems that suppon for institutional Liberal democracy is not
always high among the demos, that is the popular sectors. While neither a coup nor an
amogolpe seem likely in either the Dominican Republic or Brazil, low levels of popular
support and interest in democracy can engender an environment in
. Licit government can
become increasingly inaccessible, unaccountable and alien.
The negotiation of the identity of the citizen in Latin America shifts from a legal
arena to a socio-economic one. As Carlos Vilas writes, “...when socioeconomic and
cultural disparities reach extreme levels, effective inequality tends to dominate legal
equality' (Vilas, 1997:60). Brazil represents perhaps the clearest example of citizenship
being undermined by social status. Some Brazilians have referred to their country as
Belinda to demonstrate the vast cleavages between two Brazils, one rich and one poor,
the former resembling Belgium, the latter. India. The Brazilian economy is among the
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fifteen largest in the world, yet it has one nf th»ot the most uneven distributions of wealth in the
world (Page, 1995: 6 16).
'"3
’ BraZiHanS Wh° W
- <*» and entrepreneurs responded
overwhelmingly that they believed they were treated as citizens (63 and 75%,
respectively). Of the members of social movements" and unions who were ashed the
same question, 90% answered that they were not (Dagnino, i998: 55). When ashed to
demonstrate
“evidence” of their citizenship,
“middle-class interviewees and entrepreneurs
stressed activities such as
-paying taxes,' 'having a profession.’
-voting,' or even
-having
money'--
( Dagnino, ,998: 55). This is no, surprising given that
-cittzenship has generaily
been attached to the privileges of a class, rather than the rights of a nation.
Although similar statistics for the Dominican Republic are no, available,
interviews with Dominicans implied a cenain hesitance about using the word "citizen" for
non-elites, and i, is clear from Dominican responses to the Demos survey, that citizenship
has a very powerful class element. When Dominicans were ashed whether there existed
equaiity before law for poor and rich people, 75.3 percent of the popuiation responded
•ha, such equality did no, exist (Duarte e, al, 1996: 54). Widespread lach of faith in the
judiciaty system and the police support the claim that citizen rights are percetved as
particular, rather than universal rights.
Citizenship, then, becomes a sort of commodity which is possessed in relative
amounts. The greater the capacity to buy or spend that an individual has. the greater the
For an idea of income disparities in other countries in the region the poorest 40% “°et S 70/ tu„-
rs.
% in wnezuda
- in
predomlnandy m^ddlfand“^LT"6"“ ° f 1 "ei8hborho°ds a"d“*
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status, and the higher the libel.hood
,ha, his or her rights wiii be respected. The wealthy
have asserted this citizenship through the creation of spaces that can be controiied and
monitored privately. Large shopping mails, private security- forces and guarded
condominiums are becoming incorporated into Latin American culture. Brazil offers
clear examples of the construction of private spaces for citizens
citizen is dependent upon their financial status (Caldeira, 1992.
whose recognition qua
337). The shopping mall
is an open space where through the medium of consumption, rather than politics, citizens
can be distinguished and recognized. Similarly, private security forces and closed off
condom,mums guarantee safe spaces in which the w ealthy are. literally, walled off from
.he poor. The poor may enter only to provide services. As James Holston and Teresa
Caldeira explain:
The walls not only separate residences but also create semi-public
enclaves, such as shopping centers and office complexes, where entrances
can be controlled and social homogeneity guaranteed. In thR cense, fear of
crime legitimates practices of segregation and considerably chances the
character of public space. In a society where people from different social
groups tend not to interact or even encounter each other in public, the
chances for propagation of democratic practices are surely diminished
(Caldeira and Holston, 1998: 279).
Although segregation through malls, closed off condominiums and gated
residential communities has a much longer history in Brazil, the Dominican Republic is
quickly catching up, especially during this period of rapid economic growth and growing
economic disparities. Private schools, new' condominiums with round the clock guards,
and the very common figure of private security guards (with old rifles on their laps) are
the most recent demarcations where the poor and Afro-Dominicans can pass as workers,
and not residents or consumers. Of course, as with most aspects of *r?ial and color
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identification in the two countries, this point is not absolute Afro D '
n ...
' l °- ominicans and Afro-
Brazilians can go to some exclusivee malls to shop, and often
However, their presence as consumers i
consume at high levels.
their relative purchasing
elitist mall staff18
.
IS considered somewhat alien and marginal, and
power abridges the way in which they are treated by a relatively
lism
The linkage between citizenship and consumption recalls the union of the cultural
significance of citizenship with con,empora0 economic restructuring. Neo-libemlU
individual to consume through the liberalization of markets and the elimination of impon
restrictions. Neo-liberals stress economic rights, such as the protection of property, and
freedom from tariffs, high taxes, etc, while cutting down the State and its capacity to
ensure civil rights and to redistribute wealth'’. This reinforces the idea tha, citizenship is
an economic value, one that can be attained through materia, success and/or consumption.
This markelization of citizenship has serious repercussions for democracy because as
Barber writes
“Markets are simply no, designed to do the things democratic politics or
free civil societies do. Markets give us private, not public, modes of discourse: we pay as
consumers in currencies of consumption to producers of material goods, but w e cannot
use this currency when we deal with one another as citizens or neighbors about the social
consequences of our private market choices” (Barber. 1998: 72). Also,
‘‘[consumers
P the divishe rhetoric of me
,
citizens invent the common language of ‘we’”
(Barber, 1998: 73). The neo-liberalization of Latin America, particularly with its
especially'
£
'Ills' d
" EUr°Pe ’ La ‘ in American ****** a"d *>«.
can usually expecttolle^nored'or^pokeirdmvlno at'eveiniw
^ cuslomers
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reformulation of state-society relations, contributes to an increase in individualism and
reinforces the idea of the primacy of private transactions, as already noted, but without
the notion of rights central to traditional Liberalism.
The privatization of citizenship entails an increased sense of individualism mixed
with the idea of citizenship as a form of status. When combined with globalization and
the increase in access to television, and other media, the poor and marginal begin to view
citizenship as a status that can be achieved only through economic means. Following the
belief that justices, police and citizens treat the wealthy better than the poor (Duarte et al
1 996: 79; Carvalho. 1 997: 49), and the opportunities afforded the liberalization of
markets (i.e. decline in prices of imports), many marginal citizens feel vindicated in
viewing citizenship in tenns of consumption. The capacity to consume among these
classes is relatively low vis-a-vis the wealthy and this encourages specific spending
strategies. Livio Sansone has noticed that frustrations at not being treated as full citizens
“increases the importance of conspicuous consumption and leisure ni me pursuit of status.
dignity, and civil rights" among Afro-Brazilians (Sansone, 1997: 473). From participant
observ ation in Rio de Janeiro and Santo Domingo, I noticed that status, especially among
poor Afro-Brazilians and Afro-Dominicans, was evidenced by the ability to consume,
particularly in terms of short-term, conspicuous consumption and the importance of
material status symbols. Interestingly enough. Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, and
particularly youths in both countries but especially in Brazil, are consuming culture which
is "Black,"
JI
from, or very heavily influenced by the US and the English speaking
>o
A^ough, to be fair, neither state was particularly efficient at either of these tasks.
These cultural products are generally limited to music, dance and fashion, although movies are able to
present other products as well.
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Caribbean. Sansone sees this consumption of having the double end of both a wish to
"belong" and to "protest." However, i, is important point out that Afro-Dominicans
and Afro-Brazilians are not alone in consuming reggae and other "Black" cultural
products. These cultural products are so ingrained into mainstream popular culture that
Euro-Dominicans and Euro-Brazilians consume them along similar nnes. Also the
consumption of "Black" cultural products has yet to develop a similarly widespread
notion of “Negro" political identity and activity.
The poor and marginal, as has been suggested already, are not recognized as full
citizens, because they are often the antithesis of a citizen. This is precisely because
citizenship is defined by its distinction from the poor and marginal, and from societal
discourses of poverty and criminality. This understanding of citizenship strips the poor
and marginal of their citizenship, as well as their very humanity. In an investigation of
Dominican bateys (plantations), Sam Martinez found that batey laborers are not slaves,
however, their economic condition undermines Liberal notions of freedom. He writes
that civil and political rights in such conditions lose the relevance attached to them in
wealthy democracies since “the third world poor tend to see starvation, disease, and
economic uncertainty as a more immediate threat to human dignity than being deprived of
the right to vote freely or organize politically with neighbors and coworkers” (Martinez,
1996: 17).
In both countries, the State cannot, or will not, guarantee individual rights to many
sections of the population. Paulo Sergio Pinheiro writes “Brazil, like other Latin
American countries, is a society based on exclusion—a democracy without citizenship"
(Pinheiro, 1996: 18). The dehumanization of the Haitian and Haitian-Dominicans clearly
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seen in
The quest for citizenship in the Dominican Republic and Braz.l is elusive since
•he citizen is the exception rather than the rule, and an individual becomes a citizen based
upon his or her value in a “relational universe” (da Mat, a. . 987). Such an understand-,
excludes large portions of the population, most obviously the poor, illiterate, and ethnic
and racial others." In such environments, where citizenship is the possession of the very
few, those who live in poverty become dehumanized, pathologized. and. often,
demonized (Vilas.
, 997). Dominican discourse dehumanizes Haitians and those of
darker skin who live in urban slums and rural backlands. jus, as Brazilian discourse does
•he same for street children, Afro-Brazilians, and fare,ados, who are often the victims of
police and vigilantes.
Democracy has no, been able to eliminate many of these prejudices. In fact, in
many cases prejudice worsened during democratization and economic liberalization21
.
This may be most clear in relation between criminality and law enforcement. During
field research in Santo Domingo and Rio de Janeiro many informants, across socio-
economic classes, revealed a sort of nostalgia for the order and social peace of prior
dictatorships. In the Dominican Republic, it was common to hear people say that during
the dictatorship of Trujillo “one could still walk the streets at night.” One informant in
B raZ| l deC 'ared ,ha‘ He WaS ‘'against de“y" because i, did no, work, and because i,
-O' hard to realize who ‘the people’ are who make ‘walking the streets impossible.’ and
who the people are who ‘should not have rights.’ Teresa Caldeira noted similar
comments on the par, of middle and lower middle class residents in Sao Paulo who
watched their neighborhoods become increasingly dangerous. She notes that while there
was a high degree of support for human rights during the dictatorsh.p when victims were
middle class dissenters, there was a vety significant backlash against human rights during
democratization because human rights were understood as “rights for criminals”
(Caldeira, 1992).
Police violence is supported by the fact that the police target the groups that
society considers to have a ‘proclivity,’ a priori, towards crime, and by support among
the poor majority for order and security, even if it comes at the cost of limiting liberties.
Police are able to consistently violate the rights of the poorJavelado and Afro-Brazil ian
populations because Brazilian society does not see members of these croups as citizens22
Similarly, Haitians and dark-skinned Dominicans have no recourse to protection from
regular police shake-downs and from periodic deportations. They also are not seen as
"lull members," in the sense of Marshall's definition of citizenship, and they are often
presented as not civilized, and somewhat less human. Powerful discourses of inferiority
which link racial identity and poverty to ghettos and shanties, to migrants, to
unemployment, to violence and crime, to drug use, to homeless children, etc, strip them
21
Ph' s * s also due to the increase in drug trafficking.
This could probably be compared to “racial profiling” in the United States.
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Of the,r citizenship23
. These discourses of inferiority construe, a marginal space which
se. es to dehumanize the people w ho occupy it. This margin, space is not only
discursive but also geographic and physical as slums and.fa* are real spaces which are
, solated from the wealth of the city, although they are subject to the abuses of its police.
>n a sense, repression of the poor and marginal protects what society sees as the
citizen, while violating the rights of wha, i, considers non-citizens. Even though both
groups are legally citizens, citizenship is understood in opposition to poverty and
marginalia. The citizen is recognized through his or her position of privilege and the
possess,on of rights, freedoms, and customs that are unavailable to the great majority of
the population. Political activists, social movements and Non-Governmental
Organizations often challenge this notion of citizenship by attempting to broaden the
societal understanding of who citizen is to comespond better with the legal notion. Bu,
such contestation requires high levels of participation, a highly politically "conscious-
group that can be mobilized at any time, as well as leaders and institutions with stable
resources. The conditions of relative and absolute poverty make this very difficult, since
contesting politics means missing work, losing time that could be spent looking for a job.
upsetting an employer or local bosses, and spending some of the few free hours that a
person might have away from his or her family, friends and church. In a sense, most
Dominicans and Brazilians, especially Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians, cannot
aitord to maintain high levels of civic activism, which is necessary to demand and
consolidate the rights and access necessary for constructing citizenship.
the UntedW* r 1 f C0Untry' n0r eve" t0 La,,n America ' since it seems to also happen in
frennene ,h 7-7 Asia ' "C ' The difTere"« is probably the extern 10 which and thequ cy with which the rights of people considered “marginal" can be violated
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The Privatization of Sen ices
Fmally, citizenship is 'private' in the sense that the Dominican and Brazilian
economies and governments have been, to some extent, privatized in the last decade or
•wo* Neo-liberal hegemony and efforts to cu, deficits, combat inflation and to
restructure the economy have lead to much "leaner” states in Latin America. Even the
Dominican Republic and Brazil, which have privatized to a much lesser extent than some
of the other countries in the region (e.g. Peru. Chile, Argentina), have accepted the
rationalization of national economies encouraged by the Washington consensus,
although political support for such measures is still weak, particularly because i, will
weaken politicians capacity to give out patronage.
Citizenship, traditionally conceived, revolves around the State, whether one
considers Marshall's notion of expanding political, civil and social rights within a welfare
state or the Latin American
“state-centered matrix” that Cavarozzi ( 1993 ) discusses. The
State is generally assumed to have certain responsibilities and for providing "public
goods,” which has included employment, utilities, welfare, health care, and the protection
of citizens rights, in varying degrees across the countries in the region. Large public-
sector deficits and hyper-inflation have been countered by massive privatizations and
downsizing which have changed the notion of public goods, as well as government
responsibilities to its citizens. Public goods become narrowly defined, and the
maintenance of stable markets, low inflation, as well as political and social order become
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dominant. The change in public goods is especially salient for marginalized populations
who become the victims of the narrowing concept of public goods because it places
primacy on order, which translates into police violation of the rights of marginalized
peoples2 ’. They further suffer since, even though some were already disproportionately in
the informal sector, many benefited from the State's underfunded social projects and from
the existence of large State-owned companies.
Social services are among the first areas to be sacrificed in t0 appease
international creditors and investors (Vellinga, 1998: 11). Services that have traditionally
been provided by the federal government have been decentralized to either local
governments and/or specific Non-Governmental Organizations.26 Decentralization and
priv atization of services have allowed NGOs to make in-roads in many “marginal”
communities through the promotion of direct services, offering advocacy, education, job
training, etc...
27
The growth ofNGOs has allowed for some simple and limited efforts at
advocacy for rights and community building. Said articulation of rights and participation
This is less the case in the Dominican Republic, as Balaguer almost invariably refused to give in to
international pressures to cut the state or to privatize. Fernandez, on the other hand, has been able to
implement small-scale liberalization of the economy.
‘ See chapter 4 for empirical examples.
The NGOs that 1 am referring to here are non-governmental organizations that serve as “service
providers. These NGOs are local organizations which tend to focus on one or more target populations, and
provide direct and immediate services. I will not be looking at non-partisan research institutes and think
tanks, which constitute a good number of the NGOs in Latin America, unless they supplement their
academic endeavors and policy research with programs that provide some sort of service (e.g. free legal
counsel, protection for battered spouses, etc). Additionally, 1 will not be referring to transgovemmental
groups and organizations, such as the Socialist International, which have representatives in Latin America,
unless, again, they provide direct services for communities. The focus on this section is how- NGOs are
competing for the spaces that open up when the State reduces its social spending. As a result, the most
pressing concerns is how NGOs which offer services to marginal populations can meet the immediate needs
of those people, and whether this may affect the way in which democratic citizenship is conceived,
particularly whether NGOs can replace the State in some instances or serve as a sort of intermediary'
between state and society
Obviously, NGOs differ in their size, scope, and the services they provide. 1 w ill speak generally here,
and then mention a few more specific examples.
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n politics can be seen as a type of citizenship, except for the fact .ha, these forms of
citizenship are not tied to the state, and a common collective community, but to
particular, targeted groups (Dagnino, 1994, 1998; Spanakos, forthcoming b). These
groups can serve as effective pressure groups on specific issues, although their role in
more general political decision-making and policy-making is far more limited.
Additionally, these groups lack reliable and consistent resources, as well as the ability to
coordinate their activities with larger entities (Walzer. 1 999; 63-4)
As many scholars have noted, neo-liberal economic structural adjustment
programs tend to disproportionately affect the poor and the lower middle classes
(Vellinga, 1998: 13; Vilas, 1996; Centeno, 1994). While these groups clearly benefit
from measures that halt inflation (Bolona, 1993: 191), shock packages tend to increase
unemployment, decrease the amount of services provided by the State and force many
people into the informal sector. Menno Vellinga explains that “[t]he withdrawal by the
state from areas that provide services to meet basic needs has resulted in a policy void
that has been filled increasingly by grass-roots movements and the activities of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs;)” (Vellinga, 1998: 17). NGOs, in general, have
been seen as constituting a crucial element in cushioning the shocks of economic
packages, and offering a legitimate space for public contestation of rights.
The non-governmental organization service providers examined here play two
crucial roles: one is the provision ot services to a community; the other is acting as
“experts” in the development of policies' on domestic and international levels. The first
role is the one that most directly affects marginalized communities. As opposed to the
sweeping nature of social movements, NGOs tend to be organizations which concentrate
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on a specific issue or set of issues within a specific community. The efficiency ofNGOs
to target
-problem areas" in “at risk" communities has won NGOs foreign financing,
which previously was reserved as block grants to state administrators for aid.
In chapter 5, both MUDHE in the Dominican Republic and GCAR in Brazil were
briefly discussed. The former is an NGO, consisting primarily of women of Haitian
ancestry or Afro-Dominicans, which provides direct services, in the form of medical
attention, medicine, pre-school, and a somewhat subsidized market, to plantation
workers. The latter provides lessons, ranging from history to theatre to musical
instruction to capoeira, to residents of one ofthcfavelas in Rio de Janeiro, with the aim
ol using this education, melded with an appreciation for Afro-Brazilian culture, as a
means of increasing self-esteem. Plantation workers in the Dominican Republic and
favelados in Brazil may be considered among the most disadvantaged populations in their
respective countries, and, unsurprisingly, these populations are far darker than the more
privileged sections of society.
While social projects of earlier decades were dependent upon the direct assistance
of the State, if they were not already part of a State initiative, NGOs are separated from
the State. By not being directly linked to the state, NGOs have a certain amount of
autonomy and are able to challenge institutional prejudices and arrangements. In fact,
funding tor NGOs is often contingent upon explicit non-partisan positions. For example,
the women ot Identidad in the Dominican Republic may spend quite a bit of time
educating people about racism in the Dominican Republic, despite official discourses
which deny the existence of racism, because they are not dependent on the State for
funding. Similarly, CEAP can serve as an advocacy group and bring the State, police
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officers, and other officials to trial for crimes of racism, because it is independent of the
any partisan or political
State. As a result, CEAP. like Idemidad, does not have to follow
line. In most countries in Latin America NGO workers tend to be non-partisan, although
generally of the Left. Brazil is a notable exception since there are quite significant ties
between the Worker's Party (PT) and the Workers Democratic Party (PDT) and various
NGOs and social activists (Lehman and Bebbington, 1998: 262).
Autonomy has a price. Since NGOs do not receive set funding from the State,
they are dependent upon fickle international financing. This means that the NGOs that
will receive funding will be the ones that are best organized, most capable of writing
grant applications, and of tapping international resources. This severely limits truly
popular groups who do not have the assistance of university professors or technocrats
(Alvarez, 1998: 306). Additionally, although this subject is rarely discussed, since NGOs
are olten wholly dependent upon international financing, they often reflect the policy
preferences of their financiers’ 8
. NGOs also often change their funding sources, their
foci, disappear or are swallowed up into a larger group.
Even still, NGOs can play a vital role in providing community to otherwise
marginal individuals, and also as serving as “watch-dogs” of government abuses. Sam
Martinez notes that [t] he tasks ol investigating abuses and putting r,rpssure on
governments to guarantee human rights has instead fallen largely to Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs), of which the best known perhaps are Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch (Martinez, 1996: 18). The local investigative units of the above
organizations have played a critical role in documenting the systematic abuse of Haitians
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neo-
in the Dominican Republic. Human Ri«h,s Watch nroH„w atc p duces regular reports of the
situation of human rights in Brazil moi
’ d makeS C0nsis,ent
"ffons to pressure the Brazil
government to make what i, considers necessary reforms.
NGOs play a second role in Latin America that is also very important as neo-
liberalism and traditional cultural practices meld in a transition period. The logic of
....
liberalism has been interpreted as the smaller and more decentralized the State, in terms
of service provision, the better. Bu, as social services, education, health, among other
things, are decentralized and left up to local non-govemmenta, service providers, the
comes increasingly dependent upon the expertise of NGOs. NGO workers are
regularly invited to attend and speak a, conferences on local issues for domestic and
international organizations. For example, Latin American women's groups were very
much involved in the planning of national and regional presentations at the Women’s
conference in Beijing in 1 995 (Lehman and Bebbington. 1 998). Alvarez reports that the
Brazilian government, eager to make its mark a, the Beijing conference, wen, so far as to
recruit feminists to prepare a statement on behalfof the government (Alvarez, 1998).
NGOs which targe, women were very much involved in the drafting and lobbying for the
law against “interfamily" v iolence in the Dominican Republic (Interviews. 1997).
•Femocrats” have also served as technical advisors for government policies relating to
women, such as the creation of women-only police stations in Brazil, Nicaragua and Peru
(Alvarez, 1998, 302). NGOs also are legitimate representatives in the eyes of the
international community. This provides alternative voices to that of the State, and issues
28
This is a polemic that I will not address here.
Of women’s rights, ethnic and racial politics as wellht cs. well as environmental politics (Lehman
and Bebbington, 1998: 255).
But as hinted already there are severe limitations upon NGOs. There is something
certainly appealing about local people organizing their community and protecting
themselves from state-sponsored violence, bu, fragmented and under-funded
organizations cannot replace the State as the pohtica, center of citizenship. They can. a,
times, provide better and more efficient legal advocacy for individual members of
specific communities, however, they are still dependent upon the legal apparatus of the
State. This is a critical limitation since NGO success depends upon i, being non-partisan,
and for all intents and purposes, non-political. Citizenship is explicitly political and
public, and this limits NGO service providers to the role of charity, direct service
provision and offering a social supplement to citizenship. Additionally, because the
specificity of their issue orientation, lack of funding, and lack of technological resources.
NGOs are often incapable of forming long-standing coalitions that will be capable of
producing solidarity and large-scale change29 The result of focusing on a target area
means blurring the rest of the picture. When one organization provides information on
sexually transmitted diseases for prostitutes, another offers services to battered women,
and a third offers seminars on self-esteem for racial and ethnic "others," all in three
different neighborhoods, it is difficult to build politically significant coalitions. While the
leaders of these NGOs may be sympathetic to the others' causes, mobilization is another
29
T65 " [pu]0l *tical struggle under neoliberalism increasingly works from the basis of a civilsociety paradigm, which prioritizes difference over the kind of imaginary- totalizing that national identitypresumed in the era of the popular" (Yudice, 1999: 54).
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issue. Additionally, NGOs often contpete with each other for activists, funding and
consumers, and such competition can be fierce and saturated with ideological venom.
There is an additional caveat that need be issued about NGOs. Even if the
emotive bonds between the marginal individual and the NGO are stronger than those
between the marginal individual and the State, this does no, represent wha, is generally
considered to be citizenship. There is something that resembles a fragmentary form of,
perhaps post-modern, citizenship3" NGOs can provide community, distribute services,
contribute to the self-esteem and the construction of identity of an individual ora group.
^ hey can provide a level of governance, when they are funded, on a very local level. But
since NGO service providers target the most marginal communities
->ere is the possibility
that strengthening the bonds between marginals and NGOs, without increased
government involvement, may serve to further alienate a group which is already so
alienated from politics.
NGOs are generally funded through the charity of Western European and US
organizations and/or social science grant experiments of (primarily) US institutes. These
^nds are distributed through local activists who are often very anti-State. Considering
the NGO community privileges transnational and/or local levels of politics, and attempts
to bvpass or replace the State, it is possible that the communities that are being
constructed, successfully or not, by NGOs may only worsen the alienation of the
marginal. There is a need to insure the distribution of direct services to populations
without means, however, there is a danger of creating communities that are even more
isolated than they are now. II marginal communities become increasingly insular, they
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simultaneously become increasingly excluded from state politics, which may consider
NGO activity sufficient in these areas. This may lead to a further pull out by the State.
and for even less support for human, civil and political tights of the residents in poor and
marginal areas.
The privatization of services has serious consequences for citizenship. One of the
most significant elements of a state-centered form of citizenship has been its provision of
services, however minimal, particularly to the poor and destitute. This has been a means
of enfranchising the '•marginal.” Marshall considered the development of social rights
and entitlements to be the most fundamental challenge for citizenship in the twentieth
century, since only by lessening the socio-economic differences and privileges between
people could citizenship become an effective and democratic means of integrating people
into a society. Ironically, democratization in this most recent wave, has allowed for the
articulation of many political and civil rights, and yet has been concurrent with the most
significant period of austerity and downsizing.
Conclusion
These comments on the "privatization in citizenship" are very preliminary,
although they do tend to emphasize contemporary trends and obstacles in the forms and
formation of a democratic form of citizenship in the Dominican Rer „blic and in Brazil,
particularly for Afro-Dominicans and Afro-Brazilians. A “privatized” citizenship is not
considered preferable to either the Liberal and Republican notions of citizenship outlined
In Spanakos (1999b) I make a theoretical defense of this form of citizenship. However. I am not as sure
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in chapter 1
. However, unlike the Liberal and Republican notions of citizenship, a
"pen alized" form of citizenship seems to be nonnalized into Dominican and Brazilian
political culture, behavior and expectations. This is despite two decades of
democratization and three decades of liberalization in the Dominican Republic and two
decades of liberalization and one and a half decades of democratization in Brazil.
The Dominican Republic and Brazil are not alone in being democracies that have
severe limitations on their ability to institutionalize democratic politics and norms. Other
countries in the region share a similar difficulty in integrating a horizontal type of
democratic government with hierarchical economies and societies (O'Donnell. 1998).
particularly with the considerable constraints placed upon Latin American governments
by debt, currency instability and economic crisis. Although every gm'-mment in Latin
America, with the possible exception of Cuba, approaches the millenium with some form
of democratic government, an accomplishment which should not be ignored, democratic
government does not mean democratic governance, nor even democratic politics.
Impressive as the transitions to democracy have been, democratic politics have not been
normalized into political culture, and this has been particularly worsened by the wreckage
wrought by structural adjustment programs and austerity plans.
The persistence oi non-democratic practices and values within political culture
and society, particularly the hierarchization of value of its citizens, coupled with the
“logic" of free market capitalism has contributed to the construction of a “privatized”
form ot citizenship across Latin America. The majority ol the populations of Latin
America remain fairly alienated from the politics, and the political arena is especially
it is as empirically possible and satisfying as 1 claim in this article I wrote two years ago.
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inaccessible for them. This may explain the high popttiar support for Hugo Chav
coup attempt
,992, his e.ec,ion in ,998. and 90% of his supporters being elected to the
Venezuelan constituent assembly in ,999. „ a, so explains the high levels of support for
Alberto Fujimori's autogo,Pe in Peru in ,992. and the decline of the traditional pohtica,
party system in Peru.
Patrons who dominate clientelistic networks have taken advantage of the fact that
power is not institutionalized, and that new democratic institutions still lack power and
legitimacy and have vety limited resources. One need only consider the traditional form
in which politicos (politicians) from the Mexican ruling party (PR1, coerce members of
ttnions to vote along party-lines to see that the inequality of power across society has
allowed clientelism to subvert democratic institutions. Or, recognizing a different power
source, drug dealers and insurgents in Peru, Colombia and El Salvador have been able to
exact demands upon citizens which citizens have been reasonably powerless to resist.
Again, citizenship is denied to the majority of the populations as citizenship is
conceived of as a matter of privilege that distinguishes members of the same society,
rather than a shared status that unites the members of that society. High-ranking
Guatemalan political officials are still predominantly ofEuropean and not native descent.
1 he members of the loretgn service in the Dominican Republic, Brazil, as well as in the
Central American and Andean countries hardly provide a more representative sample of
the ethnic and racial diversity of their countries. Rather, it reinforces the class
associations with power and with European features, creating only marginal spaces for
“others.”
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Finally, many of the sen ices traditionally offered by government to its citizens are
now being offered to members of targeted sub-groups by non-state actors. The presence
ofNGO service providers has been critical for the sunival of many peoples,
neighborhoods and communities, but it has come at a high cost, and that is the large-scale
withdrawal of the state from social policies. Peru has recently shifted their labor law
which allows businesses to pay wages below the minimum wage to people under the age
of 24. These young workers are considered “apprentices” and are not covered by social
security. Chile s social security system has been completely privatized. While
governments are cutting spending and pulling out of safety net programs, US foreign aid
has dropped precipitously, leaving the role of support services in many instances to
poorly funded and very parochial Non-Governmental Organizations.
Implications for Democratization
As democratization studies continue to move away from the study of transitions
and towards issues of consolidation and “deepening” (Peceny, 1999; Diamond. Hartlvn.
Linz, 1999) informal behavior and socio-economic and political hierarchies become more
important. Electoral government predominates in Latin America and many other areas in
the world where the historical roots of democracy are relatively shallow. While electoral
government in itsell is not democracy, it does allow for citizens to express preferences, to
have some role in choosing the leaders and organizations that are supposed to represent
their interests, and it provides a modicum of legitimacy and accountability (at least in
theory). This represents a substantive difference from the dictatorial regimes that have
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s.ained the history of Latin America, and other areas of the world, regimes under which
political participation has been quelled, voices of,
parties and institutions have serv ed
opposition annihilated, and political
as mere institutional ornaments.
The hegemony of electoral government in Latin America remains secure even
given the presence of autocratic politicians such as Alberto Fujimori in Peru. Hugo
Chavez in Venezuela and Hugo Banzer in Bolivia, to name a few. v„, electora|
government must be considered to be no more than fonnal democracy, and sometimes it
15 qU"C 3 bU ‘eSS ,ha" that ' Formal institutions that intend to enfranchise citizens, to
make the government accessible to its citizens, and to allow for public accountability, are
in place in all countries in Latin America, including Cuba. But formal democracy is
undermined by informal behavior, such as clientelism, by economic conditions, and by
social and political hierarchies which challenge the most fundamental claims of
democracy.
Democracy makes three very significant claims: that citizens are equal,
particularly before the law; that citizens are free; and that government institutions and
agents are held accountable to each other and to the public at large (see O'Donnell. 1998)
These three claims are problematic in Latin America, and this study has presented
evidence to that effect. People in Latin America are not equal before the Law (in the
courts or in the eyes of the police) or in terms of access to resources and opportunities.
Massive disparities in income distribution engender divisions between those who pursue
luxury versus those who pursue subsistence. Middle classes, in such situations, often
identify with the privilege of the upper class rather than with the survival techniques of
the poor. People are also not free to act, participate in politics, nor to create institutions
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that will be able «o articulate and defend their interests. Again, the poor and marginal
sections are often dependent on outside organizations and foreign funded NGOs-whose
efficacy and legitimacy varies greatly, to represent their interests. Additionally, there is
the presence of local bosses, politicians and patrons who are able to press their clients
into supporting certain politicians, spending time at particular rallies, avoiding discussion
w ith other parties or politicians, etc. Political options, access and participation takes
Place among the narrow constraints laid out by patrons, necessity ,.d economic hardship.
This is a significant impingement on the political freedom of the individual.
Finally, while there seems to be some improvement in some countries in the area
of public accountability, this remains a serious problem for Latin American democracies
(O'Donnell, 1 998), Government institutions and branches are often not accountable to
each other, despite constitutional and institutional structures which are supposed to foster
this. Similarly, institutions and individuals remain fairly unaccountable to the public.
The inability of the judiciary to check executive and legislative power, on a macro-level.
and seems unwilling or incapable of defending citizens whose rights have been violated
by the police or the military, on a micro-level, is a major problem for public
accountability (Becker, 1999).
The hierarchical arrangement of society, the restrictions on freedom and the lack
ot a legitimate and efficient form of accountability create conditions for a “privatized”
form of citizenship that, in turn, reinforces those three conditions. The increase in
income disparities and in unemployment which have followed neo-liberal economic
programs, and the existence of a culture which allows democratic politics to coexist with
very hierarchical conceptions of citizenship further “consolidates” and “deepens" the
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privatization of citizenship. During the authoritarian governments of the 1960s and
1 970s, civil society and social movements used the private sphere to force abenura
(opening) in the public sphere and, eventually, democratization. During democratization,
the public sphere has opened in some senses, however, the public sphere has been
reconquered by clienteles, patronage, and political parties who have significantly
marginalized the
-'new actors" of the 1960s and 1970s. Economic and social issues are
exemplary of this as the 1990s witnessed the insulation of economic policy-makers and
actors (technocrats) from public space, and social issues became increasingly the concern
of actors (NGOs, civil society) who operated within the private sphere. The civic
engagement of the 1970s and 1980s has been largely defused despite the presence of
polyarchic governments, and this applies to general struggles of citizenship, as well as for
the more specific group claims of identity politics (e.g. racial, ethnic, gender, labor
groups).
The institutionalization of a privatized form of citizenship explains why there has
been neither a reverse wave/ return to overtly authoritarian government (Huntington.
1991), nor a substantial improvement in the quality' of democracy in many countries
(Diamond. 1996). There may be an altogether different pattern of relations that
approximates neither formal models of democracy nor authoritarian government. In fact,
adjectives such as “democratic” and “authoritarian" may not be helpful enough in naming
the dynamics that underlie third wave democracies, such as the “privatization of
citizenship.”
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There is a virtual ntorass in between democracy and authoritarian government
which democratization theory often does not address^ Examining the forma, and
informal contexts of citizenship, particularly as understood for “marginal” groups, allows
a valuable light to be shed on the quality of democracy. Such an examination neither
exaggerates the ' democratic” aspects nor ignores
“authoritarian” elements of new
“democracies.” It also unearths the forms of political exchange, the system of social and
political values, and the dynamics ofpower which impose restrictions on democracy and
democratization.
3
1
O'Donnell’s “Delegative Democracy” is a notable exception (O'Donnell, 1994).
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